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The Global Airline Company: APent of Market Power or Competition? 
Paz Estrella TOLENTINO and Sabine REIM’ 
INTRODUCTION 
The paper seeks to analyse the global airline company in the post-US deregulation 
era in the context of the two different views of the firm in economic theory. On the one 
hand, a firm can be regarded as an entity that takes decisions over prices and output and 
maximises profits from increasing its degree of market power. Alternatively, the firm can 
be seen as a device for innovation and knowledge creation and earns higher profits from 
creating ‘new combinations’ in production (Schumpeter 191 1) or new areas of social or 
productive capability (Cantwell 2001). While the distinction between the pursuit of 
profits and profit maximisation may have little significance in a sufficiently stable and 
repetitive decision context, the significance of the distinction increases under conditions 
of substantial, non-repetitive change (Nelson and Winter 1982). The first view is 
associated with the neo-classical analysis of the firm, while the second view is linked 
with classical, Schumpeterian and evolutionary analyses of the firm. 
The main argument of the paper embodying both theoretical and empirical 
elements is developed in several stages. The disparate perspectives in the theoretical 
economics of the firm are analysed in the subsequent section, followed by their 
application to the behaviour and competitive position of profitable firms in the global 
airline industry. The main findings of the study are contained in the concluding section. 
Paz Estrella Tolentino is at the School of Management and Organizational Psychology, Birkbeck 
College, University of London. Sabine Reim is at the Department of Economics, University of Reading. 
Please address all correspondence regarding this paper to Sabine Reim at s.reim@reading.ac.uk. 
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THE THEORETICAL ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM 
Penrose (1959) envisaged two different functions of the firm.’ Within the 
standard neo-classical theory of price and production, a firm is an entity that takes 
decisions over prices and allocation of resources in order to maximise current profits, 
defined as the difference between the firm’s revenues and costs. The firm is assumed to 
produce a single, perfectly divisible, standardised product for which the cost of 
production is known with certainty. The firm is also assumed to have certain knowledge 
of the volume of output that can be sold at each price. These ‘demand conditions’ depend 
on the behaviour of consumers, and the structure of the industry in which the firm 
operates (Davies 1992). Since there is no independent scope for managerial strategy, the 
firm is a “black box” responding uniformly to changes in demand conditions. Thus, for 
example, higher levels of industrial concentration provide firms in an industry a greater 
degree of market power, as reflected in higher  profit^.^ Competition is defined in terms of 
market structure in steady-state equilibrium. The firm in the neo-classical economic 
model of the firm is thus a theoretical construct that results from the logic of optimal 
pricing and input combination. 
Within the classical, Schumpeterian and evolutionary approaches, the firm is an 
active agent of innovation and knowledge creation that leads to “new combinations” in 
production (Schumpeter 191 1) or new areas of social or productive capability (Cantwell 
2001) in search of higher future profits through appropriate capital accumulation. This 
view of the firm accommodates the dynamic concepts of competition and 
entrepreneurship whose logical plausibility is enhanced by empirical relevance and 
For further discussion of the two different functions of the firm, see Tolentino (2000,2001a). 
This is a view associated with the structure-conduct-performance paradigm in conventional or 
2 
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neo-classical industrial organisation theory. 
3 
operational meaning in terms of contemporary business behaviour (Tolentino 2001 b). 
Competition is defined in terms of the mobility of resources within and between firms, 
and the balance of forces between firms in an industry (Cantwell 1991). Rather than 
having an atomistic firm in the neo-classical mould, the alternative view of the firm is 
that of an institution with strategies and tactics, i.e. an active agent whose behaviour can 
cause changes in levels of industrial concentration. The advocates of this viewpoint have 
long challenged the ‘market power’ view of the firm that see the industrial concentration- 
profitability relationship as evidence of the ability of powerful firms in highly 
concentrated industries to acquire and use monopoly power. Those in the ‘competitive’ 
view advocate instead that industrial concentration may be the result of a desirable 
competitive process. 
THE THEORETICAL ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM IN RELATION TO THE 
GLOBAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
To analyse the theoretical economics of the firm within the context of the global 
airline industry in the post-US deregulation era requires a short historical account of the 
evolution of regulation in the commercial air transport sector. This provides the necessary 
backdrop to the analysis of the impact of the regulatory changes associated with 
privatisation, competition and liberalisatiod deregulation throughout much of the world’s 
airline industry in the past two decades on the behaviour and competitive position of 
profitable airline companies. 
4 
The History of Regulation in the Commercial Air Transport Sector 
Following the Paris Agreement in 1919 that recognised the sovereignty of 
governments over the air space above their territories (Shaw 1990, Jonsson 1987), the 
political economy of the commercial air transport sector has developed within, and 
become inseparable from, national interests and political advantage from its earliest 
beginnings. The strategic role of commercial air transport in trade, mail services, foreign 
political linkages and domestic employment in the 1920s and 1930s helped to define the 
role of airlines as guardians of national interests and the embodiment of national identity. 
This factor in combination with the perceived adverse consequences of unregulated 
competition in the industry on the public interest (Richmond 1971) explain both the high 
degree of government protection in the industry, most prominently expressed in the form 
of strict regulation, and the conduct of the airline business without regard for economic 
implications or commercial significance (Graham 1 995).4 
As commercial air transport became an important means of mass travel in the 
1960s rather than merely a strategic tool for the attainment of national goals, airlines 
assumed a more complex role apart from simply being guardians of national interests and 
the embodiment of national identity. As well-being of consumers also assumed 
importance in domestic and international air transport markets, the costs and benefits of 
rigid regulation were re-assessed, and led to an array of research on the advantages of 
freer competition in air transport (Straszheim 1969). In particular, the absence or limits to 
The adverse impact of unregulated competition in the sector on the public interest was first evident 
in the United States where the initially unconstrained domestic market for aviation trade virtually collapsed 
following chaotic economic conditions, little security and low safety margins (Doganis 1991). This led to 
the introduction of strict regulatory controls of the domestic market in 1938. 
4 
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freedom over prices, and the powerful market entry barriers prescribed by existing 
international regulations were regarded to have an adverse effect on consumer   elf are.^ 
While the accumulating business misfortunes of international scheduled airlines in 
the early 1970s were addressed initially by increased government protection of home- 
based air carriers, a more widespread attitude in favour of more relaxed regulation was 
eventually reached, initiated in particular with the liberalisation of the domestic market of 
the United States with the US Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.6 Indeed, the Act was a 
watershed in the regulatory frameworks of the international air services industry in 
support of free-market aviation economics associated with regulatory freedom and 
privatisation of firms and infrastructure (Graham 1995). The Act in combination with 
adverse business conditions in the industry set in motion the slow but decisive push 
towards greater liberalisation of international air services world-wide, as other countries 
increasingly moved away from their protectionist, bi-national stance and subscribed to 
greater liberalisation from around 1976.’ This was first evident in attempts of government 
agencies to relax restrictions on fares and route authorities (Graham 1995), the virtual 
deregulation of freight charters in 1976 (Doganis 1991), and the European Commission 
draft proposal for a single and liberal European air transport market in 1975 (Lyle 1995). 
The arguments in favour of deregulation and liberalisation in aviation were driven initially by 
concerns for consumer welfare rather than considerations of economic efficiency. The shift in favour of 
enhancing the economic efficiency of companies stemmed from the substantial business misfortunes 
brought about by the aviation crisis of the 1970s. 
In the late 1970s, the United States began to shift its aviation policy dramatically towards 
deregulation and minimisation of regulatory controls concerning trade in domestic and international air 
services. Such shift was precipitated not so much on account of the need to protect consumer interests as by 
the need to protect American air carriers in light of the rapid decline of their ‘once-dominant’ market share 
vis-&vis foreign competitors. Consequently, the United States under the Carter Administration advocated a 
new policy of ‘consumerism’, greater competition, and the need to increase American airlines’ share of 
international air transport. This led to the pronounced intention of other governments to assess the position 
of their own airlines (Doganis 199 1). 
The trend towards liberalisation outside the United States was a long and drawn-out process from 
conception to implementation owing to continuing fears of American domination of the industry world- 
wide. 
5 
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The International Air Transport Negotiations statement was issued in 1978, which was 
based commonly on the philosophy to protect consumer interests as a means to further 
national self-interests. * The statement represented the first step in the regulatory 
liberalisation of the industry at the world level, and defined a new global order for the 
airline industry (National Commission 1993). 
An important development since was the wave of successful renegotiations of 
bilateral Air Services Agreements (ASAs) in favour of the United States. The strategy of 
American airlines to penetrate the North American and Pacific markets with ‘beach-head’ 
agreements served to force more recalcitrant governments into renegotiating their 
bilateral agreements with the United States (Graham 1995), particularly between 1978 
and 1985 (Doganis 1991). The successful renegotiations of bilateral ASAs in favour of 
the United States and the strengthening position of American mega air carriers through 
increasing firm and network size - resulting from mergers and hubbing activity at the 
national level following US domestic deregulation - served to increase greatly the 
competitiveness of American air carriers relative to foreign air carriers that remained 
constrained by tight domestic and international regulation. The enhanced competitiveness 
of American air carriers in their large domestic market that remains essentially heavily 
protected against access to foreign competitors compared unfavourably with the smaller 
size of the domestic market in many countries, and the narrower scope for available 
domestic on-line feed to sustain the operations of international flag carriers in these 
US President Jimmy Carter signed the International Air Transport Negotiations statement on 21 8 
August 1978 (Presidential Documents 1978). 
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countries. Consequently, the extent of global competition in the industry has remained 
limited, particularly for international air services (Graham 1 995).9 
In response, various means were employed by airlines based in other countries to 
enhance their own international competitiveness in the long term. This included the 
movement towards privatisation of international airlines often in the wider context of 
domestic market deregulation, the liberalisation of non-U.S. bilateral treaties, and in some 
cases the formation of strategic alliances, mergers, and cross-ownership arrangements 
(Pustay 1992). 
The trend towards fiee-market aviation economics associated with regulatory 
freedom and privatisation of firms and infrastructure had the objective of altering the 
competitive environment in which firms compete, and introducing structural changes in 
the global airline industry. These important changes can be examined in the alternative 
theoretical contexts of 'contestable markets' approach to the analysis of competition or 
the classical, Austrian and Schumpeterian analysis of competition.'' Thus, depending on 
the theoretical framework adopted, the move towards free-market aviation economics is 
consistent with either the increasing contestability of airline markets or the enhanced 
process of competition in the industry. 
The large size of the country, the large number of existing firms in the air transport market, the 
size of the customer base, etc. has meant that the United States is better able than most countries to promote 
domestic deregulation with little fear of hurting consumer welfare. It is not so obvious that complete 
reliance on the free market will work so well in other nations' domestic airline markets (Pustay 1992). 
l o  Although the 'contestable markets' approach to the analysis of competition bears some elements 
in common with the classical, Austrian and Schumpeterian analyses of competition in the view that an 
industry may perform in a socially acceptable way even if it contains a very small number of firms, the 
origins of the 'contestable markets' approach lie much closer to the mainstream theory of industrial 
organisation, and rests upon more conventional analytical foundations (Davies 1992). 
9 
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The ‘Contestable Markets’ Approach to the Analysis of Competition in the 
Global Airlines Industry and Increased Market Power of Incumbent Firms 
The analysis of the impact of deregulation of the global airline industry within a 
‘contestable markets’ approach to competition requires an examination of the changes in 
the competitive environment in the industry. As the route (or city pair) defines the basic 
unit of analysis of the competitive environment in the industry,’’ the market structure of 
the industry depends in part on the number of airlines operating between a certain city 
pair (which in some cases may be served by more than one airport).12 The number of 
carriers was determined by governments prior to deregulation, but in markets that are no 
longer subject to large scale government regulation such as the United States since 1978, 
the number of carriers has since been determined both by the size of the market (i.e. the 
size of passenger traffic on a route in a certain period in relation to viable size of 
aircrafts) and a national element that has tended to limit competition. Such national 
element stems fkom the sustained dominance by carriers of two countries for flights 
between two international cities because of international regulation and consumer 
preferences. Consequently, airline routes are typically operated under conditions of 
oligopoly with the precise number of airlines tending to differ according to route 
(Ferguson, Ferguson & Rothschild 1993; Pryke 1987). 
Although many airlines operate on routes where they face little competition, this 
has not implied the existence of substantial market power by these airlines if the route (or 
Using the individual route as the basic unit of analysis of the competitive environment in aviation 
somewhat neglects the relatively newer concept of the airline as part of a network that seeks greater 
stability and profitability through the co-ordination of its activities within a wider geographical spread. 
This implies that the value of an individual route can be manipulated by intemalisation into the wider 
network of an individual airline, and/ or alliance. The individual route as a basic unit of analysis has thus 
become less important than when the concept was first developed. For elaboration of the original concept 
of route-specific contestability, see Baumol, Panzar & Willig (1982), Bain (1956) and Caves (1962). 
I I  
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city pair) fulfils the requirements of a contestable market. The entry and exit conditions 
(the cost of offering a new route or to abandon an existing route) determine the 
contestability of the market in response to profit opportunities. In the absence of 
government-imposed entry barriers, airline markets are contestable to some degree, with 
the basic homogeneity of the service facilitating entry. l 3  Conditions for a perfectly 
contestable market are, however, unlikely to be met because of some entry barriers such 
as those which result from cost differences arising from incumbent firms taking 
advantage of economies of scale and scope and density, or by congestion at particular 
airports which limit the facilities available for small and newly-established airlines. l 4  
Nevertheless, the contestability of unregulated markets in the airline industry has to some 
degree served to limit the market power of incumbent airlines and constrained their profit 
opportunities with positive knock-on effects on consumer welfare as prices are set at 
more competitive levels and consumers are allowed freedom of choice in their use of air 
 carrier^.'^ 
In response to the underlying contestability of the unregulated market, the actions 
of incumbent airlines to gain and strengthen their market power by raising formidable 
barriers to combat the threat of entry are working against the aim of deregulation 
The competitive environment is also affected by the extent to which alternative means of transport 
are close substitutes to air travel. 
In many deregulatory processes, it was assumed that airlines would be able to choose their routes 
o timally in the light of customer preferences and costs (Forsyth 1997). 
A perfectly contestable market is one in which entry is free, exit is costless, existing firms and 
entrants compete on equal terms and potential entrants are not deterred from entry by the threat of 
retaliatory price cutting by incumbents (Davies 1992). Economies of scale arise fiom an established 
network of connecting flights facilitating higher load. Economies of scope arise because passengers may 
find it convenient to make on-line connections by selecting one carrier as opposed to another. 
However, it should be noted that lower fares are often a result of price cuts by dominant carriers to 
prevent (mainly low-fare) independent carriers fiom obtaining and expanding competitive footholds in 
important routes and markets, rather than a result of more efficient operations (Brock 2000). Furthermore, 
the increased concentration of markets following deregulation (most notably in the United States where 
deregulation is at a mature stage) has, in effect, limited customer choices to below what it would have been 
in less concentrated markets with lower barriers to entry. 
I2 
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(Williams, 1993; Button, 1991) to create a more competitive industry.I6 Among these 
actions are: 
0 Predation in which an established carrier can manipulate the schedule of its own 
flights or to reduce price below cost to drive out or deter a new rival from entering the 
market; 
0 The ownership of a computer reservation system which favours established carriers;” 
The use of frequent flyer programmes (FFPs) by airlines with large route networks 
which provide opportunities for expanding the rights, amongst others, to free flights 
as well as offering a wider choice of destinations for these flights;I8 
The relationships established with travel agents and ~ustomers;’~ 
0 Mergers with other domestically-based air carriers;*’ 
0 The protection of superior and dominating slots (availed widely through historical 
grandfather rights) of incumbent carriers in relation to allocation of take-off and 
Existing carriers are regarded to have implemented a market leadership strategy (Ferguson et al. 
1993). 
The founding rationale behind joint ownership by airlines of the major Computer Reservation 
Systems (CRSs) developed in the mid- to late 1980s was to raise the enormous financing required for the 
development and maintenance of such systems. However, with the competitive restructuring of the industry 
partner airlines within a common CRS have increasingly found themselves competing against one other in 
global alliances (Doganis 2001). This implies the diminishing priority of CRS ownership in the long run in 
favour of alternative means of distribution encompassing the needs of alliance operations. 
With the growth of importance of alliances, the impact of FFPs as a tool of product differentiation 
of the individual airline has declined in favour of the alliance as benefits can be used interchangeably by 
consumers between partner airlines. Paradoxically, this has enhanced the need for new tools of product 
differentiation of individual airlines comprising an alliance to entice passengers to fly with a specific airline 
over another partner on routes where alliance partners overlap. Thus, as partners of an alliance both co- 
operate and compete with one another, the global alliance systems of airline companies conform to the 
concept of “co-opetition” described by Nalebuff & Brandenburger (1996). 
Although still valid, the airline-agency and airline-customer relationship is currently being re- 
evaluated with the emergence of e-commerce and the need to review the high distribution costs airlines 
have been facing through the widespread use of agencies. In this respect, Doganis (2001) predicts a 
growing ‘disintermediation’ of airline distribution systems in favour of Internet and direct sales. 
T h s  is particularly pronounced in the US domestic market where deregulation is at its most 
mature stage, and a vast national catchment area is prevalent. Development out of a strong domestic market 
is, however, also valid in other geographical home markets, such as the United Kingdom, Germany and 
France. 
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landing slots at congested airports, thus making it difficult for new competitors to 
gain access to airport resources;21 
Product differentiation as a means to counteract the destabilising impact of price 
competition in oligopolistic markets. By differentiating the features of the air travel 
service provided, and paying attention to the varying needs of particular categories of 
passengers, established airlines supported by advertising campaigns can counteract 
the basic homogeneity of the air travel service and gain a competitive edge by 
engendering a certain amount of customer and brand loyalty.22 
The strategies of airlines of defending markets in the face of competition have increased 
the market power of incumbent airlines (the degree of which varies by route) and began 
in some cases to undermine the consumer gains from deregulation. Thus, while the 
expectations of a more competitive industry have been largely fulfilled in the initial 
period following deregulation in the United States, developments since the mid-1 980s 
have been at variance with such expectations. The failure of new entrants to prosper 
meant that by 1990 the US market for air travel services had become more concentrated 
as 200 carriers of all sizes went out of business between 1978 and 1990, enhanced by the 
In the United States, these goals have been achieved through a rigid build-up of dominant and 
exclusive hub-and-spoke systems leading to ‘fortress hubs’, thus reducing competition on many city pairs 
and impairing the development of point-to-point direct air services between cities. Major conflicts exist 
between strategies aimed at implementing more competitive airline industries and those concerned with 
providing airport capacity. These reflect the incompatibility of public support for the tariff, frequency and 
service advantages of airline competition and widespread opposition to the construction of new airport 
capacity, particularly runaways. However, most importantly, liberalisation and deregulation of airline 
services increases markedly the demand for airport capacity in all its aspects. 
This includes the provision of unique privileges for business class air services, and other means of 
differentiation based on the characteristics of the aircraft and the flight. The process of product competition 
is increasingly intemalised into the global alliance systems of airlines. 
21 
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trend towards mergers between domestic air  carrier^.^' Similarly in Europe, only the 
larger airlines such as British Airways and Lufthansa, experienced net gains from 
deregulation with their large size and ability to expand into new European routes in some 
cases through franchising and other forms of corporate alliances (Ferguson, Ferguson and 
Rothschild, 1 993).24 
Thus, within the analytical viewpoint of mainstream neo-classical theory the 
global airline companies based in the major industrialised countries - that lead each of 
the galaxy system of airline companies and thus comprise the core of international 
aviation alliances - are attaining a considerable degree of monopoly power over other 
airlines companies as a result of higher levels of industrial concentration after 
deregulation. The global airline companies can be regarded to possess monopolistic 
advantages that derive from the concept of barriers to entry to new competition of Bain 
(1 954, 1956). These advantages enable global airline companies to exercise monopoly 
power or market power in final product markets. 
The Classical, Schumpeterian and Evolutionary Approaches to the Analysis of 
Competition in the Global Airline Industry 
While the ‘contestable markets’ approach to the analysis of competition has 
provided a useful insight in evaluating the impact of deregulation in the global airline 
industry, the approach is limited to the extent that the airline company is treated to be a 
“black box”- a reactive or passive product to the changes in the structure of the airline 
industry brought about by deregulation. The approach fails to account for the alternative 
In the United States, the consolidation process has produced a group of four mega-carriers that in 23 
1989 shared 90 per cent of the profits (Pustay 1992). 
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view of the firm as an institution with strategies and tactics, i.e. an active agent whose 
behaviour can cause changes in industrial concentration.*’ As seen in the previous 
section, the ‘contestable markets’ approach evaluates the impact of deregulation of the 
global airline industry based on changes in the competitive environment or market 
structure in the industry, and how this in turn affects the behaviour of firms comprising 
the industry. By contrast, the classical, Schumpeterian and evolutionary approaches 
would evaluate the impact of deregulation of the industry in terms of the changes in the 
strategies and tactics of the airline companies comprising the industry, and how this in 
turn affects the market structure of the industry. 
In this context, two types of profitable airlines came into their own after 
deregulation and industry consolidation in the industry to include: major carriers 
operating global networks, and those carriers exploiting a particular niche market 
(Ferguson, et al. 1993). Each of these two types have adopted different strategies and 
tactics to sustain and promote their competitiveness in the midst of the deregulation, 
minimisation of regulatory controls, and privatisation in the global airline industry. 
Notwithstanding the legacy of higher unit operating costs and inappropriate fare and 
route structures, incumbent major air carriers based in core countries have prospered 
under deregulated markets by building on their market presence through fostering brand 
loyalty, extending their route networks and consolidating their position against new 
entrants. On the other hand, a large number of smaller and medium-sized regional feeder 
For an extended discussion of the growth strategies adopted by the larger European carriers, see 
Doganis (2001). 
Such approach is theoretically opposed to the structure-conduct-performance paradigm in 
conventional or neo-classical industrial organisation theory in which the structure of the industry or market 
structure determines the conduct or behaviour of firms. 
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carriers based in some cases in developing countries have become dependent upon the 
major carriers in their role as traffic recipients and providers. 
Despite the general trend towards deregulation and liberalisation in the global 
airline industry, the presence of remaining barriers to global competition has influenced 
greatly the strategies and tactics of profitable airlines in the industry. Infrastructure 
limitations and continuing government protection of national markets through bilateral 
ASAs and restrictions on foreign ownership of airlines are some of the powerful forces 
that inhibit the full realisation of global airline competition in the aftermath of the world- 
wide trend towards liberalisation in the industry. Even if these obstacles could be 
circumvented, the problem of fortress hubs remains as the principal mechanism through 
which mega-carriers seek to establish spatial monopoly. Thus, competition 
between airlines on both international and domestic scales remains a highly restricted 
process as external constraints compete with the peculiar characteristics of the airline 
industry (Graham 1995). 
It is in light of the highly restricted process of competition in the global airline 
industry that airline companies have based their strategies and tactics. Taken within the 
context of Schumpeterian theory, some dynamic innovative airlines have fulfilled an 
entrepreneurial fiinction through the introduction of ''new combinations" in the provision 
of air services in light of remaining impediments to the process of rivalrous competition. 
The 'hew combinations" as a result of enterprise are manifested in the introduction of a 
new air service or of a new quality of an air service, the introduction of a new method of 
air service delivery, the opening of a new market, and the formation of a new 
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organisation of industry. 26 Apart from efforts in continual product differentiation, the 
most shining manifestation of the innovative strategy of some airline companies is the 
development of global market alliances since the mid- 1980s (French 1997) as a means in 
which airline companies overcome the remaining constraints imposed by the current 
regulatory system (Debbage 1994) and infrastructure brought about by limited access to 
major hubs. By providing a more novel, multilaterally based solution to air service 
agreements away fiom restrictive bilateral AS As, international aviation alliances are 
becoming an important determinant of both the market structure and the process of 
competition in the ind~stry.~’ 
Indeed, the emergence and evolution of alliances in the global airline industry has 
led to sweeping changes in the organisational mode of economic transactions in the 
global airline industry after deregulation. The organisation of the global airline industry 
encompassing both intra-firm and inter-firm relationships within and between airline 
companies has become the fundamental determinant of the competitiveness of airline 
companies as well as exerting important implications for the process of competition in the 
industry. The development of clusters or galaxies of firms linked not necessarily by 
ownership but by complex inter-firm relationships which have taken the form of quasi- 
integration has meant that competition is not defined between individual airline 
companies, but between organisational networks or corporate family constellations of 
New markets are increasingly established through and as part of alliances, thus manifesting the 
increasing importance of individual airlines (of any size) as part of a network of inter-firm relationships. 
Thus, “new combinations” in the provision of air services are increasingly being undertaken between 
p7 Although a means of implementing “new combinations” in the provision of air services by airline 
companies, alliances are also a tool to increase their market power through joint operations and the lock-in 
of consumers into their networks, thus effectively limiting consumer choice. This is most notably displayed 
in ‘beyond point-to-point’ traffic on major routes as consumers requiring connecting flights are likely to be 
offered an online connection on the large carrier allied with the carrier serving their local destination. With 
26 
artners in a global alliance. 
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airline companies. As the galaxy system of airline companies is of different tiers, the 
position of airline companies within the tier (whether core, second/ lower tier or associate 
member) as well as the position of non-members in the galaxy system has important 
implications on the global competitiveness of individual companies. 
Unlike the perspective of mainstream neo-classical theory, the global airline 
company at the core of the galaxy system of airline companies is treated in the classical 
and Schumpeterian approaches as an active agent whose behaviour to secure monopoly 
power - thorough innovation and knowledge creation and from the pursuit of higher 
profits from creating ‘new combinations’ in production (Schumpeter 191 1) or new areas 
of social or productive capability (Cantwell 2001) - causes higher levels of industrial 
concentration. In this view, the global airline company possesses competitive advantages 
that derive from the concept of firms and entrepreneurs of unequal abilities of 
Schumpeter (1 9 1 1, 1943) and Penrose (1 959). Such competitive advantages - which 
enable the firm to create a quasi-monopolistic position for itself - derive from the 
differential ability of global airline companies to discover profitable opportunities, and 
not from the presence of monopoly power since the opportunities for profit accumulation 
are open to all firms (Tolentino 2000). Nevertheless, the process of rivalrous competition 
which requires freedom of entry (Kirzner, 1978) does not fully apply in the global airline 
industry where a plethora of non-market barriers blocking entry to potential competitors 
remain, despite recent trends in deregulation and liberalisation. Indeed, global alliance 
foundation alongside greater liberalisation at the domestic and international levels has 
created the paradox that enhanced competition - or the threat of increased competition 
such ‘beyond point’ competition and the lock-in of consumers, alliances can thus be redefined as tools of 
market power. 
17 
- has, in fact, led to higher industrial concentration. 28 Consequently, airlines retain 
varying degrees of market power even after deregulation (Ferguson, Ferguson and 
Rothschild, 1993). 
CONCLUSION 
The paper sought to analyse the changes in the competitive position of airline 
companies in the global airline industry in the post-US deregulation era within the 
disparate perspectives in the theoretical economics of the firm. On the one hand, changes 
in their behaviour were examined within the mainstream neo-classical model of the firm 
in which the airline company is treated as a “black box”- a reactive or passive product 
to the changes in the structure of the airline industry brought about by deregulation. On 
the other hand, the airline company was also treated as an institution with strategies and 
tactics consistent with classical, Schumpeterian and evolutionary approaches, i.e. an 
active agent whose behaviour causes changes in industrial concentration. As the process 
of competition between airlines on both international and domestic scales remains a 
highly restricted process despite the general trend towards deregulation and liberalisation 
in the global airline industry, the paper finds that the neo-classical model of the firm still 
provides some explanation of some aspects of the changes in the competitive position of 
airlines in the global industry after deregulation. Nevertheless, the logical plausibility of 
the classical, Schumpeterian and evolutionary approaches is enhanced by their increasing 
empirical relevance and operational meaning in terms of contemporary business 
behaviour in the industry. A full understanding of the global airline company requires a 
28 For an extended discussion with reference to the US domestic market, see Brock (2000). 
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synthesis of the neo-classical, classical, Schumpeterian and evolutionary analyses of the 
firm. 
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ABSTRACT 
Airport pavements are extensive and constitute significant infrastructure supporting air 
transportation. With considerable growth in air transportation, preserving, improving, and 
expanding airport infrastructure, including pavements, have become more important and 
necessary. Thus, there is emphasis on Airport Pavement Management System (APMS). APMS 
have evolved from a concept to a coordinated, integrated, responsive, and implementable system. 
The development of technologies such as CAD, GIs, GPS, remote sensing, and multimedia tools 
have potential to considerably improve APMS. The paper first discusses the concept and need 
for APMS and various pieces of Airport Pavement Management Information (APMI). The paper 
next examines the differing characteristics and needs for APMS at commercial airports and 
general aviation airports. Finally, the paper discusses the emerging issues related to airport 
pavement management and the opportunities that exist in developing adequate, reliable and 
appropriate APMI and in making APMS integrated and responsive using emerging technologies 
and system methodologies. 
Key words: Airport pavement management system (APMS), Airport pavement management 
information (APMI), Commercial Airports, General Aviation Airports, Information 
Technologies 
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1. NTRODUCTION 
Airport infrastructure is extensive and varied and is operated and financed differently by 
different entities or agencies in the U.S. and worldwide. In the U.S. there are over 18000 airports, 
of which around 3500 are part of National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS) with over 
500 providing commercial service, over 300 serving as reliever airports, and over 2400 used for 
general aviation (GA) purposes (Wells, 2000). The busiest commercial airports have handled up 
to 75 million passengers (e.g. Atlanta's Hartsfield), up to 900000 operations (e.g Chicago-ORD), 
and up to 2.5 million metric tons of cargo (e.g. Memphis International Airport). The nation's air 
traffic delay problems are concentrated at the large hub airports, which impacts airport pavement 
management activities-from data collection to maintenance to rehabilitation to reconstruction. 
Demand for air transportation has continued to increase since deregulation. Maintaining and 
improving such infrastructure is a necessity and a challenge to provide adequate capacity, ensure 
safety and increase efficiencies. Airport pavements form the most critical asset of an airport. In 
the United States, approximately $ 2  billion per year is being spent on construction and 
rehabilitation of airport pavements under the airport improvement program (AIP) (McNemey, 
1995; Ollerman and Varma, 1998). In addition, there are millions of dollars being spent on 
maintenance. Federal support is not available for maintenance. The preservation of large 
infrastructure investments at airports through cost-effective pavement maintenance and 
rehabilitation is a major goal for airport authorities and municipalities operating general aviation 
airports. 
Airport Pavement Management System (APMS)(s) have been established in many of the major 
airports in the United States and have proven to be very useful and cost effective for the 
municipalities and airport authorities involved. APMS has been implemented in some airports 
and also at statewide level in the United States. Various agencies, states, and institutions have 
realized the merits of visualizing the information used, derived, and produced by facility 
management systems, including APMS. 
This paper looks into the differing characteristics and needs for APMS at commercial airports 
and general aviation airports. Over last couple of decades attempts have been made to develop 
integrated and responsive APMS. The development technologies such as CAD, GIs, GPS, and 
multimedia technologies have fostered development of considerably improved APMS . The paper 
discusses different perspectives related to development of integrated and responsive APMS at 
commercial airports and at statewide level for general aviation airports. 
2. AIRPORT PAVEMENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (APMS): CONCEPT AND 
NEED 
A proper maintenance and rehabilitation program can potentially extend the serviceable life of 
the pavement. APMS should not interfere with or replace good pavement design, materials, 
rehabilitation, or other activities. The system is there to coordinate these activities for maximum 
pavement life and benefits (Hossain and Uddin, 1996). 
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The identification of airport maintenance and rehabilitation (M&R) needs is a continual process. 
Most airports in the U.S. were built after World War 11, and many of the records from their initial 
construction no longer in exist. Most of these airports have been modified since their initial 
construction for many reasons, including increased traffic, larger and heavier aircraft, and safety 
considerations. Historical records of these modifications and other activities, including M&R, 
are usually available, but may be stored in many different locations. The need for these records 
to be collected and organized into a database for an airfield was realized and emphasized over 
two decades ago (Amtzen, 1978). 
A generalized framework for a total APMS is shown in Figure 1. Such a system can ideally 
provide information for programming, planning, budgeting, design, construction, maintenance, 
rehabilitation, research, field studies, and decision making. Analytical and statistical models, 
procedural or logical framework, or a set of decision rules may be utilized in conjunction with 
the database to provide the requisite information. The various activities in an APMS can be 
categorized into the network level and the project level. The network level can be further divided 
into the project selection level and the program level (Haas, Hudson, and Zaniewski, 1994). The 
project selection level involves prioritization to identify which projects should be carried out 
each year of the program period. At the program level, budgets are established and general fund 
allocations made over an entire network. APMS at the project level deals with technical concerns, 
such as detailed design decisions, for an individual project. Decisions at each level must interface 
with one another. APMS rationalizes need for maintenance activities in technical and economical 
manner and in a way is proactive way to protect substantial investment. The four basic elements 
common to all pavement management systems are a database, a pavement analysis method, a 
M&R assignment method, and a method for the displaying of results. 
APMS results in efficient utilization of limited resources and can be instrumental, if designed 
and updated properly, in qualifying, quantifying, combining, and communicating information 
about condition of infrastructure, improvement needs at different scales, and consequences of 
allocating budget for maintenance. This could lead to improved decisions regarding prioritizing 
maintenance needs, establishing reconstruction projects, and better utilization of budgets. Much 
emphasis has been on condition assessment and related data collection, tests and analyses. A 
total APMS consists of a coordinated set of activities, all directed toward achieving the best 
value possible for the available funds in providing and operating smooth, safe, and economical 
pavements. A total APMS may serve different management needs or levels, and it must interface 
with broader management systems (e.g. facility management systems) (Varma, 1993; McNerney, 
1995). 
3. AIRPORT PAVEMENT MANAGEMENT INFORMATION (APMI) 
A listing of the types of APMI is shown in Table 1. It should be noted that development and use 
of all these types of information may not be possible or even relevant for a given airport. The 
scope of pavement management (network versus project level or commercial versus general 
aviation) should be understood before developing and using such information. 
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Airport Pavement Management System 
I I 
Figure1 . Generalized Framework for an Airport Pavement Management System 
(Source: Adapted from Haas, Hudson, and Zaniewski, 1994) 
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Table 1. Types of Airport Pavement Management Information 
LOCATION 
DESIGN 
I CLASSES I TYPE O F  INFORMATION 
Multimodal & Intermodal Considerations 
Geographic Location 
Climate 
Relevance in NPIAS 
0 Design Aircraft Characteristics & Operations 
I PLANNING I Socioeconomic Characteristics 
CONSTRUCTION 
0 Air Travel Demand I Aircraft Fleet Mix, Volume, Operations 
0 Design Life 
0 Date and Type of Construction 
INSPECTION & TESTING 
CONDITION ANALYSIS 
Geometric Design-Layout, Size, Shape I Structural Design-Material, Thicknesses 
0 
0 
Non-Destructive Testing Data 
0 
0 SectionPC1 
0 PCI Remaining Life 
Drawings & Specifications for Construction 
Sections and Samples-Unit and Size 
Pavement Condition Index (PCI) Data- 
Types, Levels, and Quantities of Distresses 
Runway Profiles and Surface Friction 
I I Drainage and Safety Design Features 
CONDITION PREDICTION 
MAINTENANCE &REHABILITATION 
COST 
MANAGEMENT& INSTITUTIONAL 
0 Surface Friction Analysis 
0 Deterioration Curves-Functional Remaining 
Structural Remaining Life 
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All pavements at each airport need to be divided into homogeneous sections and assigned a 
section number. Areas are considered homogeneous with respect to function, age, composition, 
and condition. These section numbers are used as an index for accessing, storing, updating, and 
retrieving purposes in a relational database of an APMS. Sections do not need to be adjacent; 
several separate sections that possess homogeneous attributes can be assigned the same section 
number. The entire airport pavement needs to be divided into homogeneous sections and 
categorized on the basis of type, use, and condition of the section. It is important to divide 
airport pavement into homogeneous regions for analytical purposes also. Similar pavements 
deteriorate at similar rates (Shahin et al., 1986). Inspection procedures also require this type of 
division of pavement before inspection (FAA, 1982). Most airports in the United States that 
have already been inspected, have previously divided their pavement for this inspection 
during each inspection. The functional condition of the pavement is usually determined by 
Pavement Condition Index (PCI) according to FAA Advisory Circular AC 150/5380-6 (FAA, 
1982). The basis of this determination is a visual inspection, which involves identifying the 
location, type, and severity of any distress found in the pavement. The pavement sections are 
further divided into sample units for ease of inspection as well as database development. 
Random areas are inspected, and an overall PCI is determined for the section. 
The maintenance records in the database need to reflect the locally preferred method of 
maintenance for a given distress. These records can show trends in future maintenance activities 
based upon previous budget allocations. Maintenance and rehabilitation (M&R) priorities can 
also be stored in this section simply by setting the minimum acceptable PCI level for a given 
an equal basis. These data should be in a unit cost format to facilitate calculations and should be 
updated periodically to reflect changes in the economy. It should be noted that mobilization fees 
for smaller activities may raise the unit cost for some smaller M&R activities. 
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I procedure, and have permanently marked these sections so the same section boundaries are used 
I type of facility. Current cost figures are necessary to enable the evaluation of M&R strategies on 
I 
APMI could be developed by data collection efforts using observations, devices, surveys, and 
responses. In addition, APMI can be established from published data and information sources, 
planning documents, design documents, construction drawings and specifications, guidelines 
I from FAA and other relevant agencies, statistical or analytical methods, expert judgment, CAD 
tools, procedural or logical framework, and/or a set of decision rules. I 
The data requirements for an APMS are rather extensive and require the development of an 
organized database. The implementation of an APMS requires an initial database that includes 
present pavement condition, construction dimensions, and historical information concerning 
maintenance activity and current and past traffic levels (McGhee, 1990). The initial inventory 
will involve a detailed examination of all records and plans concerning design, construction, 
inspection, maintenance, and rehabilitation. These records need to reflect everything known 
about the airport and to locate pavement sections relative to each other. However, this is 
inefficient with the current APMS. The data provided by these records will help to determine the 
serviceable life of the pavement and will also help-to identify chronic problem areas. Records 
need to be easily accessed, allowing airport personnel to quickly familiarize themselves with all 
available data pertaining to any section of the airport. 
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Visual inspection is the oldest and most common method of pavement condition evaluation. The 
biggest problem with conducting a visual inspection is the subjective nature of the process. It is 
quite possible that two people may have different opinions as to the condition of a single section 
of pavement. Moreover, an inexperienced inspector may provide an inaccurate assessment of 
the distress level and severity. The pavement inspection procedures, as outlined in FAA 
AC/5380-6 (FAA, 1982), were introduced to provide a standard method for condition evaluation 
and to minimize subjectivity to some extent. The method for determining PCI using the visual 
inspection is well-established (FAA 1982, Eckrose and Green 1988). There are manuals for 
visual or field inspection ofpavements (Shahin 1989a, 1989b; Eckrose and Green, 1988). Visual 
inspection is the chosen method for determining the pavement condition at GA airports and low 
volume commercial airports due to the ease of inspection, the light traffic levels, and the light 
wheel loads. 
The PCI method was developed by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers for use by the U. S. Air 
Force to determine the condition of military airfields and has been adopted for use at civilian 
airports by the FAA. The PCI inspection is also the recommended pavement inspection 
procedure of the American Public Works Association for use in municipalities (Eckrose and 
Green, 1988). Several other methods for collecting condition information about airport pavement 
have been tried, but they are more time-consuming and expensive and are generally reserved for 
use in high traffic and loading conditions. These methods include non-destructive tests such as 
falling weight deflectometer (FWD) tests, ground penetrating radar (GPR) and infrared 
thermography, and destructive tests such as coring (Bush, 1980). In addition, for heavy concrete 
pavement section Heavy Weight Deflectometer (HWD) has been used, as was the case for new 
Hong Kong airport, Chek Lap Kok (Dynatest, 2001). 
Inspection of all the pavement in a section is not considered necessary; visual inspection is 
conducted on a select number of samples of each pavement section. The goal of sampling is to 
assess the types, magnitude, and levels of distress present in the system without inspecting the 
complete system. To this end, two confidence levels are recommended for sampling: project 
and network levels. Project confidence level is 95% and is determined statistically during the 
inspection. Project level confidence is used to determine the extent of distresses when analyzing 
specific projects to be performed. It is generally used for major commercial airports. A network 
confidence level is used in statewide systems and usually involves the inspection of 15 to 25% of 
pavement at large airports and 25 to 35% at smaller airports (Eckrose and Green, 1988). 
There are 15 different types of distress in rigid pavement and 16 for flexible pavement (see Table 
2). These 3 1 different distresses combine with four different severity levels to create 8 1 
distresses. There are distinct methods to calculate quantities for each of these pavement flaws. It 
is very important to identify the different distresses correctly because each distress has a different 
remedy; and to be cost effective, the correct rehabilitation needs to be applied in each case. 
Severe block cracking in flexible pavement looks similar to alligator cracking. Block cracking is 
an effect of the age of the pavement while alligator cracking is a load-related distress. In rigid 
pavement, a comer break may look similar to comer spalling. Comer breaks are a result of loss 
of support and are load related, whereas spalling results from excessive stresses at the joint or 
crack caused by the infiltration of incompressible materials. 
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Table 2. Distress Types and Levels 
Source: FAA, 1982; MicroPAVER, 1997; CERL, 1996 
Minimum PCI levels needs to be determined for each APMS system. This is a subjective 
decision. It is not feasible to expect all pavement sections at an airport to have a PCI greater than 
80. The first time a M&R plan is developed with this type of expectation, the monetary needs 
for the following year may be greater than the facility’s budget for the next 20 years combined. 
The correct method is to perform the inspection and determine reasonable goals for the facility. 
Generally, the minimum PCI for runways is five points greater than for the taxiways and ten 
points greater than for the apron sections. The initial goal for a section may be to achieve a PCI 
as low as 50. In time, these goals can slowly be increased as the facility’s overall condition 
improves. 
Predictions of the future condition of airport pavements can be accomplished through a careful 
examination of all aspects of a section of pavement. The condition history of similar sections of 
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pavement helps in the development of their deterioration model. A comprehensive inspection to 
determine the types of distress a pavement is being subjected to can help to select the optimal 
rehabilitation technique. Determining the current condition of airport pavement has become a 
systematic process, but there is a great deal of debate about determining of the future condition 
of the pavement. Determining the rate of deterioration is important, yet it is very difficult due to 
the complex nature of pavement deterioration. There is a lot of research underway to determine 
the rate of deterioration for both highway and airport pavements. Highways and busy 
commercial airports usually experience load-related pavement deterioration, while general 
aviation airports experience age-related deterioration. Forecasts of pavement conditions 
combined with minimum desired conditions will determine the optimal time for rehabilitation. 
The optimal repair time is the point at which deterioration begins to increase at a faster rate. 
Higher M&R costs will result from excessive deterioration if the pavement is not repaired at this 
point (Broten and McNeely, 1995). Analysis of alternatives involves the knowledge of the 
optimal repair time, current construction costs, future maintenance costs, and present and future 
budget availability. It also involves the knowledge of the structural condition and life 
expectancy. 
4. APMS AT COMMERCIAL AIRPORTS 
APMS(s) have been established at O'Hare International Airport (Broten et al., 1995, 1996; 
Schwandt, 1996), Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) International Airport (Larry and Soule, 1991), John 
F. Kennedy International Airport (Rada et al., 1992, 1995; Schmerl, 1992; Schwartz et al., 1991). 
These systems have proven to be very useful and cost effective for the municipalities and airport 
authorities involved. The airport authorities at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago compared 
the recommended action for a section of runway with the installed APMS to the action they 
would have taken if they did not have the system in place and found they saved several million 
dollars (Schwandt, 1996). The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey ( P A " J )  has 
control over three airports: John F. Kennedy International Airport, Newark International Airport, 
and LaGuardia Airport. PANYNJ has implemented a Geographic Information System (GIs)- 
based APMS for the three airports, which has enabled them to predict future pavement 
performance and conditions to make better budget forecasts (Schmerl, 1992). Much of the 
implementation is basically based on the PAVER methodology. Orlando International Airport, 
because of its airport-wide integration of CAD and GIS data, provides a very good example for 
developing GIs-based APMS (McNerney, 2000). 
Realizing the importance of having comprehensive information about airport infrastructure in 
general and airport pavements in particular several new airports of the 1990s and 2 1 st Century 
have embarked and invested on extensive data collection regarding location, characteristics, and 
conditions of airport infrastructure. For example, Dynatest, Inc was involved in collecting 
information for the new Chek Lap Kok (CLK) airport in Hong Kong. This airport contained 1.7 
million square meters of flexible pavement for the 3.8 kn runway 25W07R and the 28 km 
taxiway system, 0.4 million square meters of concrete block pavement, and 0.7 million square 
meters of rigid pavement. Heavy Weight Deflection (HWD) testing was carried out. Prior to its 
opening in July, 1998, the Hong Kong Authority contracted to collect PCI data to determine the 
baseline surface condition, profile and roughness data, and deflection data.Dynatest in 1997 
developed, based on their extensive experience in highways, the software A.I.R.P.0.R.T.S and 
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Perfromance and Economic Rating System (PERS) to deal with airport pavement management 
(Holt, 1999). The system was developed to address the deficiencies that existed then--PCI was 
not part of modeling process, maintenance projects were not integrated fully, airports did not 
collect roughnedprofile data, user costs was not a consideration, and delay costs were not used 
to evaluate rehabilitation alternatives at airports. The AIRPORTS system allows user to monitor 
the value asset over time and under different budget scenarios and also enables them to 
determine optimal budget. PERS is integral and crucial part of AIRPORTS and utilizes an 
incremental-recursive model for calculating pavement performance. 
In close cooperation with Copenhagen Airports RAMBOLL has developed AIRPAVE 
MANAGEMENT, a windows-based APMS (Ramboll, 2001). The system facilitates systematic 
and optimum maintenance of pavements and estimates needs for future. It consists of three 
modules: a management information system (MIS), a pavement management system (PMS), and 
a geographic information system (GIs). AIRPAVE MANAGEMENT has been implemented in 
Copenhagen Airport and is used for maintenance planning of the airport's pavements, 
approximately 3 million square meters. 
Some key issues have been recently associated with pavement management at busy commercial 
airports. Fatigue of airport pavements is an important consideration in the analysis and 
management of high-traffic pavements at commercial airports. The current PCI method of 
pavement evaluation does not adequately evaluate fatigue cracking of airport pavements as 
shown with inspections from Hartsfield International Airport and DFW International Airport 
(McNerney and McCullough, 2000). The suggestion from this research was geographic mapping 
of distresses by distress type, which can be best accomplished in GIs. 
Also, a full cost approach to airport pavement management should not be limited to agency costs 
but should include delays associated with disruption of operations and user costs (McNerney and 
Harrison, 1995). In addition, information from APMS can be very useful for construction 
planning and scheduling. Moreover, the environmental costs of pavement management should 
also be integrated. GIs, as a platform, can serve well to integrate these additional considerations 
into APMS. Furthermore, PAVER, developed in 1970s and subsequently updated, has not kept 
well with addressing management of pavements at commercial airports serving larger and 
heavier aircraft. There is a need to go beyond PCI-based approach. 
5. APMS AT GENERAL AVIATION AIRPORTS 
Communities that do not receive scheduled commercial service may be included in NPIAS as 
sites for general aviation aircraft if they account for enough activity (usually at least 10 locally 
owned aircraft) and are at least 20 miles from the nearest NPIAS airport. General aviation 
airports tend to be distributed on a one-per-county basis in rural areas. The airports serving 
general aviation are varied. Typically, they are small, usually with a single runway and only 
minimal navigation aids. A few GA airports located in major metropolitan areas (e.g. Van Nuys, 
Long Beach) handle extremely high volumes of traffic (particularly business and executive 
aircraft) and are busier and more congested than all but the largest commercial airports. General 
aviation fleet does include transport-type equipment similar to that used by major airlines, over 
70 percent of GA aircraft are single-engine piston aircraft. 
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General Aviation (GA) airports are owned by a municipality that decides how the airport will 
develop, expand, and operate. All airports within a state compete for limited federal grant 
money for construction improvements (Green and Scherling, 1994). Historically, M&R of 
airport pavement have been undertaken when an airport sponsor requested funds for 
improvement. These requests were usually not made by an engineer, occasionally were not the 
correct maintenance procedure, and were generally requested well before or long after they 
should have been implemented ( Broten and McNeely, 1995). Various states have recognized 
the need to evaluate the condition of the airport pavements, to determine the needed 
improvements, and to evaluate them on a priority basis. 
Most general aviation airport pavement deterioration are age (or environment) related. A very 
comprehensive study on GA airport longevity trends have been conducted recently in Illinois 
(Van Dam and Bildilli, 1996; Van Dam et al., 1994, 1995). This study dealt with concepts and 
practices for considering GA airport pavement performance and longevity. 
The concept of systematic and comprehensive maintenance program for the airports on a 
statewide basis gained acceptance in 1980s and development of APMS for GA airports started in 
1990s. APMS has been implemented on a statewide basis in Texas (Freeman and Dresser, 1993), 
Virginia (Broten and McNeely, 1993), Florida (Green and Scherling, 1994; Scherling, 1996), 
Arizona (Holt et al., 1994), North Carolina (Walston, 1996), Kansas (Hossain and Uddin, 1996), 
and North Dakota (KLJ, 2000). Most of these are network-based APMS. The Kansas system 
presents condition information on basis of PCI (used by U.S. Army;s Corps Engineer's PAVER) 
and on basis of Pavement Classification Number (PCN), which is used by International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and accepted by FAA for all airports. The North Dakota system is 
GIs-based and uses ESRI's Arcview software along with analytical models developed by 
Eckrose and Green. An object-oriented language program was used to develop an interface 
between Arcview and the PMS models. The major benefit of Texas, Arizona, and Florida system 
has been collection and storage of historical records in a centralized database which is easily 
accessible. Since FAA recommended MicroPAVER most of the systems have been based on 
that; North Dakota system is an exception in that it uses the software developed by Eckrose and 
Green and is linked to GIs. AirGIS Pavement Management Application (PMA) allows the user 
greater opportunity to visualize and understand the airport runways, taxiways, and other facilities 
with their capabilities, condition, and life expectancy through use of digital maps, charts, and 
aerial photography (KLJ, 2000). 
6. INTEGRATED AND RESPONSIVE SYSTEMS--ISSUES & PERSPECTIVES 
The system used for NYNJ Port Authority and Kennedy International Airport (Rada et al., 1992) 
and O'Hare International Airport (Broten et al., 1996) are examples of integrated system at a 
commercial airport. Among the general aviation APMS in Virginia (Broten and McNeeley, 
1995) is the most integrated and responsive. The integration of analytical components of APMS 
has evolved over the past two decades. However, typically there is no good documentation on 
the different types of information that are used by, developed within, and produced by the APMS. 
The information that is produced is in the form of computer outputs containing text, numbers, 
and graphical plots. It is difficult to understand, interpret, and visualize the information used to 
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finally evaluate and recommend a M&R plan primarily based on the paper outputs. Realizing 
this impediment, several pavement management systems, including some APMS , have been 
interfaced with multimedia systems, viewing systems, or GIS (Shahin et al., 1997; Schwartz et 
al., 199 1 ; Green and Scherling, 1994; Holt et al., 1994; McNerney, 1995; Ollerman and Varma, 
1998). Various agencies, states, and institutions have realized the merits of visualizing the 
information used, derived, and produced by facility management systems, including APMS. A 
detailed examination of the issues related to what APMI needs to be visualized, why it needs to 
1998; Ollerman and Varma, 1998). 
, be visualized, and how it should be visualized has been documented recently (see Ollerman, 
The task of airport pavement management increases considerably in magnitude and complexity 
as we go from one airport to multiple airports. The criteria for evaluating the importance of 
different types of repairs to be undertaken with the limited budget becomes one of the most 
challenging tasks. Such a challenge should be met by understanding the relative importance of 
the various pavement sections at various airports as well as the viewpoints and needs of the 
various stakeholders. 
I Pavement management saves money through effective use of available resources and funds, not 
through the reduction of an airport’s budget. More money may be available because the airport 
manager will be able to better justify the needs of the facility to the fbnding agency. Benefits of 
APMS will be seen through overall increased pavement serviceability, increased use, and 
improved credibility. APMS is a tool that may be used to fight budget battles (Bremer, 1998). It 
provides a basis for capital improvement program and can show the relative condition of the 
airport at present and possibly in the future. The FAA has determined the total annual cost to 
maintain or rehabilitate a relatively poor pavement may be four to five times the cost of 
maintaining a pavement in relatively good condition (Horonjeff and McKelvey, 1994). 
I 
i A PCI of 100 is generally accepted as an initial PCI level, and average yearly deterioration is the 
figure we need to determine. There are usually several curves; specifically, curves are created for 
PCC, AC, AC overlay, and PCC overlay pavements. In statewide systems, there may be more 
curves according to the differing soil and climatic conditions. The graphs created do not usually 
provide a straight-line graph, and some manipulation is required. Old pavements in good 
condition and new pavements in poor condition are usually moved to a different or new group 
for analysis. 
I 
Some of the methods for finding the deterioration rate line are straight line extrapolation, 
I regression\empirical, mechanistic-empirical, polynomial constrained least square, S-shaped 
curve, probability distribution, and Markovian decision models (Hossain and Uddin, 1996). 
Some pavement management programs also involve the use of predetermined curves. 
Development of appropriate performance and deterioration curves have been the area where the 
majority of airport pavement research has been focused (Monismith, 1978; Seiler et al., 1991 ; 
Shahin et al., 1987; Witczak, 1978; Van Dam and Bildilli, 1996; Van Dam et al., 1994, 1995; 
loading, material defects, or a combination of these. Typically, the pavement performance and 
deterioration curves are in terms of Pavement Condition Index (PCI) and age of the pavements. 
I Zimmerman and Broten, 1996). Pavements deteriorate due to aging, climatic effects, traffic 
~ 
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Forecasting the future condition of pavement involves knowledge of the age and performance of 
pavement of the same type. This information is necessary in determining the remaining life of 
the pavement and in identifying possible hture M&R needs. An example of this could be 
checking the history of the airport and discovering that all asphalt pavements have been seal- 
coated within three years of construction. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect an asphalt 
pavement constructed this year will need to be seal-coated within the next three years. 
Pavement analysis also involves evaluating pavement distress and determining the optimal repair 
technique. Repair strategies are determined by the dominant distress in the pavement and while 
some may be performed independently, some are mutually exclusive (Holt et al., 1994). 
There needs to be an extra emphasis on clearly identifying the types, use, and development of 
airport pavement management information. Despite such integration, there is still considerable 
difficulty faced by users and analysts in being able to clearly communicate the interpretation and 
significance of the numerous outputs produced by such models. Such communication can be 
facilitated by effective visualization of APMI. Toward this goal, some efforts have been 
undertaken to integrate GIS into APMS (Shahin et al., 1997; Schwartz et al., 1991; Green and 
Scherling, 1994; Holt et al., 1994; McNerney, 1995; Ollerman and Varma, 1998). Such 
integration is perceived to provide great flexibility and capability concerning information 
analysis, storage, retrieval, and data output and display. 
The continuing growth in the computer-aided drafting and design (CADD), GIs, and other 
graphic and multimedia systems is responsible for the increased interest in visualization. The 
extent, coverage, and complexity of transportation infrastructure have made the task of managing 
such facilities a challenge. The variety and quantity of information needed to design, operate, 
maintain, and manage the infrastructure necessitate a team approach and require use of numerous 
computer-based tools. As computers have become more common and more accepted, a variety of 
visual displays has been devised to help people to quickly evaluate and assimilate information 
(Landphair and Larsen, 1996). The simplest graphic tools are charts and graphs that show the 
relationships between two or three different variables at the same time. An even more powerful 
device is the thematic map produced from a GIS which places multiple sets of information in 2- 
or 3-dimensional space and displays the relationships among the various components. 
The major deficiency is the inability to effectively communicate the wide variety of information 
available from an APMS. Sorting through the large amount of APMI available for an airport 
network (or even an airport) can be a monumental task. The information is in inspection, 
construction, maintenance, and budget reports. The information also includes information on 
construction plans, maintenance priorities, and forecast of pavement conditions and work plan. 
All or some of this information needs to be communicated to the people associated with the 
airport system. In addition, there is a need to report and represent this information within the 
spatial context of the airport pavement infrastructure. The need can be addressed by tying the 
spatial representation or entities with the associated APMI. 
Communication is the most important reason to visualize APMI. All of the information 
collection, organization, analysis, and compilation will be a waste of time, money, and resources 
if the conclusions cannot be presented to those who need to understand and use them. 
Visualization is the best method for communicating the information. Current presentations are 
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using CAD drawings for selected features and scenarios. This process is tedious and not 
repeatable or amenable for easy updating. 
Visualization of APMI allows the viewer to quickly grasp concepts. Visualization can provide a 
map, color-coded for PCI, showing the location of all the pavement sections (see Figure 2) and 
the relative condition of each. The map can convey the PCI of each individual section, sections 
that are in better condition than others, and the size of each section. Visualization allows 
comparison of the different attributes of pavement sections to each other. This can be used to 
great advantage in airport management. It allows an airport manager or engineer to understand 
what attributes pavement sections may have in common with one another. This concept is 
important in understanding why one section of pavement is deteriorating more rapidly than other 
pavement sections. 
In this era of rising costs and tightening budget, it is very important for a budget committee to 
understand the effects of different budget scenarios upon the pavement condition of the airport. 
The concept and consequence of deferred maintenance is important to impress upon the people 
responsible for allocating money for airport pavements. Visualization can show a funding 
agency how budget reductions and the need of additional funds will affect the pavement 
condition in the future. 
The types of information to be visualized will differ from one user to another. The major groups 
of people who need APMI are airport network administrators, budget committees, airport 
managers, airport engineers, airport maintenance personnel, and others. Each group needs to see 
different information about the airport pavement to effectively do their job. Some groups will 
need to see the same information, but in a different manner. 
The visualization needs can be addressed through use of CAD programs, graphical packages, 
multimedia systems, viewing systems, and GIs. The level of complexity of the airport systems 
and the corresponding APMS and APMI will determine the appropriateness of the mechanism. 
For a project level APMS, a CAD program may be sufficient to provide the needed visualization. 
However, for project selection level and program level, the use of CAD programs, graphical 
packages, multimedia systems, and viewing systems may not be sufficient or efficient. One of 
the key reasons is the need for tying the APMI with spatial aspects of airport systems. Moreover, 
the ability to query and update is not easily and efficiently available in systems other than GIs. 
GIS is designed to manage geographically referenced information. It can efficiently capture, 
store, update, manipulate, analyze, and display spatial data in a variety of ways to achieve the 
desired result (Clarke, 1997; Star and Estes, 1990). GIS environment provides a structured, 
systematic process for quickly conveying APMI and can be utilized to a illustrate the effects of a 
number of scenarios to users. It should be noted that this paper has not explored all the 
possibilities and capabilities of a GIs. Schematic of a generalized architecture of a system for 
seamless integration of APMS and GIS is shown in Figure 3. Efficiencies can be achieved if an 
APMS is interfaced with a GIs. The querying capability and much easier updating of the various 
views are the added advantages of a GIs-based visualization of APMI. 
14 
Main 
Terminal 
N 
Pavement Sections k B  AC Runway 6305 
I AC Runway 6310 
mn 4220 
Apron 4250 
PCC Runway 6130 
5'3 PCC Runway6140 
PCC Runway 6150 
PCC Runway 69 10 
PCC Runway 6925 
Taxiway 1005 = Taxiway 1010 
_-___ Taxiway 1105 
- ] Taxiway 1205 
LI Tauway 1210 
Taxiway 1220 
- Taxiway 1305 
Taxiway 1307 
Taxaway 1310 
Taxway 1312 
Taxiway 1410 
Taxiway 1525 
Tamway 1528 
Taxiway 1705 
Taxway 1710 
Taxiway 171 5 
Taxiway 1720 
Taxiway 1815 
Taxiway 1905 
Taxiway 1910 
@ &n 4245 
Figure 2. Hector Airport: Layout and Sections 
Source: (Ollerman and Varma, 1998) 
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Figure 3. Generalized Architecture for GIS-based Visualization of Airport Pavement 
Management Information 
Interactive use is for people looking for relationships between different pieces of APMI. GIS 
accomplishes this through query commands by allowing the user to locate sections with specific 
attributes or ranges of attributes. These queries can be combinations of several different attribute 
categories that will reflect unions or intersections of different APMI. Changes in the information 
presented on the map may require the user to regenerate the map form scratch when using hard 
copies or even CAD-based methods. GIS allows the user to create a template for a map that will 
query the information in the database every time the map is created, even if the data have 
changed between map creations. 
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Typically twofold process of development and visualization of APMI at a specific airport has 
been carried out. The process can be extended to statewide systems having multiple airports. 
However, the twofold process of visualization of APMI makes it difficult to use in a distributed 
sense for statewide systems. For statewide system, ideally the system will be set up with a central 
database located with the network administrator and smaller parts of the whole database located 
at each airport in the system. These smaller parts will only contain the information necessary for 
the operation of APMS at one airport. The system can be further broken down into separate 
computers for each of the airport departments, which will have different access and 
empowerment capabilities. Such capability can be possible only through seamless integration of 
APMS and GIs. Furthermore, numerous institutional issues need to be identified regarding 
hierarchy, access, and empowerment before a scale-wise integration of the APMS can be 
implemented. 
The information pertaining to pavement sections needs to be geographically referenced to the 
pavement section location. Inspection information also needs to be geographically referenced to 
the location of the individual sample units within the pavement section. Use of GPS with GIS 
can facilitate this process of geo-referencing considerably. Visual inspection data will include 
sample identification, sample size, distresses present, distress severities, distress quantities, and 
the dates of all inspections. The database will also need to be able to store pictures of pavement 
conditions for comparison with other inspections. Inspection data from other testing will also 
need to be geographically referenced to the location of the testing. The collection and 
organization of data in this fashion will enable the airport personnel to plan and perform 
pavement inspections in a more consistent manner. The inspection planners will be able to 
determine which pavement sections have been surveyed, and this will help to determine which 
pavement sections need to be surveyed. This data organization will also make the task of 
comparing previous inspection data of sample sections with the data from current inspections a 
fairly straightforward task. Airport pavement personnel will want to identify questionable 
inspection results so they can maintain the quality of information entered in the database. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Development of APMI is a complex process and there are distinctions between network and 
project level management functions were identified. New data collection methods, in particular 
non-destructive methods, have become very popular. 
The importance of dividing the airport pavement into homogeneous sections for evaluation and 
analysis purposes is a common and necessary practice. These homogeneous sections will have 
the same age, construction, traffic levels, use, and relative condition. 
Realizing the benefits of APMS many new airports are investing considerable money collecting 
and storing all infrastructure information in appropriate form and manner in a database, which 
can be easily accessible. 
Analytically, development of deterioration curves remains a challenge for the professional 
community. Use of PCI as a basis has been challenged. In addition, lack of incorporation of user 
costs into assessments, make the assessments inaccurate or inadequate. 
17 
The need for a comprehensive database must be stressed. APMI needs to be integrated in a 
relational database so the different components of APMS can access and manipulate the database. 
In addition, there is greater need for appropriate visualization of APMI. 
Such databases and visualization should cater to needs of different users of APMI. Visualization 
is needed to be able to effectively communicate the wide variety of information available from 
an APMS. The sheer quantity of information available requires the use of a data-filtering 
method to reduce the data to a manageable level and to highlight key information. Furthermore, 
I there is a need to visualize the APMI within the spatial context of the airport or airport systems. 
Users may wish to visualize different APMI or same APMI differently. The user may wish to 
see several visualizations of the unique attributes of individual pavement sections or the effects 
I of varied budget decisions. 
I There is a need for seamless integration of APMS with GIS to provide dynamic linkage, hl ly  
explore the capabilities of GIs, and be able to do spatial analysis. Such integration is needed to 
considerably improve the responsiveness of the APMS. 
Furthermore, there is a need for devising an architecture for scale-wise integration of the APMS 
which can eliminate data redundancies; provide access, updating, and querying capabilities; and 
be flexible so that different users can obtain and visualize only that APMI that is relevant to them. 
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ABSTRACT 
Airline code-share agreements in both the U.S. domestic market and international market are 
playing a significant role in the marketing strategies developed to win market share. 
Additionally, airlines are examining a wide range of electronic distribution channels in an effort 
to control costs and serve customers. This paper examines how codeshare agreements came into 
existence and the effect of codeshares on computer reservation system displays. Finally, the 
paper examines the results of a structured investigation of airline display patterns on leading 
electronic reservation system providers (ERSP) and the presence of codeshare arrangements on 
the screen displays consumers have to examine. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the 1980's, in the wake of airline deregulation, code sharing developed in the U.S. 
between major trunk airlines and so-called "regional" or "commuter" airlines. During the 1990's, 
code sharing spread well beyond its early uses. The practice has proliferated between U.S. and 
foreign carriers serving international city-pair markets. Internationally, dozens of code share 
agreements now exist between U.S. airlines and their foreign counterparts covering hundreds of 
city pairs throughout the world (Bingaman, 1996). 
Codeshare agreements take various forms (See Feldman, 1997; Rhoades and Lush, 1997; 
Hannegan and Mulvey, 1995). If there is a financial relationship or antitrust immunity the 
relationship may also be called an alliance. Early on, passengers were not parties to these 
agreements nor in many cases were passengers aware of the codeshare existence (Howe, 1998). 
The alliance trend developed as a way for most major airlines to grow globally. International 
mergers are prevented by national ownership restrictions, while domestic mergers have a bad 
name. Alliances allow the airlines to sidestep restrictive rules in nation-to-nation bilateral 
agreements under a system established by the 1944 Chicago Convention (Ott, 1999). "Airline 
alliances come about much like any other corporate relationships where a company seeks to 
increase market share or reduce competition. But unlike other businesses, airlines are 
constrained by treaty, laws and regulations, especially in the international market place where 
crossborder mergers or acquisitions may not be possible. Alliances are one way around such 
restrictions (Howe, 1998)." Many airline partnerships, outside of the four huge airline 
partnerships of KLmorthwest ,  Star, Sky Team and oneworld (which does not have antitrust 
immunity), are limited to sharing computer reservations system codes, growing out of bilateral 
relationships between the various nations. The participating airlines focus attention on 
simplified ticketing and passenger processing, linking computer reservations systems in some 
fashion and directing sales personnel to become ticket agents for the partner carrier (Ott, 1999). 
Initially, domestic end-to-end network combinations involved code-share arrangements 
between major trunkline air carriers and commuter airlines that operated route networks linking 
the trunkline carriers' hubs with smaller cities in the region. Trunkline and commuter airlines' 
networks seldom overlapped to any appreciable extent, because they operated different 
equipment and were more efficient at serving different markets and route structures. For the 
most part, such a relationship still exists between U.S. major carriers and their feeder airlines. I 
I 
I International code-share agreements enabled both the U.S. and foreign partners to extend 
significantly the reach of their individual networks. By linking largely end-to-end domestic and 
foreign networks, the code-share partners offered "on-line" service to smaller cities located 
beyond its foreign partner's gateways. Such routes could not be served profitably with the 
individual airlines' own equipment, due to the small number of international passengers and 
cabotage prohibitions on foreign carriers serving local traffic. 
I 
I 
Network expanding agreements generated two types of public interest benefits. First, 
network expanding code-share agreements enabled airlines to offer what many passengers 
consider to be the equivalent of single-line service to large numbers of passengers who otherwise 
would be limited to interline connections. These passengers included "double connect'' 
passengers whose routes included U.S. cities located beyond U.S. gateway airports, and foreign 
cities located beyond foreign gateway airports. To the extent that passengers prefer code-share 
connecting services over traditional interline connecting services, the code-share agreements 
enabled airlines to provide valuable services that otherwise would not be available in those 
markets. In addition, by linking largely end-to-end route networks, international code-share 
i 
I 
I 
agreements can inject additional competition into city-pair markets currently served by 
competitors’ on-line connecting flights. If neither of the code-share partners currently serves that 
city-pair, the new combined code-share service might be an effective competitive alternative to 
other carriers’ existing on-line services, and constrain prices in that market (DOJ, 1998). 
The Importance of Codesharing and Display Rules 
Codeshares can be good for airlines, expanding an airline’s hub and spoke network, and 
therefore their market. Codeshare agreements give small carriers access to major routes and 
major carriers access to thinner routes and allow carriers to depict services to cities which they 
do not actually serve, giving the impression of a much bigger route structure than in fact is the 
case (Howe, 1998). “Leaving aside the question of equity, all the marketing alliances so far 
signed have much in common. They involve in particular the co-ordination of schedules and, 
where possible, the sharing of airport terminals so that the partners feed each other’s services. 
They also are based on the sharing of computer reservations system codes to improve Computer 
Reservation System (CRS) display (Shaw, 1993).” 
The advantage in display ranking in CRS systems provided by code-shares is important. 
In the early 1980’s, there were two single-access systems connected to nearly 80% of US travel 
agencies. The systems were the SABRE system, at that time owned by American Airlines, and 
the APOLLO system, originally owned by United Airlines. Single-access systems provided 
travel agents with comprehensive booking services, showing information about airline 
availability, car rental, hotel and other business (Shaw, 1993). Travel agents and the CRS 
provided an important service to consumers by making information available about the fare and 
service offerings of all airlines. The CRS also offered small airlines and new entrants access to a 
national network for marketing services and distributing airline tickets. 
Controversy over the use of the CRS soon arose. Studies indicated that travel agents 
would book passengers from the first screen of CRS display. A busy route, taking into account 
both direct flights and connecting opportunities, might require several screens to display all 
options in the CRS. However, analysis of bookings showed that more than 80% of bookings 
were being made from the first screen. Travel agents would look at subsequent screens if they 
were unable to satisfy the customer from the first screen. Even on the first page, position was 
vital. “There was a pronounced tendency for bookings to come from the top half, rather than the 
bottom half of this first page, with the airline whose flight was displayed on the top line of the 
first page of display having a particular advantage (Shaw, 1993)." 
The problem is that only a few major carriers owned a CRS. The policy of the airlines 
that owned the CRS was to receive a commercial advantage from the huge system investments 
made. Through the use of bias, the owners ensured that their flights were displayed early on the 
first screen, and competitor's flights were shown only on later and less accessible screens. This 
situation continued through the early 1980s, but led to growing concern that CRS were distorting 
competition by giving an unfair advantage to the airlines that owned the CRS. In November 
1984, the Civil Aeronautics Board, in one of the last actions of the Board, ruled CRS displays 
I 
I must be unbiased, with all airlines receiving equal treatment. The CAB was abolished on 3 1 
December 1984, under the terms of the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act. 
The CAB rule making did not solve the problem it was intended to tackle. Not 
surprisingly, the CRS vendor airlines reacted to it with great hostility. "It amounted to a 
requirement that they should provide a CRS service to competitors, many of whom had spent 
virtually nothing on CRS development, which was equivalent to the one provided for their own 
services (Shaw, 1993)." 
To combat assumed CRS bias by American and United through their ownership in the 
SABRE and APOLLO systems, in March 1991 the U.S. Transportation Department proposed 
rules aimed at fostering competition among airline reservation systems. The significant rules 
involved changes allowing for travel agents to use third party equipment and software to access 
I 
I 
I 
I airline information when making computerized bookings. At the time, airlines provided all of 
1 the equipment and software, with SABRE having a 48 percent market share and APOLLO 
having a 28 percent market share (McGinley, 1991). The rules were adopted in 1992, but it did 
not take long for the airlines to find a way around the restrictions. 
I 
l In November 1996, the DOT'S Aviation Enforcement Office accused American Airlines 
and SABRE, its affiliated computer reservations system, with violating federal rules prohibiting 
bias in CRS displays used by travel agents. The complaint charged that add-on software 
distributed by American to travel agents who subscribe to the widely-used SABRE illegally 
biases the displays by rearranging flights to favor American and its regional code-share partner, 
American Eagle. American agreed that the software, called "Preference MAAnager," rearranged 
SABRE flight displays to bring American and American code-share flights to the top, but only if 
I 
an agent elected to use the software. In its defense, American argued that the rules adopted on 
CRS bias in 1992 did not prohibit the distribution of software providing carrier-specific displays 
for travel agents (Aviation Week & Space Technology, 1996). In March 1997, a DOT 
administrative law judge ruled that American was not violating federal rules by offering travel 
agents software that lists its flights ahead of competitors in computer reservation system 
displays. Travel agencies whose customers frequently fly a single airline, or who receive 
bonuses from an airline for steering extra business its way, use preference software on personal 
computers to weed out competing carriers and boost sales to a favored airline (The Wall Street 
Journal, 1997). The outcome was the same either way. The difference is whether bias for a 
particular airline was built into a CRS or whether the travel agent "elected" to use bias in CRS 
displays. The court allowed for bias when the travel agent implemented the bias. 
Codesharing provides one way for airlines to circumvent the CRS rules against bias. ' I .  . . 
airlines prefer to offer connecting flights as on-line because CRS. . . list online flights before 
interline connections on CRS display screens, and travel agents tend to book customers on flights 
listed on the first screen (Menzies, 1999)." As preference is given to single-airline connections 
for display in CRS over interline connections, codesharing became increasingly attractive to the 
airlines. The practice of codesharing was most often used to show connection flights on two 
different airlines as a connection on one airline. "In displaying connecting flights as being on 
one airline, airlines are listing them as on-line rather than interline. . . they are responding to 
consumers' preferences for booking connecting flights on the same airline (Menzies, 1999)." 
When both carriers have the same two-letter code, the CRS will treat them as if connections 
between them are on the same carrier, whereas in fact they may be interline connections 
requiring a change of carriers. According to the DOT in 1986, consumers generally believe that 
same-carrier connections make for easier connections and are less likely to result in lost luggage 
(Menzies, 1999). Codesharing could provide airlines an advantage over competitors by 
potentially bumping flights to subsequent screens since code sharing allowed one flight to 
possibly be listed twice. 
The CRS rules governing codesharing, also referred to as Display of Joint Operations in 
Carrier-Owner Computer Reservation Systems, are found in Part 256 of the Aviation Law 
Reports. Originally drafted in 1984, the section reads, 
"The purpose of this part is to set forth a requirement for operation by air 
carriers of computer reservation systems used by travel agents so as to 
prevent unfair, predatory, and anticompetitive practices in air 
transportation . . . A system vendor shall not deny access to its system to 
two or more carriers whose flights share a single designator code, absent 
a determination by the Board that the use of the code constitutes a 
violation. A system vendor shall not discriminate against any carrier on 
the basis of that carrier's'using the same designator code as another 
carrier, either by display bias, or any other means relating to providing 
the system.. ..'I (Aviation Law Reports, Part 256). 
This set the precedent that code sharing by airlines could not be disallowed by owners of CRS 
systems such as SABRE. 
I 
~ 
In 1994, the DOT issued a policy statement that supported code-sharing alliances, but 
proposed rules that would require airlines and travel agents to notify customers, before booking 
flights, which airline will be operating a code-share flight and provide a written notice with the 
ticket naming the operating airline (Mead, 1995). Enforced only recently, Part 257.1 of the 
Aviation Law Reports, titled Disclosure of Code-sharing Arrangements and Long-term Wet , 
I Leases, states, 
"The purpose of this part is to ensure that ticket agents doing business in 
the United States, air carriers, and foreign air carriers tell consumers 
clearly when the air transportation they are buying or considering buying 
involves a code-sharing arrangement or a long-term wet lease, and that 
they disclose to consumers the transporting carrier's identity." 
Section 257.5(a) states, 
Yn written or electronic schedule information provided by carriers in the 
United States to the public, the Official Airline Guides and comparable 
publications, and where applicable, computer reservations systems, 
carriers involved in code-sharing arrangement or long-term wet leases 
shall ensure that each flight in scheduled passenger air transportation on 
which the designator code is not that of the transporting carrier is 
identified by an asterisk or other easily identifiable mark and that the 
corporate name of the transporting carrier and any other name under 
which that service is held out to the public is also disclosed" (Aviation 
Law Reports, Part 257). 
Today, the airlines and travel agents are required to tell passengers when code sharing will occur. 
Prior to recent notification rules, passengers sold a connecting flight on two carriers were often 
led to believe they were traveling on a single carrier as a result of the same two-letter code being 
I 
used on both flights. Only when they arrived at the airport did they discover that one or more of 
the segments were flown by another airline using a small and uncomfortable turbo-prop aircraft 
or aboard an unfamiliar airline. 
Past Codeshare Investigations & Rules 
As early as 1988, both the European Civil Aviation Council and the European 
Community announced that they would be publishing codes of conduct applicable to the 
operation of a CRS. These CRS codes of conduct state that on all routes, direct, non-stop flights 
should be listed first, followed by direct, stopping flights. Finally, connections should be shown, 
using the sole criterion of minimum elapsed journey time. The fastest connections should be 
listed first. Potentially, these codes of conduct are highly significant, because they allow for no 
advantage to be given to on-line compared with interline connections. As a result, theoretically, 
there is no benefit in European airlines signing code sharing agreements (Shaw, 1993). 
Due to the growth in codeshares in April 1995, the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
looked at the benefits of airline alliances. When examining the practice of code sharing within 
the alliances, the future effects on competition were uncertain (Mead, 1995). However, GAO 
found codeshares using the first CRS display screen in nearly 20% of the cases it reviewed, 
thereby "crowding out" competing flight options to lower screens. "This situation limits 
competition because industry studies have shown that travel agents - who are responsible for 
80% of all airline bookings - book flights that are listed on the CRS's first screen as often as 90% 
of the time (Mead, 1995)." While the DOT'S proposed rules from the previous year sought to 
ensure that consumers are told which airline partner will actually operate a code-share flight, 
neither the regulations in place at the time nor the proposed rules limited how often the same 
flight could be listed in the CRS. GAO found that multiple listings of the same flight give 
airlines in an alliance a competitive advantage. GAO also found it important to report to 
Congress in 1995 that, 'I. . . the European Union in 1993 limited to two the number of times a 
flight can be listed (Mead, 1995)." As a result, GAO recommended that the Secretary of 
Transportation prohibit more than two listings of the same code-share flight in computer 
reservation systems. GAO had reviewed the first CRS screen for 17 international city-pairs on 
the Worldspan and Apollo systems and found that 19 percent of them contained three listings of 
the same flight. The same flights were displayed as flights on airline "A", then airline "B', and 
finally a combination of the two. Because the same flight connection was listed three times and 
consumed six of the eight lines on the first CRS screen, a competing flight option with the same 
fare and elapsed flight time had been pushed to the second screen. GAO told Congress 
competition had been reduced (Mead, 1995). 
I 
In October 1996, GAO reported to Congress that sales and marketing strategies, when 
used by incumbent airlines in US. domestic markets, make it difficult for nonincumbents to 
I enter markets dominated by an established airline. Examples of these strategies included travel 
agent commission overrides to encourage travel agencies to book travelers on one airline over 
another on the basis of factors other than price and CRS bias in which multiple listings of a 
single flight offered by an alliance partner crowd the first few screens in US. systems, making 
the booking of an alliance partner's codeshare flight more likely (Anderson, 1998). 
Alternate Distribution Channels and Codeshares 
I A July 1999 GAO report investigated the move away from traditional distribution 
methods. "Changes in the way the airline industry sells tickets have had mixed effects on travel 
agencies and consumers. Since 1995, airlines have saved as much as $4.3 billion by reducing 
commissions paid to travel agencies. Through the use of new technology such as the Internet 
and electronic ticketing, airlines have found new ways to lower the cost of selling their tickets 
(GAO, 1999)." Indeed, over the past few years the expense of distribution and CRS usage had 
risen to the point that even airlines that owned a CRS publicly complained about the level of the 
fees (Klein, 1996). These fees have become major issues for the airlines, forcing them to seek 
alternative methods for ticket distribution. 
I 
, 
The 1999 GAO report has ramifications for CRS rules involving code-share flights. The 
report says, "Changes in the travel industry allow consumers to benefit from the emergence of 
new ways to buy tickets. The growth in Internet sales, for example, demonstrates that some 
consumers prefer this way of purchasing tickets." The GAO cites a study by Jupiter 
Communications, a technology and consulting firm, reporting Internet sales of airline tickets had 
already grown to $3 billion in 1999, or 4 percent of total sales. In another study referenced by 
GAO, Forrester Research found an estimated 8.2 million leisure trips were booked on-line in 
1998 (GAO, 1999). 85 Million travelers booked online in 1999, representing a 146% increase 
since 1998 (Hall, 2000). Since the most popular Internet travel sites, also known as Electronic 
Reservation System Providers (ERSP), such as Travelocity and Expedia are merely web-based 
user-friendly interfaces for an existing CRS , issues regarding applicability of current CRS 
display rules when the information is regurgitated in a web-based format for consumers is an 
interest of concern to many parties. 
THE STUDY 
The researchers were approached by a major U.S. airline to determine if override 
commissions have made their way into Internet Electronic Reservation System Providers and 
investigate if there were any methods currently being used to bias the customer towards specific 
airlines. To complete the study four types of origin and destination markets are investigated: 
A flight operated between the airline hub and another city that is a hub of 
a different airline 
A flight operated between the airline hub and another city that is NOT a 
hub of a different airline 
A flight operated between another airline’s hub and another non-hub city 
A flight operated between two non-hub cities 
There were a different number of O D  city pairs for each of the above criteria, due to the number 
of hubs (2) investigated, with a total of 10 city pairs selected for analysis. 
The study design utilized a variety of shopping patterns and behaviors for investigation. 
There were 4 different advance purchase requirements used: 30 days, 15 days, 10 days, and 2 
days. There were two different fare search methods used (where applicable), a Lowest Price 
(leisure traveler) search or Time Specific (business traveler) search. 
There were 5 Internet travel agencies analyzed, with the five sites not operated by any 
airline, but instead were independent electronic reservation providers at the time of the study. 
The sites investigated were: 
Travelocity (http://www.travelocity.com/) 
Microsoft Expedia (http://www.expedia.com/) 
Preview Travel (http://www.previewtravel.com/) 
BizTravel (http://www.biztravel.com/) 
Internet Travel Network (http://www.itn.com) 
unforeseen difficulties with one of the purchase profiles (business travel in Travelocity) the 
THE RESULTS 
Overall, in particular markets the presence of codeshares are quite noticeable. Of 
importance is that the codeshares that appear in the itineraries investigated not only reflect the 
presence of the global alliances linking through particular hub cities, but also the domestic 
alliance arrangement between Continental and Northwest, First, we will present data on the 
number of codeshares appearing in the selected ERSP. At the conclusion of the results section 
are a series of cross tabulation tables that show codeshares by ERSP broken down by travel type 
(business or leisure) and by the 10 city pairs used in the research. 
Travelocity 
Due to an unforeseen difficulty only the “9 Best Itineraries” data from Travelocity is 
presented. The use of this data is to represent the leisure passenger who is price sensitive. Of 
the possible 400 observations, only 360 are available for analysis as 4 days of observations for 
the 10 day buying pattern are missing. Of the 360 observations, 145 (40.3%) had a codeshare in 
one of the itineraries. The number of codeshares present ranged from 1 to 8, with a mean of 3.46 
codeshares present in the 145 observations reporting code shares. Table One presents the 
distribution of the number of codeshares present in the 9 Best Itineraries. Of note is the presence 
of 2 codeshares in 58 (40%) of the 145 nine best itineraries possessing codeshares. 
Table One - Number of Codeshares in the 
9 Best Itineraries (n = 145) 
1 
Number of Codeshares 3 
Percent 2.1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
58 28 15 19 12 8 2 
40.0 19.3 10.3 13.1 8.3 5.5 1.4 
In examining the cross tabulations between the city pairs and the codeshare variables 
Table I1 in the Appendix, codeshares do not become an issue with the leisure itineraries until 
those city pairs representing routes across the middle of the country. The cross tabulations show 
the city pairs of STL-IAH, STL-SEA, MSP-MSY and RNO-RDU as having the most codeshares 
in the itineraries, with the city pairs of STL-IAH and RNO-RDU reporting the highest frequency 
of codeshares within the observations. Examining the output from the Travelocity web site, the 
majority of the codeshares listed in the 9 best itineraries are codeshares between Continental and 
Northwest. Utilizing the combinations possible due to hubs in Houston, Memphis, Detroit and 
Minneapolis, these airlines dominate the frequency of options displayed for the city pairs of 
STL-IAH and RNO-RDU. 
Expedia 
For Expedia there is a total of 688 observations available. For the business travel pattern 
300 observations are available as there was a difficulty with the 2 day buying behavior pattern 
and this was dropped. For leisure travel, 388 of a possible 400 observations are present. 
Business: To select an itinerary as a business traveler a user must first examine a list of 
departure flights and then select one before seeing a list of return flights to select from. In the 
departure listing 23 1 (77%) of the 300 observations had codeshares present. In the return listing 
214 (71.3%) of the observations had codeshares listed. The tables below present the number of 
codeshares present in these two listings. 
Frequency 
Percent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
118 50 5 19 15 17 7 
39.3 16.7 1.7 6.3 5.0 5.7 2.3 
Frequency 
Percent 
In examining the Expedia leisure cross tabulations in the Appendix (Table VIII), the , greatest number of codeshares are in 4 city pairs, STL-IAH, STL-SEA, MCI-MSY, and RNO- 
RDU. For the STL-IAH the Delta, Swissair and Sabena alliance which was in operation at the 
time of data collection drives the number of codeshares. For the other three city pairs the 
Northwest / Continental alliance drives the number of codeshares. 
Preview 
For Preview, which had not been purchased by Travelocity at the time of data collection, 
there was a total of 778 valid observations out of a possible 800. For the business purchasing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
67 53 53 11 3 14 13 
22.3 17.7 17.7 3.7 1 .o 4.7 4.3 
1 2 3 
Frequency 86 40 9 
Percent of total observations 21.5 10 2.3 
4 
3 
.8 
behavior there were 399 observations and for the leisure purchasing pattern 379 valid 
observations. 
Frequency 
Business: Much like the other sites, Preview presents a list of departing and return flights 
for the traveler to select from. For the outbound listing there were 219 (54.8%) codeshares in the 
399 observations, while for the return listing there were 194 (48.6%) codeshares in the 399 
observations. The tables below present the frequency of codeshares appearing. In examining 
the cross tabulation tables for Preview in the Appendix (Table IX and Table X), we see the 
majority of these code shares appear in the city pair impacted by the domestic codeshare of 
Northwest and Continental. 
Table Five - Number of Codeshares displayed in Outbound Listing 
n = 399 
1 2 3 4 
173 38 6 2 
Frequency 
Percent of total observations 
Percent oftotal observations I 43.3 I 9.5 I 1.5 I .5 
67 74 51 2 
16.8 18.5 12.8 .5 
Table Six - Number of Codeshares displayed in Return Listing 
n = 399 
Frequency 
Percent of total observations 
1 1 1 2 1 3  1 4  
47 34 21 14 
12.4 8.9 5.5 3.7 
Leisure: For the leisure purchasing pattern 116 (30.6%) of the 379 observations have 
codeshares. This number is somewhat possibly reduced due to the fact that Preview only 
displayed domestic flights. Therefore, all the codeshares present are from domestic 
arrangements, and do not show the influence of any international alliances. This can be seen 
examining Table XI in the Appendix. The frequency of codeshares is for leisure purchasing 
behavior is shown below in Table Seven. 
Table Seven - Number of Codeshares displayed in Leisure Itineraries 
n = 379 
1 1 1 2 1  3 I 4  
Internet Travel Network 
The ITN site is interesting for the manner in which the same format is used for both 
buying behaviors. Unlike Travelocity and Expedia, which have different designs for the type of 
travel one is arranging, a user must enter into a personal profile page to adjust the search 
parameters guiding the selection process. The profile allows a user to set the parameters for the 
flight search by using a list of factors from price, to departure times, to fewest connections. All 
of the requested number of flight options appear on one page the user scrolls down. After 
selecting the flight options, users must click through to see the price of the itinerary selected and 
any lower priced options the site has found. For this project, the researchers utilized the 15 
available flight options. The students were required to enter the personal profile option and 
using the “sort air choices by” button select the “price (lowest to highest)” for leisure buying 
behavior, and “time (closest to inquiry)” for business buying behavior. For the project students 
only collected observations from the “Flight Availability Selections” page and did not click 
through to price the itinerary. Due to unforeseen difficulties, two days of observations were not 
collected, leaving 380 observations for each of the buying behavior profiles. 
, 
, 
Business: Further investigation lead to the dropping of 7 observations from the business 
profile, leaving 3 73 valid observations for the business purchasing profile. The researchers 
investigated the presence of codeshares in the departures and return flight listing. In the i 
1 
I Frequency 100 
Percent 41.3 
I 
I departures listing 242 (64.9%) of the 373 departure observations reported the presence of a 
codeshare flight. For the 242 observations displaying a codeshare, a mean of 2.5 codeshares per 
departure listing is found. 
Table Eight - Number of Codeshares displayed in Departures Listing 
n = 242 
2 3 4 5 6 7 10 
67 5 23 29 10 7 1 
27.7 2.1 9.5 12.0 4.1 2.9 .4 
In examining the cross tabulation tables for business departures in the Appendix (Table 
I 
XIII) codeshares do not appear in only one city pair, JFK-MSY. The largest number of 
codeshares are on the city pairs of JFK-LAX and JFK-MCO. These appear due to the competing 
international alliances on the JFK-LAX route (Star Alliance and oneworld) and the presence of 
the now defunct Delta, Swiss Air and Sabena alliance on the JFK-MCO route. 
For the return listing, 263 (70.5%) of the 373 observations reported the presence of a 
codeshare. For the 263 observations, a mean of 2 codeshares per return listing is found. Table 
Nine displays the frequency. 
Table Nine - Number of Codeshares displayed in Return Listing 
n = 263 
1 
Frequency 69 
Percent 26.2 
2 3 4 5 6 
151 30 4 1 8 
57.4 11.4 1.5 .4 3.0 
In examining the cross tabulation table for returns in the Appendix (Table XV) 
codeshares are well represented in all the city pairs except JFK-MSY and SAN-BDL. The 
widest distribution of code shares is found in the JFK-MSY and JFK-LAX city pair. Again, the 
presence of the international alliance codeshares dominates these city pairs. 
Leisure: Unlike the other sites, leisure travel purchasing requires a change in profile, not 
another display option like some of the other ERSPs investigated. So, one does not get a 
complete itinerary, but instead a departure and return listing of flights to select from. For the 
departure listing 250 (65.8%) of the 380 departures report the presence of a codeshare, with a 
mean of 2.34 codeshares in the departure listing. Table Ten displays the frequency of codeshares 
in the departure listings. 
Table Ten - Number of Codeshares displayed in Departures Listing 
n = 250 
1 
Frequency 117 
Percent 46.8 
2 3 4 5 6 
56 5 27 36 9 
22.4 2.0 10.8 14.4 3.6 
In examining the return listings 281 (73.9%) of the 380 return flight listings had a 
codeshare present with a mean of 2.48 codeshares per departure listing. Table Eleven displays 
the frequency of the codeshares in the return flight listings. 
Table Eleven - Number of Codeshares displayed in Return Listing 
n = 281 
Frequency 
Percent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
91 92 46 14 4 29 5 
32.4 32.7 16.4 5.0 1.4 10.3 1.8 
In examining the cross tabulation tables in the Appendix (Table XVII and Table XIX) for 
the leisure purchasing behavior the same pattern of codeshare activity is present as the business 
purchasing behavior. The city pairs JFK-LAX and JFK-MCO display the highest frequency of 
codeshare activity, while the city pairs JFK-MSY and SAN-BDL have almost no codeshares. 
For users of ITN the international alliances and the impact the alliances can have on screen 
display are clearly present. 
3 4 
82 98 
BizTravel 
Of the ERSPs investigated during the time period of the research, BizTravel was the only 
one owned by a traditional travel management company, Rosenbluth International. As such, 
BizTravel as an ERSP is targeted for the business traveler and the variety of loyalty plans (airline 
frequent flyer plan, rental car, hotel, etc..) the traveler may belong to. Unlike the other systems 
that provide a long list of flights, BizTravel first presented three complete itineraries for review 
and then additional lists of outbound and return flights are presented for review. For leisure 
travel the “Flight Preference” option was set to lowest price and for the business travel 
purchasing the Flight Preference” was set to display by desired schedule. There were 396 valid 
observations for both purchasing behaviors utilized. 
Business: In the three recommended itineraries, 127 (32.1%) of the 396 observations 
possessed a codeshare as part of a recommended itinerary. If one continued and examined the 
number of codeshares in the additional available flights outbound 245 (61.6%) of the 
observations in the outbound listings had a code share present. In the additional return flight 
listings 257 (64.8%) of the return listings had a codeshare listing. The tables below show the 
frequency of the codeshares in the optional outbound and return flight listings. 
5 6 
2 1 
Table Twelve - Number of Codeshares displayed in Outbound Listing 
n = 245 
Frequency 
Percent 
I I I 
33.5 I 40 I .8 I .4 
Table Thirteen - Number of Codeshares displayed in Returns Listing 
n = 257 
Frequency 
Percent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
9 13 101 102 31 1 
3.5 5.1 39.3 39.7 12.1 .4 
Leisure: In the recommended three itineraries only 60 (1 5.1 %) codeshares are present in 
the 396 observations. In examining Table XXIV in the Appendix, the majority of the codeshares 
in the recommended itineraries (35 of the 60) appear in the RNO-RDU city pair. 
For the outbound option flight listing there are 25 1 (63.4%) codeshares in the 396 
observations. For the return listing there are 256 (64.6%) codeshares in the 396 observations. 
The tables below present the frequency of codeshares in the additional flight listings. 
1 1  2 1  3 
Frequency I 20 54 I 82 
Table Fourteen - Number of Codeshares displayed in Outbound Listing 
n = 251 
4 5 
94 1 
Frequency 
Percent 
Percent I 7.9 I 21.5 I 32.7 I 37.5 I .4 
8 13 90 111 34 
3.1 5.1 35.1 43.4 13.3 
Table Fifteen - Number of Codeshares displayed in Return Listing 
n = 256 
I 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5  
Examining the tables (Table XXVI and Table XXVIII) in the Appendix that 7 of the 10 
city pairs investigated show a high degree of code share activity in the listings. Those city pairs 
not showing code share activity are JFK-MSY, STL-IAH and SAN-BDL. Looking at the city 
pairs displaying a high degree of international code share activity in the JFK-LAX and JFK- 
MCO city pair listings and a high degree of the domestic Northwest / Continental code share 
activity on the STL-ATL and MSP-MSY city pairs. 
CONCLUSION 
Except for Preview Travel, the ERSPs investigated all displayed a high level of codeshare 
activity in the displays shown to potential travelers. The code share activity that is shown during 
the time period under investigation is of two origins. On routes utilizing a city with a large 
international presence, especially JFK, the international alliances and the codeshare opportunities 
that come from the alliances do appear on the display. Again, Preview was the only site this did 
not occur because Preview did not book international travel. On some of the northhouth routes, 
especially those in the middle of the country, the Northwest/Continental alliance made its 
presence felt. Having the opportunity to utilize routings through 4 hub cities in the middle of the 
country: Detroit, Minneapolis, Memphis, Houston; and especially with the city pairs investigated 
where one of these cities was either the origin and destination city, the different routings 
available by using the other hubs dominates some of the itineraries displayed in the observations. 
Clearly, the power of an alliance and the benefit of the codesharing opportunities that come 
about are supported in this investigation. 
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Strategic classification of current airline alliances and examination of 
critical factors involving the formations-an explorative perspective 
Zhi. H. Wang and Michael Evans 
Graduate College of Management, Southern Cross University, Australia 
Abstract 
This research identifies several categories of airline alliances through a strategic 
classification of various alliance activities involving the major airlines for the period 
1989 to 1999. Such a classification enables this research to examine how strategic 
alliances are developing in the markets of North America, the European Union and 
the Asia Pacific regions, and what are the critical factors involved with a formation 
and development of alliances. Findings support the argument that the liberalization 
process, being different between countries, can affect airlines of these countries 
entering different types of airline alliances. This exploratory study facilitates research 
undertaken by the researchers to further examine effects and consequences of 
different types of the airline alliances. 
Background to the research 
In the 20th century, companies have experienced changes in a diverse environment, 
including the shake up of the social structure, economic progress and technological 
advances (Limerick and Cunnington, 1993). The social structural evolution resulted in 
dismantled hierarchical cultures within industries. The economic changes resulted in a 
change of lifestyle patterns and increased consumption (Goeldner, 1992). The 
technological changes have lifted the industrial society into an information society 
(Limerick and Cunnington, 1993). The progress of information technology has not 
just enabled banking between countries, but also allowing communication, research 
and development, and business coordination through the communication network. 
These social, economic and technological changes are paving a way for organizational 
globalization. Facing this changing environment, most industries have adopted 
various management strategies, including cooperative strategies, to cope with the 
changing environment challenges. Strategic alliances haven been employed as one of 
the forms of cooperative strategies. 
1 
Previous studies on strategic alliances can be viewed from several perspectives, 
including geographical scope (Byttebier and Verroken, 1995; Dussauge, 1990; Farrar 
et al., 1991), fundamental alliances (Pucik, 1988; Kanter, 1989), and hierarchical 
ranges (Faulkner, 1995; Pucik’s, 1988; Robinson and Clarke-Hill, 1994 & 1995). 
These concepts are shown in Figure 1. and briefly discussed next. 
Figure 1. Summary of approaches to strategic alliances in the current literature 
Joint  : \‘en t u r e 
Approaches to strategic al l iance I 
Geographica l  
Manufac tur ing  
?-I C n I I a I) o r a t inn 
Consor t ium 
Bi-nat ional  
1’ec h n i c a I 
Assis tance  Focused Al l iances  
Joint  Market ing  u
I Research Pool ing  I m Cross  Dis tr ibut ion 
I Cross Licens ing  I I 
Equi ty  Investment  
The geographical perspective studies strategic alliances in terms of collaboration, 
consortia, and bi-national groups. The fundamental studies review strategic alliances 
in terms of joint ventures, technology change, licensing, cross-distribution, and co- 
production. In turn, hierarchical ranges emphasize the levels of cooperation in an 
alliance such as simple coordination or complex alliances in terms of nature and 
features. The simpler forms of alliances can be reviewed as focused alliances such as 
research and development (R&D) or sharing resources. The more complex forms may 
include equity investment, and various activities of coordination, from joint 
manufacturing to cross licensing, and to cross distribution of products. 
Enterprises pursue alliances for the purposes of being able to cultivate multinational 
markets, save time in learning curves, share resources and manage risks, gain global 
brand reputations, and economies of scale and scope. Previous studies, although some 
2 
of them are overlapping in concepts or terminology, show various approaches to 
strategic alliances. Similar to enterprises in general, the airline industry has also 
adopted strategic alliances. 
Since 1994, there have been a rapidly increasing number of airlines entering strategic 
alliances. Meanwhile the airline industry has experienced several growth periods 
(Wang, et. al, 1999), despite the two economic depressions due to the Gulf War 
during 1990, and the Asian financial crisis in 1997. It is not just the numbers of 
alliances that has increased in the last decade; there are also various formations 
emerging. What follows is consideration of what are the alliance strategies developed 
in the airline industry? What is the impact of the strategic alliances on airline 
performance? 
Research problems 
While airlines are increasing the number of alliances and the levels of involvement to 
the alliances, there are also some problems identified. One of the problems is seen as 
there are only a few empirical investigations about the effects of strategic alliances. 
Given this gap, there is even fewer studies have examined the effects of various 
strategic alliances mergers in the air transport markets. Secondly, the stages of market 
liberalization between North America, the European Union (EU) and the Asia Pacific 
region (AP) differ (Eleck, Findlay, Hooper and Warren; 1999; PC, 1998, Oum, 1998). 
This situation may have affected the progress of the airlines entering strategic 
alliances. Thirdly, as airlines exercise different tactics on different routes, the various 
formations may therefore have different effects on airline performance and market 
competition. In fact, it has been argued that the US has been perusing ‘open skies’ 
while most of the markets in the AP region are still regulated and only a few AP 
airlines have been invited to enter the ‘open skies’ (Eleck, et.al, 1999; Hooper and 
Findlay, 1998; PC, 1998). As the airlines of North America are gaining more access 
to the AP markets through beyond rights, the economic effects of ‘open skies’ on the 
AP markets are questioned. Thus, there is a need to study these issues. However, the 
current studies of strategic alliances, particularly airline strategic alliances show there 
is a lack of clear definitions of the current alliance activities, which may partly result 
from the complex features and changing tactics of airline alliances. These problems 
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have motivated the researchers to conduct this research. Being directed to this goal, 
this research is designed and the research issues are specified as: 
RI 1: What are the patterns of the development of airline strategic alliances in the 
markets? 
RI 2: What are the critical factors involving a formation and development of airline 
strategic alliances? 
Aiming at addressing these issues, this paper firstly develops a conceptual model, and 
this model is presented in figure 2. This model shows approaches to the research 
issues and the presumed interrelationships between the factors to be examined. The 
conceptual model suggests the manner, in which the number and features of alliances 
increase are related to the liberalization process. The liberalization process implies the 
liberalization stages of North America, the EU, and the AP regions. 
Figure 2 Conceptual model of the research: development of airline alliances 
Source: developed for this research 
Theoretical study of the strategic classification 
Airline alliances vary in features and areas of cooperation. Thus, it is necessary to 
classify the alliance activities before examining the effects of different types of 
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alliance. This research therefore first of all conducts a strategic classification of the 
alliance activities currently undertaken by international carriers. Results of the 
classifications are shown in this section. 
New bilateral services 
Currently Bilateral Air Service Agreements are based on the principle of reciprocity, 
an equal and fair exchange of rights between countries. Although they vary in form, 
they generally specify services and routes to be operated between the two countries, 
designate airlines and the capacity to be provided by each airline (Oum and Yu, 1997; 
Rimmer, 1997). The new bilateral route specific services observed by this study 
mainly include the service agreements based on bilateral traffic rights between 
countries. The agreements offer carriers access of entry, and hence enable carriers 
operating flight services across country borders on a basis that the rights permit. The 
new bilateral services also include the services that apply beyond rights. For example, 
Air Canada launched a weekly Toronto-BerlidSchonefeld route, using fifth-freedom 
rights from Paris. Details of this classification is shown in the framework presented in 
Appendix 1. 
Code sharing 
Code sharing provides cooperation between carriers other than just access for city- 
pairs or non-stop flights. Under a code sharing agreement, one partner (the code 
sharing partner) assigns its airline designator a code to the flight of its partner the 
operating carrier (ICAO, 1997). Typically code sharing is accompanied by a suite of 
other coordinated services designed to provide passengers with smooth connections 
between flights operated by the partner carriers (ICAO, 1997). Code share could 
hence share a part of the nature of joint activities, if the cooperation is no longer 
limited within exchanging designation code or buying a block of seats, but involving 
cooperation of ground services. In that case, code share is classified into the category 
of joint activities, due to its being multiple cooperation in nature. The definitions of 
code share are specified in the framework in Appendix 1. 
Joint activities 
The current literature shows that various airline alliances are mixed together under 
equity or joint operations. This study sets up a framework for defining areas of joint 
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activities. It firstly, separates code share and block space sales from the ‘joint 
activities’ and considers them as the type two -code share alliance. It also shifts FFP 
and joint marketing up into the category of marketing alliance. Further, it specifies 
joint activities within the areas of coordination of ground handling, joint use of 
ground facilities, coordination of flight schedules, joint maintenance and purchase of 
aircraWfue1. A parallel alliance is considered by this research as either simply a code 
share or a joint activity. In that later case, it ought to be multiple cooperation in 
nature. A complementary alliance is regarded as a joint activity, if it is multiple 
cooperation within the areas of joint programs (see Appendix 1). 
Marketing alliances 
The marketing alliances examined in this research include the global alliances, such 
as Star Alliance, oneworld, or Global Wings. Some international airlines that have 
entered regional alliances with agreements covering the same areas of cooperation are 
also categorized into the group of marketing alliances. According to GAO (1995), 
global alliances often involve high integration and coordination of flights, scheduling, 
advertising and frequent flier programs. Regarding the item of coordination of flights, 
marketing alliances partly overlap with joint activities. However, marketing alliances 
aim at attracting passenger market and creating customer satisfaction through various 
cooperative operations. Thus, alliances in the category of marketing alliances have the 
major characteristics of cooperation in the marketing field. Definitions for marketing 
alliances are specified in the framework in Appendix 1. 
‘Open skies’ 
‘Open skies’ negotiations were tabled by countries in Northern America and 
European Union in 1992. The ‘open skies’ policy (see Appendix 1) shows that ‘open 
skies’ agreements are broad commercial alliances. The characteristics of the ‘open 
skies’ are also shown by the memorandum of understanding signed between the 
countries. The memorandum of understanding normally includes code share 
agreement on international and domestic flights, reciprocal FFP, lounge access, 
through check-in, integration of boarding procedures, computer reservation system 
linkage, joint marketing and sales programs. An example is the alliance between 
NorthwestKLM, through an agreement signed in 1992 (Airline Business, 1992). 
From 1993, Northwest and KLM tied up their commercial ties, which enabled the two 
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airlines to schedule common flights, cooperate in pricing and sales, and even share 
revenue (IC, 1997). The specified definitions for ‘open skies’ are presented in 
Appendix 1 and 2. Following this study another theoretical study is conducted, which 
is discussed next. 
Theoretical study of market conditions 
It is pivotal to identify the critical factors involved with the formation of alliances, 
and hence to explain why carriers engage in different types of alliances. Previous 
studies regard antecedent as an important factor for a company to enter an alliance, as 
specific and environmental factors influence the propensity of the company to enter 
an alliance (Glaister, 1996; Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995; Vyas et. al. 1995). A 
company choosing a partner also depends on strategic convergence and divergence, 
such as a larger market and central location, or a small market but central location, or 
a small market and peripheral location (Staniland, 1997). These previous studies take 
a general perspective of alliance objectives and market nature as important factors for 
forming alliances. 
This paper considers more specific factors and provides a detailed examination of the 
development of strategic alliances, particularly the dynamic features of alliances. This 
is partly because in the air transport markets all commercial aspects of international 
air transport matters have been generally governed by bilateral air treaties between the 
countries involved (GAO, 1995, IC, 1997, PC, 1998, Oum, et. al., 2000). Air Service 
Rights were a complex global network of bilateral air services agreements, to 
guarantee the scheduled and non-scheduled (charter) airlines certain traffic ‘freedoms’ 
(PC, 1998). International air transport is both “location-constrained‘’ and “nationality- 
constrained” gtaniland, 1997) These constraints restrict which airlines may offer 
international services from their airports and to and from what points abroad airlines 
may offer international services. As strategic alliances in the air transport market are 
restricted by Air Service Agreements (ASA), the governance of ASAs will affect the 
development of alliances. 
Also, it is argued that liberalization of this kind of service trade hinges not on the 
process of trading itself, but rather on the conditions under which providers of 
services are permitted to establish an actual direct or indirect presence in a specific 
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national market (Staniland, 1997). Currently Asian airlines have been generally slow 
and entered fewer alliances with each other or other airlines (Hooper, 1997). Most 
Asian countries are not prepared for ‘open skies’, and governments still maintain 
restrictions in free trading policy (IC, 1997; Hooper, 1997; Oum, 1998; PC, 1998; PC, 
1999). 
The progress of airline alliances may be explained as due to air transport market 
structures differing from region to region. For example, in 1979, the U S .  domestic air 
transport markets were deregulated (IATCA, 1979). In March 1992, the United States 
offered to negotiate trans-border “open slues” agreements with all European 
countries. Hence, the first US “open skies” deal was signed in September 1992 
between the U.S. and the Netherlands, and then Canada in 1995 (Airline Business, 
1992, 1995). In 1995, the US Department of Transportation (DOT) established its 
strategy for pursuing more liberal ‘open skies’ arrangements (DOT 1995). During the 
1990s, The European airline industry was liberalized through the implementation of 
three phases, and these were completely finished in 1997 (Graham, 1997). The US 
market deregulation and liberalization in Europe have provided necessary and 
important conditions for the significant progress of airline strategic alliances. When 
North America air traffic was fully liberalized in April 1997, the airline industry in 
the Far East was strictly regulated (Hooper, 1997; Oum, 1998). When the US 
extended an invitation to enter into open aviation agreements to a number of countries 
in 1995, airlines in the Asia- Pacific region were still slow to form alliances (IC, 
1997; Hooper, 1997; Oum, 1998; PC, 1998; PC, 1999). Based on these studies some 
methods are developed for the statistical analyses. These methods are discussed next. 
Methods 
Based on the theoretical studies, some quantitative methods are employed for 
conducting a statistical analysis. The sample used for the observation of airline 
alliances included 27 major international airlines (see Table 1). 
Based on the critical review of the market conditions of the three markets, some 
measures are formed for measuring the market conditions. These measures are 
considered as five categories in general: 1) regulation, 2) in the process of 
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deregulation, 3) deregulated, 4) in the process of liberalization, and 5 )  fully liberalized 
(see Figure 2). These measures are employed in conjunction with the development of 
different types of strategic alliance (see figure l), to examine how different alliances 
developed at each market, and whether the developments are related to market 
conditions. Some statistical tools are employed in testing the assumptions. Towards 
studying the assumptions, some hypotheses and structural equations are developed 
and presented below. 
Table 1 The 27 major international airlines used as subjects for this exploratory study 
North America 
Airlines 
Air Canada 
American 
Continental 
Delta Airlines 
Northwest 
SAS 
United 
Canadian 
USAir 
NW ILufihansa 
CDN I 
AL 
LH AirChina CA 
SR Japan Airlines JL 
VIR Korean KE 
Malaysia Airlines MH 
Qantas Airways QF 
Singapore SQ 
si 
IThai Airways I TG I 
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Hypothesis and structural models 
Hypotheses and structural models developed for the empirical investigation are as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant difference between the development of strategic 
alliances of the three markets 
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant difference between the development of airline 
strategic alliances with the diflerent market conditions 
Hypothesis 3: Airlines in markets liberalized involve more alliances than the airlines 
in markets regulated. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a linear relationship between the development of airline 
strategic alliances and increase of market abilities 
Hypothesis 5: Liberal markets lead to the more numbers and integrative alliances 
formed in the markets. 
Hypothesis 1 tests the difference between the development of airline alliances in the 
three markets. The equation model structured for testing this hypothesis is expressed 
as: 
E A , * E A ~  Ai={al)i, i=l, 2, 3, k k  .......... (4.1) 
Where Z: (A) refers to the total alliances and i is a market, and k refers to a 
comparative market. 
Hypothesis 1 also tests the differences between the five types of alliances formed by 
the airlines in the three markets. The equation 4.1 therefore is denoted as: 
.( 4 . 2 )  
Where j is a vector of a set of alliance variables, and f: refers to the sum total of the 
alliances, including the sum total alliances of type one to type five. 
]=I 
The equation model (4.1) is further specified as: 
a/ ~ : J  # a1 .................... 
,=I ,=I 
( 4 . 3 )  
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Where &, refers to the sum total alliances, including the sum total alliances of type 
one to type five of an airline company i, and z is a vector of market conditions faced 
by the company (i), and g refers to a comparative market condition (z&. 
1'1 
Hypothesis 2 tests the difference between the market conditions that the airlines of the 
three markets face. The equation model sustaining the hypothesis expressed as: 
z=1,2, ... 5, z#g .... (4.4) c (a1 >, # = (a1 >,&. 
Where i is an airline company, z refers to a market structure or conditioq g is a 
comparative market condition. 
Hypothesis 3 tests the parameters of the alliance developments. The structure model 
developed for testing the hypothesis is expressed as: 
Y = f ( A , Z , T , Q ; o )  ......... .(4.5) 
Where Y refers to the development of alliances, f denotes the functional relationship, 
A is a vector of a set of alliance variables, 2 is a vector of the market conditions, T is 
the dummy variables of years, and Q is the total passengers carried by the carriers that 
influences the airlines' behaviors in formations, and o is a term of unobservable 
effects as an exogenous variable that may also influence alliances. 
In particular, equation 4.1 is specified as: 
Y = f { A ( a ,  ..... a, ) ,Z(z  ...... zs), T(yq  ..... Y'"),Q(4i ..... q/( 1; w> .......... (4.6) 
Where a ,  ..... u5 refers to the alliances of 1 to 5 types, z , ,  .... z5refers to the market 
conditions or abilities specified at 1 to 5 levels, yr, ..... yr, refers to the year dummy 
variables of from 1989 to 1999, and q is the numbers of passengers carried by carrier 
(i) and k is a comparative carrier (izk). 
In order to estimate the coefficients, model 4.1 is transformed into a residual equation 
form as: 
In = Po + p , A + p2 Z + p T + p ZnQ, + ........ ..(4.7) 
1 1  
Where Y is the aggregate annual alliance formed of airline company i, A is the overall 
total alliance, including each specific type of alliances of an airline (9, Z is the 
specific market condition where the airline (i) operating, T is a vector of year dummy 
variables, and Qi is the total passenger traffic of the airline (0. 
Results from testing the hypotheses 
Descriptive results 
More than a thousand (1,2 1 1 ) alliance agreements were signed by the major 
international airlines between themselves and with other airlines during the eleven 
years from 1989 to 1999 (see Table 2). British Airways, American Airlines and 
United Airlines were the top three of alliances. Air Canada, Qantas, Air France, 
Scandinavian Airlines and Lufthansa were also top airline alliances. 
Table 2 Summary of the alliance activities of the 27 international airlines, 1989-99 
IAirline Rank Total 
BA 1 89 
A4 2 81 
UA 3 77 
QF 5 77 
AC 4 76 
SK 6 69 
AF 7 62 
LH 8 55 
JAL 9 51 
SR 10 49 
KL 11 46 
co 12 45 
cx 13 38 
alliances 
INW 14 45 
Note: airlines are descended according ; to the 
IAirline Rank Total 
alliances 
NZ 15 45 
DL 16 41 
SQ 17 34 
TG 17 33 
MH 18 36 
Az 19 33 
CA 20 22 
NH 21 25 
KE 22 22 
AL 23 20 
CDN 24 17 
AI 25 14 
VIR 26 9 
Total 1211 
ranks assessed based on total alliances 
formed by the 27 airlines from 1989 to 1999 
Table 3 shows generally the airlines of European Union had the largest number of 
alliances, airlines of North America had the second largest number, and followed by 
the airlines of Asia Pacific region. 
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Table 3 Comparison of increases of alliance activities in the three markets 1989-99 
Asia 
~ 
Year Northern America European Union 
1989 3 7 22 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
17 
18 
15 
22 
44 
54 
28 
65 
74 
62 
22 
7 
27 
46 
22 
45 
39 
78 
67 
90 
21 
43 
12 
23 
12 
24 
15 
39 
47 
43 
Total 402 450 301 
Note: This is based on each year’ new alliances of the 24 airlines (8 airlines from each 
market) 
Also, a pattern of three distinct growth phases of alliance development was identified, 
which was specified from 1989 to 1992; 1992 to 1995; and 1995 to 1999. The number 
of strategic alliances increased differently at each period. The number of alliances in 
the second period of the development of airline alliance was 2.4 times of the first, and 
the number of alliances in the third period was 2.3 times of the second (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3 Growth pattern of the alliance activities at the three markets 1989-99 
ote: these figures use accumulated data of alliances 
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The growth pattern also shows that the airlines of the Asia Pacific region were leading 
strategic alliance activities between 1989 and 1995. However, the airlines of Northern 
America and European Union had more rapid progress after the 12 European 
countries had completed the liberalization in 1993 and the US established ‘open skies’ 
regime after 1992. 
~Jointprclgrams 
.Open&$& 
0 Mark&ing 
Comparing the three markets, the airlines of EU developed the largest number of code 
share activities and marketing alliances, followed by the airlines of North America. 
The airlines of North America also had the largest number of new bilateral services. 
The airlines of the Asia Pacific region increased the largest number of joint programs 
from 1989 to 1999, and new bilateral services between the period of 1989 and 1994. 
The airlines of North America had the largest number of agreements signed under the 
‘open slues’ (see Figure 4). 
62 103 109 
100 117 32 
29 21 7 
Figure 4 The three markets’ involvement in the five types of alliance activities 
involvement to the he types of alliance by the three markets: 
cases of 24 mapr international airlines (1 98499) 
97 76 58 
114 I 133 I 95 
Results of the descriptive studies lead to the tests of differences of the alliance 
development between the airlines with different markets conditions. These results also 
lead to the tests of effects of the market conditions on the development of airline 
alliances. 
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Test alliance differences 
Test results of HI are presented in Table 4. Results show that there are significant 
differences between the three markets with the numbers of joint activities k2=2 1.1, 
d e 2 ,  p<O.OO l), marketing alliances k2=29.7, df=2, p<O.OO l), ‘open skies’ 
agreements k2=64.5, df=2, p<O.OOl) and route specific services k2=15.6, d e 2 ,  
p<O.OOl). The mean ranks show that the airlines of North American engaged in 
alliances in total (h=149.2) 5.6 points more than the airlines of the European Union 
(h= 143.6), and the airlines of European Union engaged in alliances in total 4.4 points 
more than the airlines of Asia Pacific region (h=139.2). Results also show clearly that 
the airlines of North American and European Union significantly engaged in more 
marketing k2=29.7, d e 2 ,  p<O.OOl) and ‘open skies’ alliances (x2=64.5, df=2, 
p<O.OOl) than the airlines of the Asia Pacific region. 
However, there is no significant difference between the numbers of total alliances and 
code share activities of the airlines in the three markets. Nonetheless, the airlines of 
North American and European Union significantly engaged in more code share 
activities than the airlines of the Asia Pacific region, as the results of asymptotic 
significance and estimated mean ranks show. One the other hand, the airlines of the 
Asia Pacific region significantly forged more route specific services and joint 
activities than the airlines of North American and European Union. Test results of HI 
agree with findings of the descriptive study, and support HI. 
Table 4: Differences of the development of strategic alliances in the three markets 
Chi-square df Mean Ranks Asymp. 
Sig. 
North European Asia P. 
Variables America Union Region 
Total alliances 0.78 2 149.2 143.6 139.2 0.68 
Route specific 15.6 2 113.6 113.3 143.5 0.00 
Code share 2.69 2 141.8 156.1 136.7 0.26 
Joint activities 2 1.1 2 116.9 143.9 168.9 0.00 
Marketing 29.7 2 157.5 173.8 114.1 0.00 
Open skies 64.5 2 173.5 168.5 105.7 0.00 
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Test market condition differences 
Test results of Hz are presented in Tables 5 and 6. Results from multiple tests based 
on the models designed generally show that the increased market abilities 
significantly contributed to the formations of alliances. 
Table 5 shows the comparisons were made between the five models, in that the 
market conditions (2) were 1,2,. . . ’5 and z+g. Results show that the mean rank of each 
year’s total new alliances are 133.3 after the markets were deregulated compared to 
117.1 when the markets were regulated, and the mean rank of each year’s total new 
alliances are 210.4 when the markets were fully liberalised compared to 133.3 when 
the market were deregulated (x2=54.8, df=4, p<O.OOl). The comparisons show that the 
airlines’ numbers and features of alliances are significantly different when they were 
in different market conditions, except with merging the route specific services. Also, 
the airlines engaged in more alliances when the market abilities were increased. 
Table 5 Estimation results: The difference between market conditions and the 
development of strategic alliance 
Chi-S Df 
xz Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Sig. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Asymp 
Variables XA.#XA# 
(%=1) (z=2) (z=3) (z=4) (z=5) t(aO,#$aou 
, I  
Annual 54.8 4 117.1 110.9 133.3 179.1 210.4 0.00 
allian’e 
Route specific 4.4 4 55.7 45.9 60.1 57.8 47.4 0.36 
Codeshare 23.8 4 66.3 59.5 63.9 85.7 101.5 0.00 
Joint activities 12.3 4 56.1 40.16 51.35 49.8 70.7 0.02 
Marketing 21.6 4 40.6 44.5 43.8 51.3 73.4 0.00 
Open skies 5.1 4 * 16.0 16.0 19.3 23.9 0.17 
a z is the market condition z=1,2,. . .,5 a tg  
The assessment based on each year’s new alliances of each airline 
*There was few ‘open slues’. 
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The insignificant result for ‘open skies’ may be explained as that there were not 
sufficient numbers that could be executed by the statistical method of listwise 
regression in the comparison. In fact, few ‘open skies’ were formed when the air 
transport markets were still regulated (when z = l ) ,  and hence a 0 value can be 
applied so the result was highly significant (pc. 001). 
Table 6 shows results from tests of the three models:L( 1 5 G (  ), L( I ) 5 G( ), 
/=I K=5 / = 2  g=3 
and L (  1 G ( (where L=1,2, ..., 5 ,  and kG) through t-tests. Results show the 
K = 5  / = 2  
airlines formed numbers and types of alliances that are significantly different in 
different market conditions, which agrees with the results from tests of the five 
models. As indicated in Table 4, the test of Model 1 compares market condition one 
with five, Model 2 compares market condition two with three, and Model 3 compares 
market condition two with five. 
Table 6 Estimation results: alliance developments with the five market conditions 
OutputC Model one Model two Model three 
Significant Significant Significant 
(2.94) (2.99) (7.08) 
Route specific Ns 0.05 
(2.25) (1.92) 
Code share 0.02 0.0 1 
(1.87) (1.64) 
Joint activities 0.04 Ns 
(2.74) (2.28) 
Marketing Ns Ns 
(2.1 1) (2.17) 
IIS 
(2.14) 
0.00 
(2.92) 
0.0 1 
(3.41) 
0.03 
(3.19) 
Open skies Ns Ns 0.01 
(1  .O) (1 .OS)  (1.31) 
Results of t-test 
ns = not significant 
?he numbers in parentheses are means 
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Results from the test of Model 1 show airlines in market abilities measured at level 
five formed numbers of joint activities significantly larger than airlines in market 
conditions at level one (mean = 2.74, p< .Ol) .  Results from tests of Model 2 show 
numbers of code share and route specific services developed are significantly 
different between the market conditions as two and three. Results from the test of 
Model 3 show the developments of total alliances are highly significantly different 
(p<. 01, mean = 7.08) between the airlines in different market conditions. The airlines 
significantly had more numbers of joint activities (p<. 01, mean=3.41), marketing 
alliances (p<. 05, mean= 3.19) and ‘open skies’ (p< .01, mean= 1.31) with market 
abilities measured as level five, compared with that the market abilities as level two. 
All results from the multiple tests support Hs. 
Test linearity between market condition and alliance development 
Three models are structured in testing linearity (H4 and Hs) and the test results are 
shown in Table 7. In Model 1, the coefficients of the estimation show that all the 
endogenous variables (the alliances) are significantly related to the exogenous 
variables (the market conditions), and the increase of market abilities leads positively 
to the formation of strategic alliances. 
Before testing Model 2, stepwise regression analysis is executed with three variables 
entered, including year dummy variables, passenger traffic volumes, and market 
conditions. Stepwise analysis brings with results showing market conditions as the 
predictors of the developments of code share (Adj-R?:O.23, F=24.7 p<.O I) ,  marketing 
alliances (Adj-R2:0.16, F=31. p<.OOl), ‘open skies’ (Adj-R2:0.18, F= 10, p<. OOl), 
and total alliances (Adj-R2:0.59, F=228.3. pc.001). The year dummy variables are 
significantly related to increases in the numbers of code share, joint activities, and 
total alliances. The variable of passengers carried is the predictor of the increase of 
route specific services. 
As market conditions are not predictors for all the alliances, the second model 
therefore applies two stage-least squares regression, which enables the estimation to 
treat the market conditions as the explanatory factor but year dummy variables and 
passenger carried as instruments. Results of the estimation show market conditions 
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are the significant explanatory factor for both the increased total numbers and 
different features of alliances. Following this step, Model 3 is tested. 
Results from Model 3 suggest market conditions are the alliance parameters other 
than the year dummy variable or the passenger volume of a carrier. The estimated 
coefficient on marketing alliances is p = 0.37 (p<O.OOl) and on ‘open skies’ is p= 
0.55 (p<O.OO I), which indicates the increases of market abilities significantly leading 
to the development of airline alliances. Market conditions, as suggested by the beta 
values, are more important than the other two factors (year dummy and passenger 
carried) in contributing to the development of airline alliances. Importantly, the 
development of route specific services do not depend on market conditions but on 
year dummy variables. Thus, II4 and H5 are supported. 
Table 7 Estimation results- developments of airline alliances with the market abilities 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Y = f (CN.) Y= f (CN, YR, Q) Y=b*+b,CN+ 
brYR+ b3Q 
2 Stage least Adjusted df Variables 
squares R2 
Total alliances 0.65*** 1.1*** 0.91 ** 0.61 162 
(14.3) (9.2) (14.8) 
Route specific 0.43*** 0.56*** 0.73 0.35 
(7.9) (4.5) (9.0) 
Code share 0.59*** 0.44*** 0.79 0.45 
(12.4) (3.3) (10.6) 
60 
62 
Joint activities 0.27*** 0.69*** 0.32*** 0.24 162 
(4.7) (4.7) (3.6) 
Marketing 0.65 *** 0.79*** 0.68*** 0.36 162 
(14.6) (5.4) (8.05) 
Open skies 0.66*** 0.76*** 0.69*** 0.36 162 
(15.4) (5.1) (8.3) 
**p<o.o 1, ***p<O.OOl 
( ) The number in parentheses are T value 
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For the model fit, Curve Estimates are applied. The estimation predicts the value of 
the increases of alliances from the increases of the market abilities through curve 
estimation. The estimation uses the predicted value and residual and the upper and 
lower 95% confidence limits for the predicted value (Norusis, 1993). The estimation 
also plots the curve based on observed and logarithmic value. Results from the Curve 
Estimations show the structure models 5 and 7 fit (see Appendix 3), and hence II4 and 
HS are again supported. 
Generally, results from tests of HI and & show there are significant differences with 
the developments of strategic alliances between different market conditions. krlines 
of North America and European Union are engaged in more numbers and dynamic 
features of alliances than the airlines of the Asia Pacific region. Tests of H3 to H5 
bring with a positive linear relationship between the developments of alliances and the 
progresses of air transport markets towards liberalization. Results therefore suggest 
that market conditions are significantly important for the formation of alliances, 
particularly for the dynamic features alliances such as ‘open skies’ and global 
alliances. Countries, with market structures changing toward liberalization, enable 
airlines to form alliances that are more integrative, towards building up global brand 
reputation and competitiveness. 
Conclusions 
The research commenced with an attempt to address the research problems of the 
development of airline alliances and the critical factors involved in the development. 
The descriptive results show that the three distinct growth phases of the development 
of airline alliances was in line with the three periods of the development of airline 
alliances: 1) fundamental agreements for new bilateral services and code share before 
1992; 2) joint activities covering several areas between 1992 and 1995; and 3) 
dynamic alliances including global grouping and ‘open skies’ after 1995. These three 
periods corroborated the three stages of changes of the market conditions: regulation, 
deregulation and liberalization, suggesting airline alliances being affected by the 
critical factors of market conditions. The test of the hypotheses show that there is a 
significant difference between the development of airline strategic alliances with 
different market conditions. Airlines in liberalized markets involve larger numbers 
and deeper scope of alliances than the airlines in regulated markets. Also, there is a 
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linear relationship between the development of airline strategic alliances and the 
increase of market abilities or conditions suggesting more liberal markets lead to more 
alliances and integrative alliances formed in the markets. 
Previous theoretical studies argue that Asian airlines have been seen as generally 
entering into few alliances with each other or with other airlines (Garnham, 1996, 
Hooper, 1997, Li, 1999 PC, 1998; Oum, 1998). Also, the liberalization process differs 
strongly between regions (Hooper, 1997; Oum, 1998). These arguments show a 
concern of airlines of the Asia Pacific region’s involvement in strategic alliances and 
suggesting market abilities or conditions may affect airlines to involve with strategic 
alliances (Eleck, Findlay, Hooper and Warren, 1999; Oum, 1998, PC, 1998). This 
research through observations and empirical analysis has confirmed that the airlines 
of North America and the European Union are significantly engaged in more numbers 
and more dynamic features of alliances than the airlines of the Asia Pacific region. 
The findings of this research demonstrate these arguments are supported. Findings of 
this research also provided the diagnostic answers through the explanatory variables 
identified, and hence partly explain the alliance behaviors. 
The findings of this research make a contribution to the strategic airline alliance 
literature, and also provide useful information for airlines’ formation of strategic 
alliances. First it found that the airline industry has remarkably developed different 
features of alliances in various areas. The airline alliances are similar to, but also 
different from, the collaboration and consortia of other industries. The similarities are 
the nature of collaboration, which are involved by the horizontal bi-national groups 
and consortia, which are engaged by multiple partners of different countries, such as 
the Star Alliance and oneworld. The differences are the complex features, as well as, 
areas of cooperation. These areas of cooperation are linked to the characteristics of the 
industry and the motivations of airline alliances. These findings have implications for 
the development of concepts and features of airline alliances. 
The strategic classification is a another contribution to studying the typology of 
strategic alliance, as little research has been done to specify current airline alliances, 
according to their overall nature and features. Also, the five types of airline alliances 
can range from simple alignments to integrative cooperation or from fkdamental 
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focused coordination to integrative alliances. These clear definitions are useful for 
classifying and measuring airline alliance development and related studies. Further 
the measures created based on the theoretical investigations of the market abilities and 
conditions of North America, the EU and the Asia Pacific region would be useful for 
examinations on formation behavior of airline alliances and public policy. 
This research identifies that the progress of market liberalization significantly 
contributes to the development of airline alliances. Regulation, on the other hand, 
restricts the development of an airline alliance, particularly the integrative features of 
alliances. As market conditions and trade abilities vary between countries, airlines 
significantly differ with entering numbers and forms of alliances. The market 
conditions also restrict airlines in choice of partners and features of alliance. Findings 
of this research can contribute to public policy making and ASAs, and air transport 
market liberalization. 
Despite the contributions, there are some limitations in this thesis. First, the total 
number of airline alliances up till 1999 reported by the Airline Alliance Survey is 
different from the result of the exploratory study conduced by this thesis. According 
to the Airline Alliance Survey (1999), there were a total number of 856 alliances 
formed between the world international airlines in the 1990s. This research recognizes 
that there are 121 1 alliances formed by the 27 major international airlines within 
themselves and with other airlines from 1989 to 1999. This number was accumulated 
based on each year’s new alliances of the international airlines and these agreements 
were reported by the Airline Business monthly issue from the year of 1990 to 1999. 
This number of alliances may not be exactly the number of alliances that the airlines 
are upholding so far, as some airlines were de-allied with each other or abolished the 
agreements during this period of time. However, it can be seen through the 
observation that most of the alliances have been stable. It also identified by Oum et. 
al. (2000) that the survival rates of airline alliances have been improving very rapidly 
during the last decade, and this trend is likely to continue in the future. 
The future prospect of airline strategic alliances is seen as increasing and stable. Oum 
et. al. (2000) indicate that the emerging global alliance groups being formed by 
several major carriers residing in different countries and continents are expected to be 
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strengthened over time, due to the increasing market shares, operation revenue, 
consumer benefits and economic welfare of society. Thus this study is expected to 
become a milestone in studying strategic alliances and the development of airline 
alliances in the future 
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Appendix 1 Frameworks for the strategic classification of the five types of airline 
alliances 
Types Estimates 
Type one Route specific alliance refers to the prime Bilateral Air Service Agreement 
signed between two countries, to enable flights between cities of the two 
countries, or boost capacity or frequencies of flight service between cities of the 
two countries (or may grant beyond rights, to use intermediate stops or beyond 
services). To this extent, the bilateral agreement of six weekly Singapore-New 
York services signed between Singapore and USA enables three flights 
agreement operated via Brussels and three via Frankfurt is an example. A 
trading beyond right between Korea and India enables Korean Airlines to fly 
from India to Europe and Egypt, in retum for the right to Air India to fly from 
Seoul to the United States is another example. 
Type two Code share refers to block space agreements, or code share on a number of city- 
pair markets. These agreements often involve one airline buying blocks of seats 
on the other’s flights and reselling them. ie. Qantas and Air Nuigini operate a 
route-specific alliance, which involves code sharing on flights between Cairns 
and Port Moresby and Mount Hagen. The agreement between United Airlines 
and Ansett enables passengers to travel to Sydney on a United Airlines flight 
and connect with Ansett flights to eight Australian cities. Code share also 
involves one airline’s designator code is shown on flights operated by its 
partner airline. Code-sharing agreements allow each airline involved providing 
services with its partner’s flights even though it does not operate the aircraft 
itself. For Example, Canadian Airlines and Qantas have a code-sharing 
agreement on the Vancouver- Honolulu- Sydney route where Canadian serves 
the Vancouver-Honolulu section and Qantas serves the Honolulu-Sydney 
section of the route. 
Type 
three 
Joint activities generally refer to joint venture, collaboration or cooperation 
including joint purchasing of aircrawfuel, equity investment or stake purchase, 
aircraft leasing, maintenance, staff training, labor agreement, joint operation, 
which is within the areas of cooperation in joint use of ground facilities, 
coordination in ground handling, coordination of flight schedules. 
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Appendix 1 Frameworks for the strategic classification of the five types of  airline 
alliances (Continued) 
Types Estimates 
Type 
four 
A marketing alliance involves cooperative agreements on ticketing service, 
share of CRS, FFPs and joint advertising, including milestones such as Star 
Alliance. To this extent,a marketing alliance overlaps with joint operation, as 
the marketing alliance also involves joint use of ground facilities, coordination 
in ground handling, coordination of flight schedules and on-line and interline 
co-operations under the agreement of global alliances. Marketing alliance 
includes oneworld, Star, Qualifier, Air France/Delta Global Wings 
(Northwest/KL,M), and other similar types but regional based alliances 
Type five ‘Open skies’ refers to the alliances initiated by US between some American, EU 
and a few Asian countries. The alliances, formed under the US bilateral ‘open 
skies’ policy, are basically commercial alliance in nature, being more 
integrative in levels and areas of cooperation, compared with the other types of 
alliances. The memorandum of understanding normally leads to code share 
agreement on international and domestic flight, reciprocal FFP, lounge access, 
though check-in, integration of boarding procedures, computer reservation 
system linkage, joint marketing and sales programs ‘Open skies’ also involve 
single aviation market, free access to the markets, full traffic right, may also 
grant anti-trust immunity, but so far a few counties have been granted (Also see 
the notes of the ‘open skies’ policy). 
Appendix 2 Open skies policy 
Items 
0 
0 
Open entry on all routes between the bilateral partners; 
Unrestricted rights for partner airlines to operate between any international gateways in 
the United States and participating countries, including to intermediate and beyond 
points; 
0 
0 
0 
Unrestricted capacity, frequency and aircraft on all routes; 
Flexibility for airlines in setting fares within certain guidelines; 
Liberal charter and cargo arrangements; 
The ability of carriers to convert earnings into hard currency and return those earnings to 
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their homelands without restriction; 
Open code-sharing opportunities; 
0 Rights for carriers to perform their own ground handling in the partner country; 
The ability of carriers to enter freely into commercial transactions related to their flight 
operations; and 
A commitment for non-discriminatory operation of, and access to, computer reservation 
systems 
Sources: Airline Business, 1992; Subcommittee on Aviation 1997. 
Appendix 3 Curve estimates- Development of strategic alliances with the change of 
market conditions (Model prediction) 
Independent: MKTCO 
Dependent M t h  Rsq d . f .  F Sig bo bl 
BILAT LOG .158 280 5 2 . 5 3  . O O O  1.8989 3.8416 
CODE LOG .267 280 101.92 .OOO -.3879 6.0314 
JOINT LOG .053 280 15.62 .OOO 2.9361 2.3092 
MARKET LOG .325 280 135.10 .OOO -1.5017 5.5676 
OPEN LOG .324 280 134.34 .OOO -.5247 1.2196 
TOTALAL LOG .327 280 136.01 .OOO 1.7845 19.2356 
Appendix 4 Curve estimates- Development of strategic alliances with increase of 
market abilities (Model fitting) 
Name L a b e l  
FIT-1 Fit for BILATl with COND1-5 from CURVEFIT, MOD2 LOGARITHMIC 
FIT-;! Fit for CODE1 with COND1-5 from CURVEFIT, MOD-5 LOGARITHMIC 
FIT-3 Fit for JOINT1 with CONDI-5 from CURVEFIT, MOD-5 LOGARITHMIC 
FIT-4 Fit for MKTAl with COND1-5 from CURVEFIT, MOD-5 LOGARITHMIC 
FIT-5 Fit for OPEN1 with CONDl-5 from CURVEFIT, MOD-5 LOGARITHMIC 
FIT-6 Fit for TO-AL with CONDl-5 from CURVEFIT, MOD-5 LOGARITHMIC 
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Airport Privatization Policy and Performance Measurement in Korea 
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Abstract 
Korean government is considering the reformation of airport operating system. The objective of the reformation is 
to improve the economic efficiency related to airport operation. For doing this, it is necessary to know the best 
practices on various dimensions of airport operations, and it is subsequently required to evaluate the performance of 
airport operation. This study is to measure and compare the operating performance of each airport in Korea. In Korea, 
there are 17 airports opened to civil aviation and these airports offer scheduled flight service. Five of them are able to 
serve international flights and other twelve airports are for domestic flight service only. The ownership of all those 
airports belongs to central government. The ministries responsible are the Ministry of Construction and 
Transportation and the Ministry of National Defense. The autonomous governmental organization, KAA(Korea 
Airports Authority) is responsible for the operation and management of civil airports without ownership, excluding 
Incheon International Airport which opened March 2001. The productivity and eficiency, unit costs, and financial 
status of each airport in the system will be measured and compared. Some interpretations on the results of 
performance measurement are tried and some recommendations are suggested based on the interpretation of 
performance indicators of this study. 
Keywords: Airport Performance, Workload unit, Airport operating cost 
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1. Introduction 
The air transport industry has been experiencing globalization and liberalization, and it is foreseen that 
this trend will keep going on into the future. This means that the international airlines will be able to 
choose its base airport with greater freedom in the future. It will lead an airline to consider more the 
economic advantage than nationality or national boundary when it chooses the base airport or composes 
service network. So, the competition between international airports to attract airlines will be severe. For 
relatively small domestic airports, the economic efficiency related to their operations is more important, 
because they should compete not only with other airports but also with other modes of transportation. 
Airport owners and operators who realize this situation are trying to improve the economic performance 
in operating airports in order to provide the service efficiently and effectively. In an era where airports are 
subject to more competitive pressures, it is more required to know what their performance is. 
It is necessary to measure the performance of airport operations for each major players involved in air 
transport industry such as airlines, airport operators and regulators. Airlines need to evaluate the airport’s 
performance in choosing their base airport to operate with low costs and high level of service. Since 
airport operators want to improve their service level offering lower user charge to attract airlines, they are 
keen to identify the strong performers in the industry and to improve their own practices of operation, as 
airports become commercially oriented. To achieve such an objective, it is prerequisite to have the 
information about their own performance and other airports’. The regulators also need to have some 
performance information concerned with airport operation when they make the policy to lead their air 
transport industry more competitive. Anyway, the usefulness of performance measurement in airport 
operation cannot be disregarded. 
The objective of this study is to measure the operating performance of the airports serving to airlines’ 
flight operation in Korea. Costs performance, productivity and efficiency, and financial status of each 
airport in the system are to be measured and evaluated. Any possible advice derived from such an analysis, 
concerned with the improvement of economic efficiency in operating airport system is presented. 
The methodology of airport performance measurement is classified in two categories; total factor 
productivity methods and partial indicator methods. This study will utilize partial indicator methods, 
because we are interested in the performance indicators related to unit costs, productivity, revenues, and 
profits. 
2. Korean Airport Systems, Ownership, and Operation 
I 
In Korea, there are 17 airports that offer scheduled air transport services, eight international airports and 
nine domestic airports. The ownership of all these airports belongs to central government: some of them 
are controlled by the MOCT (Ministry of Construction and Transportation) and the others are controlled 
by the MOND (the Ministry of the National Defense). The civil aviation airports except lncheon 
International Airport are operated by Korea Airports Authority (KAA), which is the independent 
governmental body. Incheon International Airport, which is recently opened in March 2001, is operated 
by another independent company named Incheon International Airport Corporation, which is also owned 
by central government of Korea. Military airports are operated by the Army, Air Force, Navy, or US Air 
Force. 
KAA is the autonomous governmental organization responsible for operating and managing civil 
airports without ownership. The military airports, which the airlines are allowed to use, are jointly 
operated by KAA and military authority. The airport use agreement between the Ministry of Construction 
and Transportation and the Ministry of National Defense is established for the civil use of military 
airports. The military authority is usually in charge of operating landing field and air traffic control 
around airport, and KAA is in charge of the civilian terminal operation and ramp operation for civil 
aircraft. For both civil and military airports, the private sector participation in airport operation is limited 
to passenger and cargo handling, a small portion of commercial activities in the terminal building, and 
ramp service for the civil aircraft. 
Table 1 shows the summary of Korean airports' ownership and scale (the number of passengers handled 
annually). The airport operational works commissioned from central government to KAA are ranged as 
follows. ' 
(i) Maintenance and operation of landing field, including runway, taxiway, and ramp area for aircraft 
movement; (ii) Management of passenger and cargo terminals; (iii) airport security, fire fighting and 
accident handling; (iv) operation and maintenance of Instrument Landing System, Air Navigation 
facilities, and communication systems; (v) environmental protection - including noise problem, water and 
air pollution. 
Almost all of the operational works commissioned to KAA are administered directly by KAA 
employees or airlines. The duty free shops are mainly operated by the Korea Tourism Authority, which is 
another governmental organization, and only immaterial portion of duty free shopping and the 
commercial activities in the passenger terminals are conducted by private sector entrepreneur. 
Table 1 
Ownership and Control of Korean Public Airports (2000) 
Rank I Airport 
I I I Construction and I I 
Ownership & Control Passenger volume(thousand) 
Source: Korea Civil Aviation Development Association, Aviation Statistics, Seoul, Korea, 200 1 
1 1  Gimpo Int’l 
The airlines or civil aircraft operators pay some fees to the Ministry of National Defense for using 
military airport facilities, building and land. The civil aircraft landing fees are charged by the Ministry of 
Construction and Transportation. However, the revenue of landing fees must be used for the landing field 
maintenance and operation. The passenger and cargo terminal and accompanying facilities to be used for 
the ground handling of civil traffic at military airport are constructed and maintained by the Ministry of 
Construction and Transportation, while KAA and airlines are responsible for the terminal operation.* 
Now, Korean government opened New Seoul Airport in March 2001, which is named as Incheon 
International Airport (IIA). According to  dramatic increase of air transport demand in 1980’s, the Korean 
government recognized the urgent need to  expand the airport capacity for Seoul area. However, the 
existing Gimpo Airport has the limitation to be expanded. The master plan for the development of the IIA 
was announced in 1992 and followed by the ground breaking in the same year. IIA opened for the first 
phase operation in March 2001. Incheon International Airport Corporation whose 100% stake holder is 
Korean central government is in charge of the airport operation. The airport has an annual capacity of 
170,000 flights, 27 million passengers, and 1.7 million tons of cargo annually. On completion of the last 
phase beyond 2020, IIA will have the capacity of handling 100 million passengers using four runways. 
On opening IIA, all the scheduled international flights which had been operated at Gimpo airport, moved 
to 11.4. Now, Gimpo airport is operating domestic flights for Seoul area and some non-scheduled 
international flights. 
MOCT (Ministry of 36,637 
3. An Attempt to Improve Airport Operation System in Korea 
’ Article 7 of “The Law of Korea Airport Authority’’ ’ Article 4,5,7,11 of “Agreement for the civilian use of military aerodrome”, Korean Government, 1998 
Almost all the areas of Korean economic system have been undergoing renovation motivated by IMF 
(International Monetary Fund) control since the currency crisis in late 1997. The Planning and Budgeting 
Board (PBB), which has published the plans concerned with the renovation as a newly established 
governmental agency, made the laws to privatize the public enterprises. The law to corporatize and 
privatize airport system is one of them. 
It has been generally recognized that the current system of airport operation in Korea is very inefficient 
and the level of service quality is relatively low. Gimpo international airport has been the only one that 
recorded profit, and all the other airports have been suffering deficit continuously. Even in Gimpo, the 
portion of non-aeronautical revenue among total revenue is very low, which means that the financial 
performance of airport operation cannot be considered de~irable.~ 
The Korean government has been trying to promote the private investment for pubic facilities, with the 
incentives that the investor can operate the facilities and earn profit. The participation of private sector for 
funding and operating public facilities may lead to the improvement of economic efficiency. This 
privatization concept is being applied to airport systems. The cargo terminals, fueling systems, and 
electric power systems for IIA were constructed by private investors. The terminal building and car 
parking facilities for local domestic airports are also considered as the facilities to attract private 
 investor^.^ In addition, Korean Government changed the legal status of KOACA from governmental 
authority to public corporation and named it “HA Corporation” in February 1999, in order to facilitate the 
privatization process of the airport. IIA Corporation is endowed to operate the HA as well as keep going 
in construction. 
Korean central government is also currently trying to change the legal status of KAA to another public 
corporation in order to speed up the privatization process of existing airports. Even though the 
government has not finalized its detailed proposal, the conceptual outline of the idea for KAA 
corporatization can be summarized as  follow^:^ (i) KAA’s legal organizational status is changed from 
autonomous governmental authority to public corporation, temporarily named “Korea Airport 
Corporation (KAC)”, (ii) The capital of KAC is composed of shares, (iii) KAC will be allowed to issue 
the corporate bond, (iv) KAC will be allowed to commission the right of airport operation to other 
organizations, (v) KAC may be allowed to utilize international debt financing. 
The ultimate purpose of such a renovation is to improve the economic efficiency of airport operation. 
Through the performance measurement for each airport, a clue for optimistic strategies for that purpose 
can be generated. 
’ KAA, Detailed Income Statement, 1997 
KOACA, Introduction to lncheon International Aimort Project, Seoul, Korea, 1997 
Korean MOCT, A Draft of the Law Related To KAA Comratization, Seoul, Korea, April, 1999 
4. Performance Measurement for Korean Airports 
4.1. Demand levels of each Airport 
It is generally accepted that the results of economic performance of airport operation, are mainly 
influenced by the size of the airport traffic. That is to say, ‘economies of scale’ is applied to the 
performance of airport operation. Through the studies of British Airports in 1980s, Doganis (1992) found 
that unit costs fall sharply as traffic demand increases, particularly up to 1.0 or 1.5 million passengers. He 
also pointed out that unit costs flatten out and do not seem to vary much with airport size, as traffic grows 
beyond a level of about three million passengers a year (see figure I) .  
As shown in table I ,  the demand level of each airport in Korea is various. Gimpo International Airport 
has the biggest demand, ranked within top 20 in the world in the aspect of the volume of annual traffic. 
Jeju and Gimhae Airport can be considered as big airports too. They handled about 10 million passengers 
annually. Jeju airport is owned by MOCT and Gimhae airport belongs to Korean Air Force. Daegu and 
Gwangju airports have demand level between two millions and three millions, and these two airports 
belong to Korean Air Force. Ulsan and Pohang airports recorded between one million and two million of 
annual passenger demand. The other airports can be considered as small airports that have less than one 
million passengers as annual demand. 
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Figure 1. Airport Long-Run Costs Curve 
4.2. Input Data for Performance Measurement 
The KAA annual financial report for 1997 is utilized as database for the study. As Korean economy 
started to be affected by the currency crisis from December 1997, the air transport demand in 1998 has 
sharply fallen. Though the demand for international air transport in the year 2000 has recovered to the 
level prior to IMF control situation, the domestic transportation has been well behind. So, this study 
utilizes the data of the last year without the effect of the currency crisis in Korean economy. 
The study begins by describing the revenue and cost structures of airports. The typical classification of 
airport costs and revenues and the structure of costs and revenues of Korean airports are introduced 
(Table 2, 3). 
Table 2. 
Typical Classification of Airport Revenues and Costs Structure 
REVENUE 
Aeronautical Revenues: 
Landing Fees 
Passenger Charges 
Aircraft Parking Fees 
ATC Charges 
Other Charges (Lighting, Airbridges, Fueling Service, etc.) 
Non-Aeronautical Revenue: 
Rents or Lease Income 
Concession Income 
Direct Sales 
Car Park Revenue 
Recharge 
Non-airport related activities (e.g. Land Development) 
Other Non-Aeronautical Revenue 
EXPENSES 
Labor Costs 
Capital Charges (Depreciation and/or Interests) 
Services, Equipment and Supplies 
Maintenance and Repairs 
Administration and Other 
Source: Doganis, R. the Aimort Business, Routledge, 1992 
Graham, A. “Airport Economics and Performance Measurement”, Aimort Economics and Finance SvmDosium, 
University of Westminster/CranAeld University, 1998 
Table 3. 
KAA, Airport Revenues and costs structure 
1. Operating Revenues 
(1) Rental (or Lease) 
- Lands 
- Buildings 
- Facilities 
- Equipment 
(2) Aeronautical Revenue 
- Landing fee 
- Aircraft parking charge 
- Rampcharge 
(3) Landside facility user charge 
- Carpark 
- Waiting Room charge 
(4) Commercial Revenue (Shops & Snack Operated by KAA) 
( 5 )  Other Revenue 
2. Operating Expense 
(1) Facility Operation and Maintenance 
- Laborcosts 
- Other Expenses 
(2) Costs for direct commercial activities 
- Laborcosts 
- Other Expenses 
3. Sales & Administrative Costs 
(1) Staff Costs 
(2) Overhead expenses 
Soumet Statement ofAccountings, KAA 1997 
4.3. Measurement of Overall Costs Performance 
The scale of traffic volume at an airport significantly affects the unit costs, which is represented by total 
operating costs per WLU (Work Load Unit). Total operating costs include all the cost items related to 
airport operation. However, the depreciation costs of runway and taxiway, and interest costs are not 
included in KAA's statement of accountings. The expenses accrued from providing ATC services at 
airport control tower are not included either, because this service is provided by MOCT without charging 
to KAA. 
Table 4 shows the total operating costs per WLU for each airport, as unit costs. Figure 2 depicts these 
data to show the variation of unit costs according to traffic volume. The unit total costs of Korean airports 
decrease sharply as  traffic volume increases, until three million WLU of annual demand. This is the same 
trend with Doganis’ study. Figure 3 is to show this trend clearly by presenting the graphics of unit costs of 
the airports which have traffic demand less than three millions only, excluding large airports such as 
Gimpo, Gimhae and Jeju. As showmat the graph, Chungju and Daegu have extraordinarily higher unit 
costs deviating from normal pattern. Chunglu opened new passenger terminal a few years ago, which is 
relatively large for current demand level, and this resulted in high unit costs. Daegu was conducting 
construction work for runway expansion sharing construction costs with Air Force, and this caused high 
unit costs. 
Table 4. 
Costs per WLU (Unit: Korean Won) 
I Airport Total operating costs per WLU 
Mockpo Domestic 8,186 
Wonju Domestic 16,294 
18000 
16000 
10000 . 
too0 . 
SO00 . 
0000 . 
2000 . 
a -
12000 
'Ooo0 1 
0 
0 
5 
O 
N 
vca 
0 
R 
m 
U J  MI 
o n  P 0 
a -
K 
0 
50000 
OD 0 J 
0 10000 20000 soooo 00000 
I L U  
Figure 2. Unit cost and demand level 
T 
0 
A 
0 
OD ? so0 1000 1500 2000 2500 so00 
WLU 
Figure 3. Unit Cost for small Airports 
Legend 
K Gimpo 
H Gimhac 
C Jeju 
G Chungju 
T Daegu 
A Gwangju 
W UIsan 
P Pohang 
R Yeosu 
J Jinju 
S Sockcho 
N Gunsan 
Y Yeochon 
0 Mockpo 
M Wonju 
U GanpWIg 
0 
Legend 
G Chungju 
T Dacgu 
A Gwangju 
W Ulsan 
P Pohang 
R Yeosu 
J Jinju 
S Sockcho 
N Gunsan 
Y Ycochon 
0 Mockpo 
M Wonju 
U Ganpung 
It is found that Ulsan recorded higher unit cost than Pohang, in spite of slightly higher traffic demand. 
While Ulsan Airport is a pure civil airport under control of MOCT, all the facilities of which are operated 
by KAA, Pohang belongs to Ministry of National Defense. As KAA does not operate landing field 
facilities at Pohang Airport, it pays part of runway maintenance costs to Military Units which operate the 
landing field of the airport. Almost same kind of result is obtained through comparing total unit costs 
between Yeosu and Jinju, whose traffic demands are in almost same level. Jinju belongs to Military, and 
Yeosu belongs to  KAA. Conclusively, it can be said that the civil use of military airport is more cost 
efficient for KAA, under the condition of current Military Airport Use Agreements between MOCT and 
MOND. .\scotding to ‘inothcr s i t id> o f  c.oniparing thc t i t i i t  costs ; I C C I . I I C ~  t o  K.-\,\ I‘i.oln c i \  i l i a t i  t isc 
\.lilitar> xrndronic .  i t  I S  h i n d  rh;it corninon usc of  A i r  Force Acrodronic fiicilitich rcwltcd i n  Io\ \cr  u n i t  
cost>. tli;in t h a t  tit.:\rrn> .Acrodrninc. ‘I’Iiat nu!  bc hccnusc t l ic Air Forcc pro\ idcs Iitplici. q u a l i t >  arid \\ idcr 
Iarigc of sci.\.icc for ili$t opcl-ation tlwi ,\rin!. ( 
4.4. Labor Productivity 
Table 5 is to show the indicator of labor productivity. Labor productivity is measured by labor costs per 
WLU, WLUs per employee, or revenue per employee. Through comparing labor costs per WLU of each 
airport, ‘economies of scale’ is also found. Larger airports recorded lower labor costs per WLU. The 
comparison of WLUs per employee of each airport represents same result as  that of labor costs per WLU. 
The common use of military airport shows some cost advantages. Military airports show better 
performance than pure civilian airports, because KAA assigned smaller number of employees to military 
aerodrome where KAA does not have to administer the landing field operations. Revenue per employee 
also shows ‘the bigger, the better’ trend. Gimpo Airport, which has an incomparably large volume of 
demand, ranked number one in the aspect of revenue per employee by a striking difference. Through 
comparing the revenue per employee between Jeju and Gimhae, it is found that Gimhae shows better 
record by significant difference. This may be because Gimhae Airport, which has larger terminal building, 
had more rental income than Jeju Airport. Overall the military airports show more favorable performance 
than the airports controlled by MOCT. This is because the military airports have the advantage of fewer 
employees. However, it is also suspected that KAA was not successful in commercial activities at its own 
airports in spite of more controllable situation than at military airport. 
Table 5 .  
Labor productivity Indicators (Unit: Korean Won for labor costs and revenue) 
Chungju Int’l 
Mockpo Domestic 
Wonju Domestic 
I Airport 1 LaborcostsperWLU 1 WLUperemployee I Revenue per Employee 
8,533 3,311 9,176,832 
6,044 5,774 4,257,889 
10,207 5,040 7,430,926 
Asset value WLU/miltion won asset 
(Million Won) value Airport 
Gimpo Int’l 1,248,300 44 
Jeju Int’l 96,700 131 
4.5. Capital Productivity 
Total revenue/million 
won asset value 
143,307 
135,20 I 
The productivity of capital employed is considered very difficult to measure because it is not easy to 
identify and assess the net value of an airport’s assets. Fortunately, KAA published officially the 
estimated value of assets in each airport. This study utilizes the value as a base to calculate the indicator 
of capital productivity. Table 6 shows the estimated asset value of each airport and the capital productivity 
indicators; WLU per million Korean Won of estimated asset value and total revenue per million Korean 
Won of estimated asset value. 
An interesting fact was discovered through comparing the indicators about WLU per asset value. That is, 
Gimpo Airport which ranked first by unit costs and labor productivity, ranked last. That is because Gimpo 
Airport is located around Seoul area, where the value of land is extraordinarily higher than any other 
places in Korea. On the contrary, Yeochon Airport, which is located in mountainous countryside, recorded 
best performance in capital productivity. This indicator seems to be mainly influenced by the value of the 
land where the airport located, because the value of land has very wide range of variation from location to 
location in Korea. 
Table 6. 
Asset Value and Capital Productivity 
Yeochon Domestic 
Chunglu Int’l 
Mockpo Domestic 
Wonju Domestic 
900 442 26 I ,012 
5,600 54 40,297 
4.6. Revenue Generation Performance 
The major indicator to measure the revenue generation performance is total revenue per WLU. This 
indicator can show the overall performance of an airport in the aspect of generating revenue. Gimpo 
Airport where they run relatively big duty-free shop, several restaurants and shops, recorded best 
performance. However, for the other airports, this indicator does not show the trend compatible with 
traffic volume of each airport. For example, Chungju and Wonju marked relatively good record in spite of 
very low level of demand. There are some suspected causes to such an unexpected results. First of all, the 
passenger charges are not included in airport revenue in Korea, since they come into government. This 
means that the airports where they have higher traffic demand and more passengers per flight, do not have 
the advantage in revenues from passenger charges. In addition, since the two airlines of Korean Air and 
Asiana Air whose fleets composed of mainly large aircraft, operate large aircraft for small airports, 
subsequently small airports can get high landing fees compared to demand level. This is why Chungju 
and Wonju had relatively high value of revenue generation indicator. 
One needs to break down total revenue into two components, aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenue. 
However, the accounting practice of KAA does not allow this clearly, because there are some rental 
income items coming from mixed activities of aeronautical purposes and non-aeronautical purposes. In 
addition, the passenger charges which belong to aeronautical revenue, are not included in airport revenue, 
as stated above. 
Table 7. 
Revenue Generation Performances (Unit: Korean Won) 
Gimpo Int'l 
4.7. Profitability Measures 
2.09 
KAA recorded total revenue about 223 billion Korean Won and 5.9 billion Korean Won as  an operating 
profit in 1997. But in understanding this figure, it should be considered that the big cost items of 
depreciation and interest are excluded and passenger charges are not included in revenue. Depreciation 
costs for runway and interest costs are not accounted in KAA's income statement. According to table 8, 
while all the other airports suffered deficit, only Gimpo Airport recorded profit. Gimhae showed 0.9 of 
revenue/expenditure ratio and the others marked very undesirable performance. 
Gimhae Int's 
Gwangju Domestic 
Daegu Domestic 
Ulsan Domestic 
Pohang Domestic 
Yeosu Domestic 
Jinju Domestic 
Gangnung Domestic 
Gunsan 
Table 8.  
RevenueExpenditure Ratio 
0.90 
0.57 
0.15 
0.27 
0.36 
0.20 
0.32 
0.25 
0.18 
I Airport 
Sockcho Domestic 
RevEx 
0.09 
Yeochon Domestic 0.17 
Chungju Int'l 
Mockpo Domestic 
Wonju Domestic 
Sachon 
5. Conclusions - Recommendation to improve the efficiency of Airport Operation 
0.16 
0.08 
0.09 
0.32 
As conclusions, this chapter will suggest some recommendations to improve the economic efficiency of 
airport operation in Korea, based on the results of performance measurement in this study. First of all, it is 
required for K A A  to add some management accounting practice in its accounting system. It is useful to 
allocate costs to the major cost areas associated (or cost centers). There are four major areas; ( 1 )  the 
landing area, (2) the terminal, (3) hangar area, and (4) other non-aviation-related areas (Gesell, 1992). 
The information obtained from such an accounting practice can be utilized for the performance 
measurements of specific area in airport. For example, if labor costs for terminal management are 
available, it is possible to measure labor productivity in operating terminal. The cost accounting by cost 
centers is also useful to determine the rate of user charge based on each service costs, which is a pricing 
concept recommended by ICAO. 
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Revcritic Gciicratioii Pctforinaticc 
MOCT has been constructing some civil airports to quit co-using the military aerodrome in Gwangju- 
Mockpo, Sockcho-Gangnung, and Junju area. This is because there have been some serious safety 
problems and constraints on obtaining slots from the military. However, in terms of economic efficiency, 
it is desirable to  use military airports-and enjoy the cost advantage as long as possible. The development 
of new airports to  replace military aerodrome can be effective only in the cases of safety problems and 
capacity shortage. For most cases, it is recommended to invest for the improvement of facilities at 
military aerodrome, especially the terminal building to accommodate more commercial activities, instead 
of constructing a new civil airport. 
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Pilot and Air Traffic Controller Relationships : 
The Role of Interdependence and Relative Influence 
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Choi Youn Chul 
(Doctor degree course of Aviation Hankuk Aviation University) 
There have been many studies which revealed most of the accidents related to pilot errors. 
Looking at each phase of flights, the accidents which occurred at the segments of take-off and 
landing consist of 70%, because these phases need precise cooperations between pilots and ATC 
specialists to make sure every instructions understood and instruments to be normal. Therefore, 
the accidents of these phases leave great regrets and the price was enormous to people and 
equipments. Until now, most of the studies investigate the accident itself and very few show the 
relationships between pilots and air traffic controllers. This study analyzes the impacts of inter- 
dependence to mutual trust, cooperations and relationship efficiency between them who play 
important parts in flight. Based upon the findings, the inter-dependence has an effect on mutual 
trust and the latter influences to cooperations. Also, mutual trust and cooperations have a 
leading role in the relationship efficiency. It implies that mutual trust, cooperations, and the 
degree of inter-dependence are important factors to improve the relationships between them. 
INTRODUCTION 
Pilot and Pur traffic controller are effort developed to succeed in flight environments such as 
in the aviation safety and air transportation. Our proposed model, using data from Pilot and 
ATC, substantiates that interdependence and relative influence between the (pilot and ATC) 
partners impact relationship effectiveness through mutual trust and cooperation as a co-workers. 
Drawing on the theoretical perspectives of organizational and social exchange theories, our 
study develops and tests a model of partner relationship effectiveness that incorporates the 
effects of the interdependence and the relative influence of the partners as co-workers by mutual 
trust and cooperation. 
Analysis of interaction levels, integrates trust-based (Morgan and Hunt 1994) and 
interdependencelinfluence-based(Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995) models of relationship 
effectiveness, explicitly recognizes the conceptual difference between interdependence and 
relative influence, examines interdependence, trust, cooperation, and relationship effectiveness. 
And Studies(Moorxnan, Deshpand and Zaltman 1993; Anderson and Narus 1990) have 
generally examined these constructs at the individual level of analysis and taps into the 
perspectives of both partners in a relationship. 
After reviewing the background and theoretical foundation for this study, our model is 
developed, the research approach is described, the results are shared and analysed , and the 
implications for managements and future research are based. 
Background for the research 
Interdependence 
Interdependence is generally defined in terms of the structure of dependence relations the 
extent to which firms need to maintain a relationship with a partner in order to achieve their 
goals( Anderson and Narus 1990; Frazier 1983)and reflects both the magnitude and symmetry 
of dependence (Gundlach and Cadotte 1994; Kumar , Scheer , and Steenkamp 1995). 
On the other hand, powerhnfluence is the ability to affect another's decision 
making(Wi1kinson 1974) or evoke a change in another's behavior(Gaski 1984). Interdependence 
is the extent to which both partners perceive a need for their relationship, This 
conceptualization is rooted in Thompson's (1967) concept of task interdependence and is 
concerned with the extent partners rely on each other to realize joint opportunities. It is 
consistent with Anderson and Narus's (1990) notion of relative dependence, in that 
interdependence is a relational construct that reflects the interaction of individual perceptions of 
dependence. 
Empirical support for a linkage between interdependence and mutual trust is limited as many 
researchers have implicitly assumed that dependence relations are characterized by trusting 
relations (Andaleeb 1996). Andaleeb( 1996) and Geyskensetal( 1996) found interaction effects 
between trust and dependence and trust and interdependence asymmetry, respectively. 
Mutual Trust 
For stable ongoing relationships, trust must be mutual(Anderson and Weitz 1989) as 
unreciprocated trust by one party will lead to a withdrawal of trusting behavior and a subsequent 
downward spiral of mistrust(Homans 196 1). Consequently, the research model incorporates 
mutual trust, the extent to which both partners trust each other, or the extent of mutual trust 
perceived in the relationship as a whole. 
Integrating the works of Swan, Trawick, and Silva(1985) and Gabarro (1978), we 
conceptualize mutual trust as having facets of : honestyhntegrity, reliability/dependability, 
responsibility, competence, likeability, judgment, and motiveshntentions. 
The centrality of trust in facilitating effective interorganizational and interpersonal 
relationships well established theoretically(Rmg and Vane Ven 1992 , 1994; Morgan and Hunt 
1994). 
From a social exchange theory perspective, mutual trust is essential for ongoing relationships 
since exchange entails unspecified obligations, and parties have no way to ensure appropriate 
reciprocation(B1au 1964). Some previous studies of trust and dependence have specified trust as 
having a moderating effect on the relationship between dependence(Anda1eeb & Geyskensetal. 
1996). 
This approach is consistent with Morgan and Hunt ( 1994 ) in their context of relationship 
marketing. Consequently we rely on social exchange theory, the conceptual centrality of trust in 
relationship marketing , and limited evidence to hypothesize 
H1 : Greater interdependence between partners(pi1ot and air traffic controller) will lead 
to greater mutual trust in their working relationships. 
Cooperation 
Cooperation is the extent to which partners undertake voluntary coordinated action and jointly 
strive to achieve individual and mutual goals (Skinner, Gassenheimer, and Kelley 1992). 
Cooperation is aimed at both achieving these goals and at maintaining the longer-term 
relationship. Interdependence is also expected to directly affect partner relationship 
effectiveness. 
Thus there is theoretical and empirical support to hypothesize : 
H2 : Greater interdependence between partners(pi1ot and air traffic controller) will lead 
to greater cooperation in their working relationships. 
H3 : Greater mutual trust between partners will lead to greater cooperation . 
Effectiveness of Relationships 
Following Gladstein( 1984), effectiveness is conceptualized as a higher-order construct 
concerned with task performance, non-task performance, partner satisfaction, and customer 
satisfaction as perceived by partner sales representatives. Satisfaction is an overall measure of 
the extent to which the selling partner relationship meets the needs of the partners. Customer 
satisfaction is the partners' perceptions of the extent to which their customers have been pleased 
with their activity and performance. This relationship-level conceptualization of effectiveness is 
appropriate here given the focus on relational processes and outcomes. 
By cooperating, partners voluntarily increase their vulnerability to each other. 
Relationships between trust and cooperation have been found in channel relationships(M0rgan 
and Hunt 1994) and in buyer-seller relationships(Schurr and Ozanne 1985; Selnes 1998). 
H4 : Greater mutual trust between partners(pi1ot & air traffic controller) will lead to 
more effective working relationships . 
H5 : Greater cooperation between partners(pi1ot & air traffic controller) will lead to more 
effective working relationships . 
<Figure 1> 
A Model of Pilot and Air Traffic Controller Relationship Effectiveness 
Aircraft Operation 
P n r t n P r  RPlntinnchin 
Research Method 
Survey research was used to collect data from pilots and air traffic controllers involved in 
aviation partner relationships in the air transportation industry. Two hundred sixty-eight 
participants(pi1ots 144, air traffic controllers 124) were randomly selected from the employee 
who work at air transportation industry in Korea. Participants were asked to consider a customer 
situation in the past where an aviation partner was involved. They were asked a self-defined 
successful relationship and a self-defined unsuccessful relationship. Participants then responded, 
mainly as key informants, to questions about their working relationship with that partner. 
Measures 
Modeled constructs<Figure 1 > were operationalized with multiple indicators using a mix of 
original and adapted 5-point Likert scales. Both relationship-level items (informants reporting 
on relationship properties) and individual-level items (partner reports of their own beliefs [e.g., 
trust of their partner] aggregated to reflect a relationship property [e.g., mutual trust]) were used 
as measures. This is in the tradition of multimethods of measurement (Campbell and Fiske 
1959). Individual-level items were aggregated to the relationship level by taking the square root 
of the product of the partner responses. This procedure captures both the level of an aggregated 
relationship property and the degree of differences in partner responses to individual-level items 
I 
Interdependence 1 
(Smith, 1999). 
Interdependence was measured by three items based on the conceptual work of Anderson and 
Narus(l990) and Sethuraman, Anderson, and Narus(l988). These original items tapped the 
extent to which both partners recognized they needed each other to accomplish their objectives 
and were dependent on each other to be successful. 
Mutual trust was measured by six items reflecting the facets of trust identified by Swan, 
Trawick, and Silva( 1985) and Gabarro( 1978): honestyhntegrity, reliability/dependability, 
responsibility, competence, likeability, and motiveshntentions. 
Cooperation was measured by three items conceptualized by Heide and Miner (1992): 
flexibility, information exchange, joint problem solving. 
Efectiveness was measured by four relationship-level indicators closely adapted from 
Gladstein’s( 1984) measure of effectiveness in a team selling context. These items tapped mutual 
satisfaction, perceived customer satisfaction, partner perceptions of task performance, and 
manager perceptions of partnership task performance. 
Component Cronbach’s a 
1 2 3 4 
.723 
Assessment of Construct Validig and Internal Consistency 
Prior to analyzing the data, the psychometric properties of each of the five measurement 
scales was assessed for construct validity(Peter 1979, 1981). A factor loading of S O  was used as 
a cut-off for factor selection, although all items exhibited factor scores of .53 and above. The 
summary statistics reported in (Table 1> reveal that a one-factor solution emerged for all four 
constructs. The analyses indicate that the measures seemingly demonstrate adequate construct 
validity. 
To assess the internal consistency of the scale, Cronbach’s coefficient alpha was 
computed(Cronbach 1951). As shown in Gable 1>, reliability estimates for five scales ranged 
form .62 to .83, thus exhibiting adequate realibility. 
-able I >  
Rotated component matrix & Reliability test 
I I 
Interdependence 2 
Interdmendence 3 
Mutual Trust 1 
Mutual Trust 2 
Mutual Trust 3 
Mutual Trust 4 
Mutual Trust 5 
Mutual Trust 6 
Cooperation 1 
Cooperation 2 
Cooperation 3 
Effectiveness 1 
Effectiveness 2 
Effectiveness 3 
Effectiveness 4 
.665 
.532 
.626 
.711 
.739 
.693 
.776 
.68 1 
.616 
.805 
.677 
.6547 
.8202 
.6156 
.8337 
Model Specification and Testing 
The model was specified, and its parameters estimated, following the Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation(MLE) approach to structural equation modeling. The measurement model represents 
the epistemic relationships between the observed variables and the constructs. Using Cohen et 
al’s (1990) guidance, these epistemic relationships were specified as reflective for all constructs 
suggesting that the constructs are manifest in or give rise to their measures. As per Anderson 
and Gerbing( 1988), the measurement model was first assessed using confirmatory factor 
analysis(via LISREL), and then reliability and convergent, discriminant, and nomological 
validity were evaluated in the context of the theoretical model. 
Analysis and Results 
Prelim in ary Analysis 
Consistent with Anderson and Gerbing(l988), using LISREL and traditional tests of item and 
construct reliability, measurement properties were assessed and measures refined before 
structural analysis was conducted. Differences in perspectives between Sponsor and Partner 
representatives necessitated respecification of the model into two. But t-test of the two partner 
group didn't reveal significant difference in Interdependence, Effectivenessaable 2>. So in 
this study we set up a one model. 
Interdependence 
Mutual Trust 
Cooperation 
Effectiveness 
cTable 2> 
T-Test Results: Relationship of Pilots and ATC in Aircraft Operation 
Pilots Air Traffic Controllers t-value p-value 
(n=124) (n=144) 
Mean(S.D) Mean(S .D) 
3.82( .68) 4.06(.54) -3.11 .oo" 
3.46(.54) 3.5 5( .  59) -1.23 .2 1 
3.94( .53) 3.83(. 5 8) 1.64 .10 
3.67( .60) 3.74(. 57) -1.01 .3 1 
, 
Structural Path 
Interdependence -> Mutual Trust 
Standardized t-value Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
0.582 5.3 18** HI 
Structural Results 
We estimated the hypothesized structural model using LISREL8.0. The fit of model was 
acceptable(Chi-square = 226.878, p = 0.00, GFI = 0.902, CFI = 0.908). 
Gable 3> 
Standardized Parameter Estimates, T-values, and Summary of Results 
Interdependence -> Cooperation 
Mutual Trust -> Cooperation 
0.055 0.500 HZ 
0.604 5.446" H3 
Chi-square with 99degrees of freedom = 226.878(p = 0.00) 
Goodness of fit(GF1) = 0.902 
Adjusted goodness of fit(AGF1) = 0.866 
Root mean square residual(RMR) = 0.060 
Comparative fit index(CF1) = 0.908 
Mutual Trust -> Partner Relationship 
Effectiveness 
Cooperation -> Partner Relationship 
Effectiveness 
" P < 0.01 
0.446 3.694'. 
0.474 3.281.. H5 
As to HI,  there are strong direct effects linking Interdependence and Mutual Trust in model. 
This finding is consistent with that of Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995) and suggests that 
interdependence provides an important foundation for the development of trust in selling partner 
relationships. It is the perceived need by both partners for each other and the relationship that 
enables them to take risks, which when reciprocated, forms the bonds of trust. 
Interdependence was not found to be a predictor of Cooperation (H2) in model. In support of 
hypothesis H3, Mutual Trust was found to be a strong predictor of Cooperation in model. This is 
consistent with Morgan and Hunt's (1994) findings and suggests that selling partners are 
unlikely to risk established accounts or engage in new opportunities without a foundation of 
trust. Mutual Trust was found to be the second most important predictor of relationship 
Effectiveness (&) in model. This is consistent with the centrality of trust in theories of rela- 
tionship marketing (e.g., Morgan and Hunt 1994) and with Ring and Van de Ven's (1994) 
observation that trust may be particularly important in non-equity alliances. Cooperation was 
found to be an important predictor of Effectiveness (H5) in model. This result is consistent with 
Cespedes' (1992) finding of the importance of coordinated action in team selling and reinforces 
that selling partners need to work together as true partners to be effective. 
These results further support relationship marketing theory that suggests balanced 
relationships are more stable and achieve greater non-performance and performance outcomes 
than relationships where one party has greater power or influence (e.g., Anderson and Weitz 
1989; D y e r ,  Schurr, and Oh 1987). 
<Figure 2> 
A Model of Pilot and ATC Relationship Effectiveness Structural Results. 
** p -= .01 
Implications 
Our results suggest that interdependence should be as central a construct as trust in 
relationship marketing research. Mutual trust and cooperation were both found to be key 
predictors of relationship effectiveness. And mutual trust was found to be key predictors of 
cooperation 
The centrality of interdependence suggests that it is imperative that aircraft operation partners 
perceive a need for each other. They can enhance their partnership value by developing and 
demonstrating each experiences, and by providing access to resources, such as technical support 
or administrative assistance. Making one’s value or potential contribution known to prospective 
partners is also important and might be accomplished through role plays or partner referrals. 
Mutual trust is what allows aircraft operation partner relationships to develop and grow from 
opportunity to opportunity. While trust clearly takes time to develop, aircraft operation 
managers can facilitate the process by instigating joint training sessions where partners can 
demonstrate their trustworthiness, e.g., in role-play situations. 
Cooperation is also critical for effective aircraft operation partner relationships. Adaptation to 
organizational rules and procedures and partner styles and preferences may be required, and 
give and take is needed. Managerial intervention to bridge organizational differences may be 
required to permit aircraft operation partners to cooperate. 
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Abstract: This paper provides a background discussion and economic analysis on the 
liberalization of air cargo services in international aviation. It shows that all-cargo carriers may 
have different routing needs than passenger carriers and thus require different sets of air traffic 
rights from those needed by passenger carriers. On the other hand, separation of air cargo and 
passenger rights will be fraught with difficulty in Asia because of distinctive characteristics of its 
air cargo market, where most passenger carriers have substantial cargo business and operate 
“combination” fleets. 
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1. Introduction 
The liberalization of international air transport services has been the subject of numerous papers. 
Most of the studies have focused on the air passenger market. However, there have been growing 
interests in the subject of liberalization of air cargo services for the last few years. The interests 
arise due in part to the fast growth of the sector, and in part to the push by shippers and traders 
and by major fieighter carriers especially air express operators. For the last decade or so, 
streamlining business supply chains has made air cargo in general, and air express in particular, 
the fastest-growth area in the dynamic cargo sector. Companies need to reduce inventories and 
cut down the time it takes to move products to the market. Product life spans are also shortening 
in many industries (computers, pharmaceuticals, and designer clothes). While some companies 
have turned to “virtual warehousing,” keeping goods in transit as a substitute for holding goods 
in storage, a growing community of E-commerce retailers have begun to rely on strategically 
located “fulfilment centers” to enable speedy and economical delivery of goods bought “on-line.” 
Moreover, as a result of continuous declines in tariffs and other trade barriers, international 
fragmentation, i.e., outsourcing various production blocks to countries that possess a 
comparative advantage in that type of productive activity becomes a major economic force to 
firms to remain competitive. This increases the demand for international service links, in the 
form of transport services, and intensifies the search for a more efficient trade regime in 
international air cargo services. 
Despite its growing importance, there are few published papers that examine effects of 
liberalization in international air cargo services. In this paper we provide a general discussion of 
various issues related to the liberalization of air cargo services in international aviation. The 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some basic characteristics of air cargo service, 
and Section 3 discusses general background of approaches to liberalization. Section 4 examines 
features of air cargo service that distinguish cargo fiom air passenger services and the 
implications for air cargo liberalization. Section 5 examines the interaction between air cargo and 
passenger services and the pattern of cargo vs. passenger services for both US and Asian airlines, 
and then discusses their implications for liberalization of the international air cargo industry. 
Section 7 contains concluding remarks. 
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2. Basic Characteristics of Air Cargo Service and its Growth 
2.1. Air Cargo vs. Land and Sea Cargo 
For cargo, it is much more expensive to use air transportation than surface transportation (road, 
I sea, and rail). There are two principal reasons for a shipper to select the air mode. First, the speed 
of air transportation, especially over long distances, is critical for goods subject to spoilage, 
goods requiring next-morning delivery (e.g. newspapers), and a key competitive advantage for 
goods subject to just-in-time supply chain pressures, in particular computer-related products and 
fashion goods. Second, air transportation’s low risk of losing or damaging shipments is an 
advantage for goods with a high ratio of value to size. Air cargo charges for these valuable and 
time-sensitive goods are usually small in comparison with the value of the items. 
, 
The viability of air cargo transportation for shippers can be further assessed using the total 
distribution cost (TDC) framework. Applying this framework to distribution involving long- 
distance transportation, it is argued that the use of slower modes (such as land or sea 
I transportation) may lead to higher total distribution costs than the air mode even though the latter 
may involve significantly higher freight charges. Striking a minimum TDC involves a trade-off 
between freight costs on the one hand, and inventory cycle and warehousing costs on the other. If 
inventory costs are very high relative to freight costs, air transportation becomes an attractive 
option while land or sea transportation is preferred in the reverse scenario. 
~ 
I The TDC framework becomes particularly relevant when the cargo industry is viewed in the 
context of providing broader business-related logistics services. With shifting economic patterns, 
companies are now manufacturing the parts of goods in different locations before reaching their 
final destination. With this dispersal of production and services and the fast flow of information, 
product life spans are shortening in many industries. Companies have, therefore, turned to 
“virtual warehousing,” relying on goods in transit as a substitute for holding goods in storage. 
This helps reduce the risk of obsolescence and is especially crucial for those industries dealing 
I with computers, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, perishables and designer clothes. 
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Today, international airfreight traffic constitutes less than 2% of all tonnage transported on an 
inter-continental basis, with ships carrying the rest. Goods carried by air represent over a third of 
the total value of international trade, however. For many countries, this percentage is 
considerabIy higher, and most economies involved in international trade are seeing a steady 
increase in the percentage of goods moving by air, based on their total value of export and 
import. 
2.2. General Air Cargo vs. Express Cargo 
Within the air cargo sector, there have historically been two major cargo types, namely, express 
cargo and general (heavy lift) cargo. The latter is still in the dominant position: for example, it 
accounts for around 95% by weight and 85% by value of airfreight handled by Hong Kong. 
Worldwide the market share of express cargo was by value 9.2% in 1999. However, the past two 
decades have witnessed a much faster growth in air express than in overall air cargo business. In 
1979, just-in-time (JIT) was introduced to American business (Vokurka and Davis, 1996). JIT 
can be broadly defined as a logistics system philosophy for providing better customer service at 
lower total cost. Lower inventory is considered to be the primary purpose of JIT logistics. As 
such, it implies greater use of air cargo transportation. To see this, consider various types of 
inventory. In-transit (or, pipeline stock) inventory is a function of transit time. Since air is the 
fastest mode for many types of goods, airfreight yields lower pipeline stock. At the destination, 
the two primary types of inventory are cycle stock and safety stock. Cycle stock is a function of 
incoming shipment size. Air cargo shipping allows for more frequent delivery of smaller 
shipments and lower cycle stock. Finally, safety stock is a function of lead time and lead time 
variability. By offering transit time speed and reliability, air cargo also reduces safety stock 
(Larson, 1998). 
Furthermore, within the air cargo sector, practice of JIT logistics in certain manufacturing sectors 
- in particular the electronics and computing businesses - has led many corporations to favour air 
express. Such companies, faced with the need to reduce inventories and cut down the time it 
takes to move a product to the market, have found it worthwhile to pay a premium for one-day or 
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two-day time-definite delivery. Product life spans are also shortening in many industries, in 
particular, computers, pharmaceuticals, and designer clothes. Companies, therefore, have turned 
to “virtual warehousing,” keeping goods in transit as a substitute for holding goods in storage. 
2.3. Integrators and Industrial Structure 
As a consequence, the integrators, Le., air express companies that provide an inclusive door-to- 
door service, have developed and expanded quickly over the last two decades. Nowadays, the 
four largest integrators, namely, Federal Express (FedEx), UPS, DHL and TNT, account for 
about 90% of the world’s air express, door-to-door market. Of the four integrators, FedEx and 
UPS operate their own air flights, while DHL and TNT make more use of the services of major 
airlines. It is worth noting that the high value-added integrators were less affected by the recent 
Asian financial crisis. DHL, for instance, registered a 15% growth from Asia to the US and 10% 
growth from Asia to Europe in 1998. While overall air cargo traffic through Hong Kong and 
Singapore fell in 1998, air express to/from Asian markets still rose 3.5%.’ 
However, it remains open to question how far across the manufacturing spectrum such acute just- 
in-time pressures will span. At the same time, competitive response by passenger airlines with 
substantial cargo businesses to provide time-definite and express delivery, and to exploit sea-air 
combinations, might create new business niches across the air cargo spectrum. As dedicated air 
express integrators continue to expand their businesses to accommodate general cargo and to 
persuade companies to “graduate” to higher value-adding air express services, so it is likely that 
those airlines dedicated to general cargo will also continue to expand their express services. In 
effect, a few combination carriers have attempted to compete head-on with these integrators by 
entering the air express, door-to-door market by forming partnerships with freighter and shipping 
companies. For example, Cathay Pacific has expanded its services into the express industry, 
mainly with its Wholesale Courier and Cargo Express services. Cathay Pacific has also entered 
into an innovative arrangement with DHL to provide overnight short-haul cargo services to Asian 
regional destinations, exploiting the new night-time capacity available at Hong Kong’s new 
In Hong Kong, express carriers with their own airside facilities also benefited opportunistically from the two-month I 
disruption of general air cargo services following the opening of the new airport at Chek Lap Kok in 1998. 
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airport during a period when passenger aircraft would otherwise have been “parked” overnight 
Dodwell and Zhang, 2000). 
Another development that can impact this product/provider spectrum is the rapid growth of 
Internet applications. Overnight document delivery has been an especially fast-developing sector 
of the air expresdintegrator market. However, document business is expected to decline as paper 
data can be transmitted with increasing ease via Internet. 
2.4. Growth of International Air Cargo 
Figure 1. World Total Freight and International Freight by Air (millions) 
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Source: World Air Transport Statistics. 
The air cargo volume throughout the world has strongly linked to trade growth. In effect, it has 
grown slightly faster than the international trade volume; consequently, it has grown at between 
1.5 and 2 times the rate of worldwide GDP growth. Average annual growth in freight-tonne 
kilometres on international scheduled services during the last decade is 7.9%, while on domestic 
services it is 2.1%. The situation is depicted in Figure 1. In addition, both the JIT pressures and 
the vertical integration of the logistics industry along with the increasing trend towards 
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outsourcing distribution have led to much faster growth in the air express market than the total 
air cargo market. Annual growth in international express has averaged nearly 24% since 1992. 
Finally, E-commerce is likely to generate increased demand for air cargo, particularly the time- 
definite, express market. 
Future air cargo growth is expected to be robust. According to Boeing World Air Cargo Forecast 
2000/01, world airborne cargo will grow by 6.4% per year for the next 20 years. Most of this 
growth will occur in international markets, which will exceed 86% of total revenue tonne- 
kilometers (RTK) by the year 2019. Two key factors are identified as drivers for the forecast: 
international express cargo, and E-commerce. The international express segment is expected to 
grow at an annual rate of 13% through 2019, which is twice the overall growth rate. Its market 
share is expected to grow from 9.2% in 1999 to 31% in 2019. The faster growth is due largely to 
its time-definite nature and the global trend in outsourcing logistics. As for E-commerce, it is 
expected that the increase in international and inter-continental transactions in both B2B and 
B2C markets will contribute to air cargo growth in excess of general economic expansion. 
3. Approaches to Liberalization 
~ 
In November 1979, amendments to the Federal Aviation Act deregulated domestic all-cargo air 
service in the United States, removing government control over rates and routes. Limits on 
aircraft size were also eliminated. Deregulation was promoted on the promise of lower rates and 
improved services to shippers. It is found that the deregulation, along with the use of JIT, has 
stimulated the air cargo growth in the US (e.g., Larson, 1998). 
I 
On the other hand, all commercial aspects of international air transportation have been governed 
by bilateral air services agreements (ASAs) since the Chicago Convention held in 1944. ASAs 
are based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, an equal and fair exchange of rights between 
countries with different market size, different geographical location and different economic 
interests, and with airlines of different strength. They fix a set of rules to identify the airlines of 
the contracting parties with the rights to fly on each route, determine the capacity that can be 
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provided by each of those designated airlines, and limit the capacity that can be offered by 
airlines from third countries. 
In discussing the exchange of rights for scheduled air services between nations, a vocabulary has 
emerged that is referred to as the freedoms of the air.* The first two freedoms are considered as 
“transit” rights as opposed to the remaining freedoms, which are counted as “traffic” rights. The 
third (fourth) freedom refers to the right of an airline to carry traffic from the home (foreign) 
country to the foreign (home) country. Perhaps the most controversial are the fifth and seventh 
freedoms. The fifth freedom is the right of an airline to pick up additional traffic in a first foreign 
country and carry it to a second foreign country. Typically it is an extension of flights that start 
out as third or fourth fieedom rights. On the other hand, the seventh freedom is the right of an 
airline to pick up traffic in one foreign country and carry it to another foreign country, without 
the flight originating fiom or ending at the home country; consequently, this is a pure foreign 
flight. Both fifth and seventh freedom rights are limited in practice. Finally, cabotage, the right to 
provide air services within a foreign country, is almost non-existent at present. 
3.1. The US Bilateral “Open Skies” Initiative 
Thus, bilateral ASAs have a large impact on the aviation industry because, unlike shipping, 
airlines require rights to fly passengers or cargo to/fiom other countries. Restrictions are often 
imposed on the ability for a carrier to operate services to destinations where there is a perceived 
business opportunity. The bilateral system is under increasing pressures to keep pace with the 
general economic and trade expansion of the world (e.g., Findlay, 1999). 
Since 1992, the US has been promoting bilateral “open skies” agreements with individual nations 
in Europe in preference to a multilateral approach. The first open-skies deal was signed in 
September 1992 between the US and the Netherlands. By the end of 1996, the US had 
successfully signed open-skies deals with ten European countries. Difficult US-UK negotiations 
There are nine concepts of freedoms of the air. The first five freedoms are specified in the Chicago Convention 
while the others have been developed subsequently. 
9 
continue, while the US is also targeting France for a possible deal. The US signed an open-skies 
agreement with Canada in 1995. 
The US government has been pursuing similar strategies towards Asian countries. The primary 
I reason for this US strategy is to optimise its bilateral negotiating leverage to ensure that US 
carriers continue to play leading roles in the world air transport industry (Oum, 1998). The US 
open-skies initiative in Asia was announced in summer 1996. By January 1997, Singapore 
became the first Asian country to sign an open-skies agreement. It is noted that recent bilateral 
agreements between the US and some Asia-Pacific economies (Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, 
and Singapore) include seventh-freedom traffic rights on cargo (i-e., the hubbing or change of 
gauge rights in a foreign territory), although limits are imposed on the fifth-freedom rights for 
passenger travel. The provision is intended to help Federal Express and UPS to set up mini-hubs 
in Asia (Oum, 1998). On May 1, 2001, the U.S. and four other Pacific-rim nations (Singapore, 
New Zealand, Chile and Brunei) signed the accord known as the “Multilateral Agreement on the 
Liberalization of International Air Transportation.” The new element is the full liberalization of 
cargo operations among the five countries. It is now possible for Singapore Airlines, for example, 
to operate cargo services between the US and New Zealand without go via Singapore. 
’ 
I 
The US initiative has met strong resistance in Japan. In March 1998, the US and Japan agreed a 
new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Since the Japanese government strongly resisted, 
the MOU was not the liberal agreement that the US wished to get. The official reason for Japan’s 
position was that there remained an inequality of rights and interests in the Japan-US bilateral 
agreement, and this inequality hampered fair competition in air transport market between the two 
co~ntr ies .~ The US is also pushing hard to have the hubbing rights in Hong Kong, although the 
US-Hong Kong bilateral has already been very liberal. 
A consequence of the US initiative is that if the US liberal bilateral initiative succeeds in having 
sufficient Asian countries offer fifth or seventh freedoms to the US, then the US carriers may be 
~~ ~ ~ ~~~ ~~ 
The Japanese government insisted that, first, in the original agreement the US has unlimited fifth freedom rights 
beyond Japan, while Japan has only one point of such right beyond the US. Second, the US has more “full right” 
carriers, carriers that can change capacity without advance notice, than Japan. Third, there is an imbalance in the 
3 
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able to serve intra-Asia spokes more freely than the home carriers of the spokes, in particular if 
the two countries concerned have restrictive bilaterals between themselves. The strategy by the 
US is sometimes referred to as a strategy of “divide and conquer” (Oum, 1998; Findlay, 1999). 
3.2. The Multilateral Approach 
An alternative approach is to adopt a multilateral approach to air transport liberalisation. The 
Uruguay Round succeeded in applying multilateral trade concepts to three limited aspects of the 
air transport sector, in the form of a separate Annex on Air Transport Services under the GATS:4 
aircraft repair and maintenance; selling and marketing of air transport services; and computer 
reservation system (CRS) services. The Annex specifically excluded anything affecting traffic 
rights and services directly related to their e~erc ise .~  
The two most important principles of the GATS are the most-favored-nation (MFN) clause and 
national treatment. The (unconditional) MFN clause means that the concession that one country 
yields to another country extends automatically to all other WTO member economies. In the case 
of air services, a distinction was drawn in the Uruguay Round between the application of MFN to 
traffic rights - routes, capacity, and pricing - and its application in the three ancillary areas (Le., 
aircraft repair and maintenance, selling and marketing of air transport services, and CRS 
services). On balance, it is not yet clear that liberalization in the air transport sector would be 
speeded up by the application of (unconditional) MFN to traffic rights (Kasper and Hindley, 
1999). 
Application of the national treatment principle to the air services sector would require that 
foreign services and suppliers be treated the same as comparable home services and suppliers. 
Applying this principle to non-traffic rights would be relatively straightforward - as illustrated by 
capacity provisions in the North Pacific market. The MOU has equalized the number of full-right carriers for the two 
countries, however. See Yamauchi (1999). 
’ Traffic rights were defined in the widest sense to include routes, capacity, pricing and the criteria for the 
designation of airlines. Specifically, paragraph 6(d) of the Annex states: “traffic rights mean the right for scheduled 
and non-scheduled services to operate andor carry passengers, cargo and mail for remuneration or hire from, to, 
within, or over the territory of a member, including points to be served, routes to be operated, types of traffic to be 
A fourth, Ground Handling Services, was considered until late in the Uruguay Round but eventually discarded. 
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the coverage of three ancillary services in the Uruguay Round. If applied to traffic rights such as 
routes, national treatment becomes more problematic (Kasper and Hindley, 1999). 
Recognising these potential problems with the multilateral mechanism, the approach also offers 
some obvious advantages for the integrated express air cargo sector. First, it provides an 
opportunity to include aviation in the negotiations for the broader goods and services. This may 
result in a win-win situation for all the countries involved. Second, if the integrated express air 
cargo industry is under the GATS umbrella, then several issues of key importance to the carriers 
can be addressed relatively easily. For example, customs clearance procedures for trans- 
shipments can be dealt with under the WTO trade facilitation programme, whereas restrictions on 
inter-modal and airport handling rights fall under the market access programme. Finally, this may 
be a more strategic and effective way to deal with the US “divide and conquer” strategy. 
3.3. “Open Skies” for Air Cargo First 
The approach of the “GATS 2000” negotiations once again raises the issue of how - and to what 
extent - the airline sector should be dealt with in the WT0.6 Various possibilities to expand the 
scope of the services in the Annex have been advanced by governments, international 
organizations and by various trade associations in the last year or so. One prominent proposal is 
to include some services involving traffic rights, specifically all-cargo services and express 
delivery services, under the Annex of the GATS. 
Since substantial liberalization in the air passenger sector is not likely to occur in the near future, 
the debate on this proposal centers on whether the air cargo rights should be separated from the 
air passenger rights and be liberalized first through the multilateral services liberalization 
program of the GATS. It appears that some of the US carriers are for the proposal while most of 
the Asian carriers are against it. As to be illustrated below, the heavy reliance of Asian carriers on 
air cargo carriage as part of their overall business model means that it is unlikely that air cargo in 
I 
carried, capacity to be provided, tariffs to be charged and their conditions, and criteria for designation of airlines, 
including such criteria as number, ownership and control.” 
start in 2000. 
“GATS 2000” refers to the new round of multilateral negotiations on services trade under the GATS, mandated to 6 
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Asia will develop along the lines of the US market where the air cargo market is dominated by 
all-freighter carriers including dedicated express carriers. As a consequence, liberalizing the air 
cargo sector first may result in differential impacts on the US and Asian carriers, and separation 
of air cargo and passenger rights may be fraught with difficulty because of the distinctive inter- 
linkage of passenger and air cargo business in Asia. In effect, for this reason UTA, an inter- 
airline or trade association that represents the interests of airlines, is still yet to develop an 
industry view on the proposal. 
4. Distinct Features of Air Cargo and Passenger Services 
4.1. Needs of Air Cargo vs. Needs of Passengers 
Human air travellers prefer to fly non-stop, directly to their destination, wherever possible. If a 
transfer is needed, they prefer the waiting time at the hub airport to be as short as possible (see, 
e.g., Carlton, Landes and Posner, 1980). They also prefer an attractive airport environment, rich 
in diversions, or endowed with facilities to enable them to work fluently, to make the waiting 
time as productive and enjoyable as possible. Cargo is relatively indifferent to such preferences. 
Whether it travels direct, or hubs through one or more airports, is of lesser consequence than for 
passengers. It is also insensitive to transfer flight synchronization,. and to airport terminal 
services. By contrast, it is sensitive to different factors, including whether a change of aircraft is 
required, whether pallets need to be broken down and rebuilt, and the cost of trans-shipment 
handling. 
In addition, cargo flows are unbalanced, or “uni-directional” - much more flows from Asia to the 
US than from the US to Asia, for example. By contrast, passenger air travel is much more 
balanced: passengers tend to make a two-way journey (from home to destination and back again). 
As a result, all-cargo carriers sometimes design their networks with “big circle” routes, while 
passenger carriers tend to fly east and west or north and south along the same linear route linking 
two cities. 
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As a result of these differences, all-cargo carriers sometimes have different routing needs and 
priorities than passenger carriers. It is for this reason (among others) that all-cargo carriers argue 
that separate all-cargo air traffic rights need to be negotiated, quite distinct from the air traffic 
rights negotiated in bilateral air services agreements on behalf of passenger carriers. Because of 
the bi-directional nature of passenger traffic, for example, it is more natural for countries to 
negotiate passenger traffic rights on a reciprocal basis than to negotiate cargo rights. 
I 
4.2. The Inbound/Outbound Imbalance 
As mentioned above, a consignment of cargo tends to move in a single direction. Cargo also 
tends to move from manufacturing to distribution centers, or from production to consumption 
centers, while passengers tend to travel to and from centres of commerce, production, and 
leisure. This difference suggests that passenger carriers filling belly space with cargo, and 
combination aircraft may not provide optimally efficient services both to passengers and cargo, 
and that an imbalance of inboundoutbound cargo can be significant on many given routes. 
Besides the apparent bilateral imbalance of cargo flows between Asia and North America, there 
are imbalances even within the same region. Table 1 shows, for example, there are imbalances of 
import/export cargo throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, such imbalances can be 
endemic. This is because fundamentally the inboundoutbound imbalance is influenced by 
import/export imbalances between countrieshegions. Although solutions may exist to positively 
adjust import/export imbalances, the application of these solutions in any particular region will of 
necessity be subject to political, economic, commercial aspirations and development strategies. It 
also takes time to formulate and implement corrective policies. 
I 
t 
I 
~ 
I 
I 
Table 1. Import/Export Airfreight Movements to Year 2000 (ton): Asia-Pacific 
, 
South Asia Southeast Asia Northeast Asia 
South Asia - Imports from 37,700 62,500 47,000 
South Asia - Exports to 37,700 80,500 55,500 
Southeast Asia - Imports from 80,500 570,500 666,000 
Northeast Asia - Imports from 55,500 1,001,800 2,019,700 
Northeast Asia - Exports to 47,000 666,000 2,019,700 
Source: IATA 's 1995 Airfreight Forecast (adapted from TLIAP, 2000). 
Southeast Asia - Exports to 62,500 570,500 1,001,800 
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Further, cargo and passengers may demand different scheduling and routing. Much express cargo 
seeks to move overnight, with departures in the late evening hours and arrival in the early 
morning hours, whereas passengers prefer to travel in the morning and early evening. (Overnight 
operation will also reduce the lead-time of cargo on the ground.) Cargo has less preference as to 
circuity or number of stops, whereas passengers strongly prefer non-stop flights. Given the large 
quantum of belly space available on passenger routes, pure cargo operators tend to focus their 
attention on those major routes where there is particularly heavy demand for cargo space. 
Cargo carriers also face their own scheduling difficulties because of the directional imbalance of 
air cargo. Air freighters may be fully laden when travelling eastbound from Asia to the US, or 
westbound to Europe, but then fly back to Asia with much lighter cargo loads. As a result of 
these supply/demand imbalances, air cargo rates vary greatly according to the time of year and 
the direction of travel. Sometimes, dedicated freighter operators construct special routing patterns 
- for example clockwise circular routes around the Pacific, or intensive “hub and spoke” 
operations. This can mean that they require different sets of air traffic rights from those needed or 
prioritised by passenger carriers. 
4.3. Network Patterns 
As indicated above, air cargo is concentrated on several key trade flows between regional centers 
of production and consumption. This concentration is more pronounced in cargo than for 
passenger flows (which are much more diffuse). This feature has contributed to the dramatic 
growth of hub-and-spoke systems for passenger travel after airline deregulation in the US. The 
hub-and-spoke operation is now emerging in the international market following global strategic 
airline alliances (see, e.g., Oum, Park and Zhang, 2000). 
The ability to funnel traffic to one location (and changing aircraft) does not always work for air 
cargo. Air cargo traffic is predominantly focused only on a few flows that are based around 
centers of production and consumption. These flows are best met by substantial capacity on 
direct flights. The key determinant for air cargo volumes for most airports is the size and scope of 
local O&D market whether for exports or imports. For example, electronics and computers 
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produced for the US market should take the most direct route. Sending air cargo flows on indirect 
paths via hubs is time-consuming and inefficient. 
On the other hand, hub-and-spoke systems work for smaller flows that are difhse in nature and 
uneconomic to fly directly. This market is being catered for through the growth of express 
operations that specialize in these flows along with door-to-door distribution. Therefore, hubbing 
does make sense to express operators who handle smaller, diffuse flows. However, even for 
express operators, developing cargo hub-and-spoke operations needs to take into account the size 
and scope of the local O&D market. Hubs work best when there is a large O&D market or easy 
surface access to it. Without large O&D markets, even express operators have trouble making 
their operations operate profitably. As a result, dedicated all-cargo carriers prefer to gather cargo 
in particular hubs (where a large O&D market exists) to make best use of their fleet capacity, and 
then fly to a destination hub for break-down and onward carriage. They use regional hubs where 
shipments are processed centrally before onward distribution in order to profitably handle smaller 
flows within a guaranteed timeframe. 
5. Interactions: All-cargo vs. Passenger Carriers 
5.1. Role of Passenger Travel as a Driver for Air Cargo Business 
The air transport industry can be divided into the cargo and passenger sectors. Cargo may be 
carried in the belly compartment of a passenger aircraft or in a freighter aircraft configured 
exclusively for that use. “Combi” aircraft are also used in which passengers may occupy the front 
section of the aircraft, with cargo occupying the back section. In Hong Kong, for example, 
between 55-60% of airfreight are carried in the belly compartment of passenger aircraft, so the 
two sectors overlap in a significant way. 
For mixed passenger/cargo carriers, passenger revenue for most airlines is still significantly 
larger than cargo revenue. This can be seen from Table 2 where passenger revenue accounts for 
70% or more for most airlines. But strategies that work for the passenger business may not be 
conducive for the cargo business. As an illustration, strategic alliances have generally worked 
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I Uscarriers 
well for the passenger market, but they appear to have little bearing on air cargo. Passenger 
airline alliances are particularly more effective if they are formed on a regional or global scale 
rather than for specific markets. The former is referred to as major (“strategic”) alliances, 
whereas the latter as minor (“tactical”) alliances. Major alliances refer to network-based, strategic 
alliances in which partner airlines combine their networks to gain access to other parts of the 
global markets, whereas minor alliances refer to route-based alliances in which airlines cooperate 
on one or more routes without linking their entire networks. The prominent examples of major 
alliances include the Star Alliance, Oneworld, Air Francemelta, Wings, and Qualiflyer. Together 
these five alliances account for about 60% of the world air passenger market. It is found that the 
major alliances tend to increase partner airlines’ productivity and profitability, while the latter 
have no statistically significant impact on productivity and profitability (Oum, Park and Zhang, 
2000). 
Table 2. Cargo Share of Revenue for Top 25 Cargo Airlines 
revenue I revenue share Of Cargo share of Asian Carriers 
27.2% 
23.0% 
13.4% 
26.4% 
33.7% 
39.6% 
24.9% 
~ 16.5% 
“Combi” 
Airlines 
Cargo 
Airlines 
United 
American 
Northwest 
Delta 
Continental 
FedEx 100% Nippon Cargo 96.3% 
U P S  100% 
Airborne Express 53% 
5.2% 
4% 
7% 
4% 
3.5% 
Korean Air 
Singapore Airlines 
Japan Airlines 
Cathay Pacific 
China Airlines 
EVA 
Asiana 
Thai Airways 
In contrast, air cargo alliances are more likely to occur for specific markets rather than on a 
regional or global scale. For example, the long-term limited alliance between Cathay Pacific and 
Lufihansa on the Hong Kong-Frankfurt route even though they are in different passenger alliance 
(Cathay Pacific in Oneworld and Lufihansa in the Star Alliance). Therefore, while strategic 
airline alliances work well in regards to passengers, they can be counterproductive for air cargo. 
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5.2. Different Patterns of Air Cargo Development: The US vs. Asia 
In Asia, passenger airlines have competed keenly for general air cargo business, as can be seen 
from Table 3 that lists the top 25 cargo airlines in the world based on revenue ton kilometres 
(RTK). Express carriers have yet to build a similar dominating position in the general air cargo 
business. The proportion of cargo that requires time-definite delivery within 24 or 36 hours door- 
to-door is comparatively small in Asia (about 5% of all air cargo). However, there are indications 
on the part of both FedEx and U P S ,  which operate dedicated air freighter fleets around the 
Pacific region, that they would be keen to build general cargo businesses, in part to help ensure 
their aircraft fly as fully-utilised as possible. This trend is inevitably destined to intensify 
competition between mixed passengerkargo carriers, conventional heavy-lift cargo carriers, and 
the express cargo operators. 
A different pattern of development has occurred in the world’s largest air cargo market, the 
United States. Here, the fact that most passenger carriers use narrow-bodied aircraft for their 
domestic operations has put severe limitations on their capacity to carry cargo. Passenger carriers 
also had a reputation for inefficiency and unreliability, as did the US Postal Service. As a result, 
dedicated air express carriers have emerged, using a combination of wide- and narrow-bodied 
aircraft, over 20 years raising their share of cargo carried from 4% to 60%. 
While there is good reason to believe that air cargo operators and express carriers will continue 
to grow strongly in Asia, there is also good reason to believe that growth will not follow a pattern 
identical to that in the US, in particular the share “captured” from general air cargo carriers by 
dedicated express carriers. Most of Asia’s domestic carriers operate wide-bodied fleets, and rely 
heavily on revenues from air cargo operations for their overall business profitability (see Table 
2). It is therefore likely that they would have a keen competitive interest in building air cargo 
business in the coming decades, competing head-on with express carriers, and continuing to 
develop mid-price options like time-specific two and three day services as well as premium 24- 
hour express services. 
Table 3. The World’s Top 25 Cargo Airlines (in RTK) 
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Rank Airline Country Type* RTK million 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Fedex 
Lufthansa Cargo 
UPS 
Korean 
Singapore 
United 
Air France 
British Airways 
Japan Airlines 
KLM 
Cathay Pacific 
American 
Northwest 
China Airlines 
Delta 
Cargolux 
EVA 
Swissair 
Nippon Cargo/ANA 
Martinair 
Asiana 
Qantas 
Airborne Express 
Thai Airways 
Continental 
World Total 
USA 
Germany 
USA 
South Korea 
Singapore 
.USA 
France 
UK 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Hong Kong 
USA 
USA 
Taiwan 
USA 
Luxembourg 
Taiwan 
Switzerland 
Japan 
Netherlands 
South Korea 
Australia 
USA 
Thailand 
USA 
I 
C 
I 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
F 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
F 
C 
C 
9,988 
5,696 
5,575 
5,225 
4,9 19 
4,767 
4,595 
4,277 
4,088 
3,885 
3,297 
3,176 
3,145 
2,87 1 
2,764 
2,687 
2,543 
2,518 
1,898 
1,817 
1,788 
1,761 
1,63 1 
1,548 
1,533 
120.000 
* 
C - Passenger and freight operator (“combination” carriers) 
F - All freight operator, i.e., 100% cargo share of total RTKs 
I - Integrated services operator 
Source: Airline Business (November 1999). Year ended December 1998 or March 1999. 
While many Asian airline groups have their own dedicated cargo fleets, many still rely heavily on 
their passenger route network to underpin the growth of their cargo services, and can be expected 
to retain that reliance into the future. Boeing, in its air cargo forecasts, predicts that express 
operators may account for 40% of global air cargo carriage in Asia by the year 2019. However, in 
view of the different pattern of aviation development in Asia, and the aggressive competitive 
interest in cargo on the part of those passenger airline groups that rely heavily on air cargo 
business, this may be a significant overestimate. As such, the development of passenger route 
networks is likely to remain closely linked with the development of cargo business. 
5.3. “Open Skies” for Air Cargo? 
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For governments involved in negotiation of air services agreements, the key issue is likely to be 
that negotiation of passenger rights may not be easily separated from negotiation of cargo rights 
in those circumstances where carriers rely on cargo business for a substantial share of revenues. It 
is noteworthy that at a recent OECD workshop on reform of air cargo regulation in Paris, 
delegates expressed concern that “all-cargo and integrated services would be the only or major 
beneficiaries from any regulatory reform process, and “combi” aircraft (both belly cargo and 
main deck) would not benefit appr~priately.”~ Putting on one side any arguments about the 
definition of “open skies,” it is clear that this issue applies mainly to dedicated air cargo carriers: 
those carriers basing their air cargo businesses on the use of belly-space in passenger aircraft will 
rely for growth mainly upon the bilateral negotiation of air traffic rights for passenger aircraft. 
In the United States, such segregation of the business interests of passenger and cargo carriers 
appears to have emerged naturally and reasonably from the fact that most domestic passenger air 
travel is in narrow bodied aircraft which have very limited cargo carrying capacity. Dedicated air 
cargo operators emerged, using a variety of pure freighter aircraft operating a dense domestic 
network based on selected hubs. Today air express carriers account for about 60% of all air cargo 
carried in the US. 
, 
The structure of passenger air travel across Asia is quite different from that in the domestic US 
market in many respects. Critically important, average journey lengths are longer, and many 
passenger carriers rely heavily on wide-bodied aircraft as they have developed route networks 
both domestically and internationally. These passenger carriers have therefore had a greater 
ability to carry large volumes of air cargo. Many have placed strategic emphasis on the growth of 
cargo business along their passenger route networks, and have come to generate a significant 
proportion of their total revenues from the carriage of cargo. It is therefore likely into the future 
that the Asia region’s passenger carriers will continue to have substantial interest in the growth of 
their cargo businesses, not only acquiring dedicated cargo aircraft as part of their fleet, but 
I 
~ 
I 
l 
I 
I 
I 
’ “Discussion summary” by the Transport Division of the OECD’s Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, 
July 12, 1999. 
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negotiating air services deals which allow them to use both passenger and pure freighter aircraft 
on many passenger routes. 
If dedicated air express cargo services are likely to account for a smaller proportion of overall 
aviation activity in Asia, and since major international passenger carriers are going to retain a 
keen interest in developing both their cargo and passenger businesses - including both heavy-lift 
and air express services - it is reasonable to query whether a separate set of air services 
agreements for dedicated air cargo carriers is either desirable or achievable. 
This is not to deny that the air express sector is likely to be one of the most dynamic areas of 
growth in the aviation industry in Asia in the coming decades. But the very fact that it is likely to 
be a highly dynamic sector, with passenger and cargo carriers alike anxious to build their cargo 
businesses as a critical area of business development, is likely to make it difficult to win 
agreement for air services agreements providing specific competitive benefits exclusively to 
cargo-only carriers. 
It is thus important to recognise that airlines with strong revenue reliance on cargo (like China 
Airlines, Korean Airlines, Cathay Pacific, Asiana, China Eastern, Japan Airlines, Thai Airways 
and Lufthansa) will have quite different interests from those with only marginal reliance on air 
cargo (like United Airlines, Delta, American Airlines, Continental, Qantas and Northwest Orient 
(see Tables 2 and 3), and from dedicated all-cargo carriers. Again, this illustrates a clear division 
of strategic interest between airlines with a balanced reliance on both cargo and passengers (most 
Asian carriers), and those that either have minor air cargo interests, or rely wholly on air cargo 
for their business. 
5.4. Effect of Open Fifthheventh Freedoms Unilaterally 
As noted above, particular circumstances in the US aviation environment have resulted in the 
emergence of dedicated air cargo carriers and air express carriers as the major force in the air 
cargo business within the United States - whether this is general air cargo, or parcels, packages 
and other high value/low volume or perishable items. In the distant past, however, most air 
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services agreements were built on rights to carry passengers. Airlines’ rights to carry cargo have 
frequently depended wholly on the use of belly space in passenger aircraft. This former bias is in 
the process of being remedied, but there are still many aviation markets on which no specific air 
cargo rights have been negotiated. While this situation is a matter of little concern to airlines 
without dedicated cargo aircraft, or with negligible cargo businesses, it is clearly much more 
important to those airlines with substantial air cargo businesses. For dedicated air cargo carriers, 
the issue is critical. Specific attention needs to be given to the optimal air traffic needs of 
dedicated cargo carriers and airlines with dedicated freighters in their fleet, but this should not 
occur in the absence of a balanced approach which takes account of the entire spectrum of air 
cargo and passenger services. 
As a case in point, there have been calls for Hong Kong to liberalize the fifthheventh freedom 
rights for the air cargo business unilaterally. If Hong Kong unilaterally opened its fifth and 
seventh freedom cargo rights to the US, Hong Kong carriers would be at a competitive 
disadvantage to the US carriers. First, since the US domestic market, the world’s largest air cargo 
market, is open only to US carriers (no cabotage), Hong Kong carriers will, other things being 
equal, have a higher unit cost than US carriers, This is because there are economies of scale and 
economies of network in the airline business. Second, the US carriers may be able to serve Hong 
Kong-Asian routes more freely than Hong Kong carriers, in particular while countries around 
Asia continue to maintain restrictive bilateral treaties with Hong Kong (Dodwell and Zhang, 
2000). 
Hong Kong’s airlines use the belly space in passenger aircraft to carry cargo (55-60%). In 
addition, cargo revenue account for more than 26% of Cathay Pacific’s total revenue. The 
passenger and cargo markets are not independent to each other. A liberalization of air cargo 
service will have impacts on the service to passengers. If Hong Kong unilaterally opened its 
fifthheventh freedom cargo rights, foreign carriers will enter the market. The immediate result 
will be a drop in prices and an increase in the volume of cargo services. However, Hong Kong 
carriers would lose a significant amount of business to foreign airlines under a great disparity in 
the market share of domestic carriers and foreign mega-carriers. The reduction in cargo business 
will further raise the cost of operating “combi” aircraft, since passenger and cargo are jointly 
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produced and there are economies of scope and scale. The Hong Kong airlines will then reduce 
their passenger output by cutting frequency. The foreign all-passenger airlines will increase their 
passenger output, leading to a situation where Hong Kong “combi” carriers lose market share and 
profit in both markets. Of course, the adverse effect on the home carriers does not necessary 
imply that the policy is also detrimental to Hong Kong. The Hong Kong economy as a whole 
might benefit if users (shippers, passengers) could enjoy lower user charges, better network 
connections and better services. Nonetheless, there is a strong body of evidence worldwide to 
suggest that success of a hub depends heavily on the successful development home carriers. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The air cargo volume throughout the world has strongly linked to trade growth and has grown at 
between 1.5 and 2 times the rate of worldwide GDP growth. Average annual growth in freight- 
tonne kilometres on international scheduled services during the last decade is 7.9%. In addition, 
both the JIT pressures and the vertical integration of the logistics industry have led to much faster 
growth in the air express market than the total air cargo market. Annual growth in international 
express has averaged nearly 24% since 1992. Finally, E-commerce is likely to generate increased 
demand for air cargo, particularly the time-definite, express market. 
Future air cargo growth may however be constrained by the current international regulatory 
framework. There have been calls from users (manufacturers, shippers and traders) and air 
carriers to liberalize the sector. One prominent proposal is to include all-cargo services and 
express delivery services under the GATS, that is, to have “open skies” for air cargo services. 
This paper has discussed basic characteristics of the air cargo industry. The implications for air 
cargo liberalization are as follows: 
0 All-cargo carriers sometimes have different routing needs and priorities than passenger 
carriers. It is for this reason (among others) that all-cargo carriers argue that separate all- 
cargo air traffic rights need to be negotiated, quite distinct from the air traffic rights 
negotiated in bilateral air services agreements on behalf of passenger carriers. 
Cargo carriers also face their own scheduling difficulties because of the directional imbalance 
of air cargo. For instance, air freighters may be fully laden when travelling eastbound from 
0 
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Asia to the US, or westbound to Europe, but then fly back to Asia with much lighter cargo 
loads. This can mean that they require different sets of air traffic rights from those needed or 
prioritised by passenger carriers. 
The ability to funnel traffic to one location (and changing aircraft) does not always work for 
air cargo. Air cargo traffic is predominantly focused only on a few flows that are based 
around centers of production and consumption. These flows are best met by substantial 
capacity on direct flights. The key determinant for air cargo volumes for most airports is the 
I 
size and scope of local O&D market whether for exports or imports. 
On the other hand, hub-and-spoke systems work for smaller flows that are diffbse in nature 
and uneconomic to fly directly. This market is being catered for through the growth of 
I express operations that specialize in these flows along with door-to-door distribution. 
Therefore, hubbing makes sense to express operators who handle smaller, diffuse flows. 
However, even for express operators, developing cargo hub-and-spoke operations needs to 
take into account the size and scope of the local O&D market. 
Strategies that work for the passenger business may not be conducive for the cargo business. 
I 
~ For example, strategic alliances, in which partner airlines share route networks, capacities 
t 
~ 
I 
and develop unified products, have generally worked well for the passenger market, but they 
appear to have little bearing on air cargo. If they do exist, air cargo alliances are more likely 
to occur for specific markets rather than on a regional or global scale, in contrast to air 
passenger alliances. 
The air cargo business in Asia is not likely to develop as the US market has developed, since 
Asian passenger carriers rely heavily on air cargo carriage as part of their overall business 
model. Dedicated all-cargo carriers will grow business strongly, but are unlikely to gain the 
I 
0 
I massive market share that they have won in the US. 
0 Separation of air cargo and passenger rights will be fraught with difficulty in Asia because of 
distinctive characteristics of the air cargo market, in which most passenger carriers have 
substantial cargo business, and operate wide-bodied fleets. This is not the case in the US, 
where passenger carriers rely on cargo business for only a small proportion of revenue and 
thus are indifferent to segregation of air cargo and passenger rights. 
As a consequence, liberalizing the air cargo sector first may result in differential impacts on 
the US and Asian carriers, and separation of air cargo and passenger rights may be fraught 
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with difficulty because of the distinctive inter-linkage of passenger and air cargo business in 
Asia. In effect, U T A  is still yet to develop an industry view on the proposal. 
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ABSTRACT 
The structure of an airline’s network plays an important role in the development of airline’s 
strategy. In this paper, a theoretical model supposing two airlines’ hub and spoke networks 
investigates the effects of different strategies on the airlines outputs, profits and economic 
welfare. The model simulates the market results of two profit-maximizing airlines under the 
basic form of bilateral agreement, the partial alliance and the complete alliance. It is found that 
firstly, the basic bilateral agreement, which combines the two airlines’ separate networks, 
stimulates more local and connecting traffic. Passengers are better off for the increased service as 
well as the reduced airfare. The profits for both airlines increase after the agreement for the 
extensive network and the economies of traffic density. Consequently, the basic form of the 
bilateral agreement definitely improves the economic welfare. Secondly, under the background 
of the bilateral agreement, two airlines make partial alliance by which they jointly offer the inter- 
hubbing flights. After the alliance, the output between the hub cities decreases, while the flights 
on the local and connecting markets increase for both airlines. Though passengers are worse off 
on the inter-hubbing market, they benefit from the increase of service and the decrease of airfare 
on other markets. As market size gets larger, the gains to passengers become high enough to 
compensate for the losses to them. Therefore, consumer surplus increases for the partial alliance. 
Furthermore it is shown that the total profits of the two airlines increase for the partial alliance 
and the increase of the profits gets larger as the market size increases. As for the change of 
economic welfare, it is found that in most conditions, it increases due to the partial alliance. The 
paper also shows that when increasing return to traffic density is relatively strong, the partial 
alliance tends to increase the economic welfare at the lower market size. On the other hand, 
when increasing return to density is relatively weak, the rise of the economic welfare results from 
the higher value of the market size. Finally, the complete alliance is examined under which the 
two airlines make the most extensive strategic alliance within their networks as compared to the 
situation of the open sky bilateral agreement where no alliance exists. The results show that the 
complete alliance makes the passengers whose flights are within an airline’s network better off, 
but for those passengers on the markets combing the two airlines networks’, they are worse off 
due to the complete alliance. As for the two airlines, their total profits decrease for the complete 
alliance and the losses get larger as the market size increases. Consequently, the complete 
alliance makes the economic welfare deteriorate. From these conclusions, some explanation and 
policy implication are developed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There are two significant developments in the air transport industry in recent years. The 
first of these was the emergence of the hub and spoke network following the deregulation 
of U.S. air transport in 1978. Airlines use hubs to consolidate traffic and therefore to take 
advantage of economies of traffic density. Through consolidation, airlines can offer 
direct services to more places at higher frequency and lower unit costs, using larger 
aircrafts. Passengers also benefit from the hub and spoke network for the increased 
frequency of flights and more choices of routes. Secondly, more and more airlines have 
been extending their service networks by strategic alliances with other airlines to form 
global service networks. 
Several reasons can explain the two phenomena. For example, passengers always prefer 
an airline with an extensive international network. This preference motivates airlines to 
establish global networks to attract more passengers in the increasingly competitive 
markets. However, it is difficult for an airline to establish a truly efficient network in 
foreign continents. Furthermore, it is known that most passengers prefer the on-line 
connecting services to the inter-line connecting services provided by two or more 
different airlines. High frequency and flexible schedule are also attractive factors of an 
airline to passengers, especially those business passengers. The above characteristics of 
the demand side drive airlines to transform from the initial point-point linear network to 
the hub and spoke network in its own route pattern. As for the connection with other 
airlines’ networks, it is not surprising that the strategic alliance among airlines is an 
efficient means for an airline to extend its service network. On the cost side, the common 
factor behind these two trends is the economies of traffic density. Economies of density 
arise because high density enables airline to use larger aircraft more efficiently at higher 
load factor. Therefore, the marginal cost of carrying an extra passenger on an individual 
route segment falls as traffic on the route rises. By the switch to hub and spoke network, 
airlines consolidate traffic from many different origin-destination markets into a much 
smaller number of links in the network and raise the traffic density on spoke routes. On 
each spoke, airlines can carry passengers with the same origin but different destinations, 
or passengers with the same destination but different origins. As for the strategic 
alliance, it not only extends the airline’s service network into the partner airline’s 
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network. More importantly, it consolidates passengers originally served by the two 
airlines on the route they jointly operate. Therefore, the alliance partners also benefit 
from the economies of traffic density intrinsically in the air transport network. 
In this paper, I construct a model consisting of two airlines in two nations, each of which 
has its own hub and spoke network structure. The stretch of the model development is 
summarized as follows. Firstly, the two airline networks are separate each other on the 
assumption that no bilateral agreement exists. Then the simple form of bilateral 
agreement between the two countries combines the two airlines’ networks and airlines 
compete on the route connecting their hub cities. Depending on the regulatory regime, I 
consider the two types of alliance. Under the regime of the simple form bilateral 
agreement, each airline can fly to another one’s hub city via its own hub and thus the two 
separate networks are connected. For example, the U.S.-China Civil Air Transport 
Agreement amended in 1995 authorized Minnesota- based Northwest Airline and the 
Beijing -based Air China the right to fly between Detroit and Beijing. But for Northwest 
Airline, it has no right to fly beyond Beijing. The partial alliance is based on such 
restrictive bilateral agreement. It is assumed that the two airlines make alliance on the 
route between the two hub cities, considering the case that Korean Air and Air Canada 
code shared their flights on the Seoul-Vancouver routes. Under the regime of the open 
sky bilateral agreement, complete alliance is studied in the model. For example, the open 
sky air treaty between the U.S. and Netherlands allowed KLM to operate open-shared 
flights with Northwest to more than 80 U.S. cities beyond NW’s hub. The purpose of 
this paper is to analyze the effects on outputs, airline profits and economic welfare of 
these two types of airline alliance and investigate the effects under different market sizes 
and extents of economies to traffic density. 
The next section reviews studies on the hub & spoke network and the airline alliance 
strategy. In section 3, the theoretical model is developed on the basis of profit 
maximization assumption of two airlines, each of which has an individual hub and spoke 
network. Section 4 investigates the effects on the output and airlines’ profits of bilateral 
agreement, partial alliance under the regime of simple bilateral agreement, and complete 
alliance under the open-sky bilateral agreement. In section 5 ,  some simulation work is 
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done to examine the effects on the consumer surplus and economic welfare respectively. 
Conclusion and some policy implication are made in section 6.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The earlier work about the study on the economies of traffic density in air transport 
network was attempted by Douglas Caves, Laurits Christensen and Michael 
Tretheway( 1984). Their work estimated the economies of density by analyzing the 
relationship between airline total costs, network size and the magnitude of passenger and 
freight services provided. The study using the panel data of U.S. trunk and local service 
airlines during the period 1970-1981 found that the difference in scale has no significant 
effect in explaining the different costs of airlines, while the factor of great significance 
was the density of traffic within airline’s network. Given the unchanged airline’s route 
structure, total cost increased 80 percent as rapidly as total traffic, implying the 
significant existence of increasing return to traffic density. 
Brueckner and Spiller( 1994) investigated the strength of economies of traffic density on 
individual route segment using a structural model of a simple hub and spoke network that 
connects three endpoints out of a hub city. The marginal cost of serving a passenger is 
determined by the marginal costs of the spokes along which he travels. Therefore, the 
marginal cost of serving a connecting passenger is the summation of the marginal cost of 
each segment he flies. This point illustrated the characteristic of cost complementarities 
across markets. The empirical work using the data of U.S. airlines in the fourth quarter 
of 1985 found that the marginal cost of carrying a passenger along a spoke route had 
significantly inverse relation with the traffic density and the airfares were low in a city- 
pair market when traffic densities on the spokes connecting the market cities were high, 
both of which strengthened the density effect in air transport network. As compared to 
the previous study, Brueckner and Spiller included the density information at the 
individual route level focusing on the hub and spoke network structure and their 
estimated economies of traffic density turned out to be stronger. 
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The theoretical analysis examining the effects of alliance on airlines’ outputs, profits and 
economic welfare was made by Park( 1997). The model he established consisted of three 
airlines operating in a network including three gateway cities. In the model, the effects of 
parallel alliance and complementary alliance as compared to the pre-alliance condition 
were examined respectively. By parallel alliance, two airlines make alliance on the route 
they compete each other before alliance. While by complementary alliance, the two 
partners jointly connect the two- flight segments on which they operate seperately before 
alliance. Therefore, the connecting flights now jointly provided by the two alliance 
partners compete with that offered by the other airline. The result showed that the two 
types of alliances had different effects on output and economic welfare. Economic 
welfare rises due to the complementary alliance, while parallel alliance tended to 
decrease it. 
In my paper, the same theoretical analysis method is taken and the differences are in the 
model construction and problem discussed. Instead of using the same network consisting 
of three cities for three airlines, the model I construct solves the situation for two airlines, 
each of which has its own hub and spoke network. In reality, these two airlines can be 
those in two different countries or continents. The alliance between them under different 
regulatory regime can be partial alliance referring to the alliance on their inter-hub city 
I 
I pair market, or complete alliance indicating the alliance on the most extensive city pair 
markets within their networks. Then the effects of these two types of alliance are 
~ examined respectively. 
I The theoretical model developed in Park (1997) used two important research results on 
the airline industry. Firstly, Coumot model was supposed in the competition of the 
airline industry. Brander and Zhang (1990) used the data of 33 Chicago-based airline 
duopoly routes for the third quarter of 1985 and found that the airlines’ conduct most 
reasonably appropriated Coumot behavior. In fact, the Bertrand and cartel models were 
also considered in the article, while the sensitive analyses on the basis of the data set 
were more consistent with the assumption of Cournot model. The second important 
finding was made by Brueckner and Spiller(1991). In that paper, a simple model of a hub 
and spoke network was firstly constructed to analyze the welfare effects of competition 
l 
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within the network. Capturing the cost complementarities and economies of traffic 
density inherent in the hub and spoke network, the structure model assumed the linear 
demand and marginal cost function on each flight leg of the network. On the basis of the 
profit maximization and Coumot equilibrium, different forms of competition within the 
network were considered to investigate their effects on the economic welfare. 
Researchers also studied the effects of strategic alliance on airfares, traffic volume and 
consumer surplus empirically. Park and Zhang( 1997) used the panel data of four major 
alliances in North Atlantic market in the period 1990-1994 to examine the effects of 
strategic alliance. Their results showed that the equilibrium airfares decreased on the 
routes where alliances occurred and the annual passenger volume increased, and 
consumers were better off after the alliance. 
In recent years, code-sharing agreement between airlines has become an essential form of 
airline alliance. It is a market arrangement between two airlines by which one airline’s 
designator code is shown on flights operated by its partner airline. The complementary 
code sharing agreement occurs when the two partners link up their networks together and 
feed traffic between domestic and international routes. Oum et al. (1996) used a panel 
data of 57 transpacific air routes in the period 1982-1992 and found empirically that the 
complementary code sharing alliance between non-leader partners led to the increase of 
the leader’s output and the decrease of the leader’s airfare. Such results were not 
consistent with the finding in the theoretical model by Park (1997) which argued that the 
leader airline produced less output under the same situation. The inconsistency resulted 
from the ignorance of the traffic-enhancing effect in the theoretical model. It was argued 
that the complementary code sharing alliance between non- leaders not only made the 
leader airline face competition and thus lose its traffic (the competitive effects), but also 
had the effect of increasing the traffic demand (the traffic-enhancing effects). In reality, 
the traffic enhancing effects may outweigh the competitive effects. Therefore, it was not 
surprising that the leader’s output increased. While, in the theoretical model, it was 
assumed that there were no such demand shifts after the alliance, and thus the significant 
traffic enhancing effects were ignored. The same limitation exists in my model 
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construction, and I am thinking to include a demand- shifting coefficient due to alliance 
in the further study. 
Recently, more studies on strategic airline alliance emphasize the stability of the airline 
alliance, the international regulatory issues with the alliance and the future evolution of 
the alliance. Oum and Park(1997) concluded that the strategic alliances among major 
airlines would be strengthened in the future and they envisioned the emergence of the 
competing global alliance networks. Yu et al. (2001) proposed the desirable international 
regulatory structure on alliances. Considering the asymmetrical regulatory policy across 
countries and uneven progress on the deregulation and liberalization across regions in 
world airline industry, the convergence of national competition policies and the 
coordination of regulatory agencies are necessary to deal with the problems with the 
international airline alliances. 
3. THE MODEL 
3.1. No bilateral agreement model 
As depicted in fig 3.1, consider two airlines (designated by airline 1 and 2) each 
operating its own network HAB and KCD. Before the two countries make the bilateral 
agreement, these two networks are separated and each airline has a local monopoly power 
on its hub and spoke network. 
A 
Figure 3.1 No bilateral agreement model 
For airline 1, its network consists of A, H and B, where H is the hub connecting traffic 
between A and B. Airline 2’s network consists of K, C and D with hub K. In each 
network, there are three city-pair markets, while aircrafts are flown only on two spoke 
routes owing to the nature of hub and spoke network. 
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For the convenience of analysis, demand is assumed to be symmetric across city-pairs. 
Let D( Q,) be an inverse demand function for round-trip travel in market i( i= AH, BH, 
AB, CK, DK and CD) where Qi represents the number of round-trip passengers in the 
market i. Furthermore, a common cost function, denoted as C(Q), is assumed for the cost 
of carrying Q passengers on each leg of the network. The cost function should reflect 
increasing returns to traffic density, satisfying C'(Q) > OandC"(Q) < 0 .  
The demand function has the form: 
D(Q)=a-Q/2 , a > O  
where a represents the demand level on each city pair. As for the cost function, it has 
the form: 
c'(Q) = I - @ ,  e > o  
where Bmeasures the extent of increasing return to traffic density. The higher value of 
0 shows the higher degree of increasing return to traffic density. 
The left side of above equations represents the marginal revenue in each city pair market, 
which is set to equal the marginal cost of serving a passenger in that market. The cost 
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complementary property of the network, which is an intrinsic feature of hub and spoke 
system, is apparently shown on the right side of equation, for example, the marginal cost 
of serving a passenger in the market AH falls when either QAH (local traffic) or 
QAB (connecting traffic) increases. 
The results are as follows: 
a-a6-1 Q’ =Q’  = 
1-36 AH B H  
a+a6-2 
1-30 Q:, = 
It is shown that the second-order condition for the airline’s profit maximization problem 
reduces to 6 < -. By the requirements of the positive values for the marginal revenue 1 
3 
2 1 
1+6 < a < - - .  26 
(marginal cost) and the output, a is constrained as - 
In order to get the profit value, I assume that the fixed costs associated with each leg 
operations are a constant. For the simplicity of the model, it is assumed to be zero. 
Therefore, the cost function on each leg has the form: 
For airline 1, since its profit function has the form: 
xi = QmO(QAH ) + QBHO(QBH ) + Q A B N Q A B  ) - C(Qm + Q,m 1 - C(Q, + QAB 1 
From the above results, the profit is: 
n, = - 3(-2 + a6* + 66)  + a[-8 + a(3 - 106) + 6(4 + a@6] 
2(1- 36)’ 
- 6 + 8a - 3a2 + 3a6’ + 186 - 24a6 + 1 Oa26 - 6a26’ 
Or, n, = 
2(36 - 1)’ 
The same result can be applied to airline 2 for the symmetrical assumption. 
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3.2. After-bilateral agreement model 
Now consider the situation when the two countries sign the bilateral agreements, then 
both airlines can fly between their two hub cities, i.e., H and K. Furthermore, for 
passengers from city A, they can fly from A to K through the airline 1's hub H, and 
passengers in B can also fly to K by connecting service offered by airline 1 through hub 
H. 
Figure 3.2. After bilateral agreement model 
By such an agreement, the two airlines (1 and 2 )  compete on the route HK. The following 
model examines the effect of that competition on the two airlines' outputs and profits. 
Given the above equations, airline 1 's first order conditions are: 
a-Qe,, = ~ - @ ( Q , H  +Q,M + Q A s )  ( 3 )  
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And for airline 2, the first order conditions are: 
a-QcK = l - e ( Q C K  +QcH 
a - Q D K  = l - Q ( Q D K  +QDH 
a-QcH =2-8(Q, +QcH +QcD)-Q(QL +QcH + Q o H )  
a - Q D H  =2-@(Q, +QDH +Qco)-8(QiK +QcH + Q o H )  
a-QcD =2-8(QcK +QcH +QcD) -o (QDK +QDH 
1 -e(Qf, + QcH + QDH 1 a-QbK -7Q H K  - 
Now consider the equilibrium arises when the two airlines play a Cournot game in the 
common market, i.e., the city pair between H and K. Note that the left-hand side of the 
I 
I I 
I 
~ 
equation (3)-(8) represents the marginal revenue in each market of airline 1 ,  which are set 
to equal the marginal cost of serving a passenger in the market. Referring to equation (3),  I 
for example, the marginal cost of serving a passenger in the AH market falls when either 
local traffic QAH or connecting traffic QAK , QAB increases. 
I For the symmetrical assumption, I can suppose that QhK = Q& . Then the solutions from 
the above equations are: 
~ 
(58 - 3 ) [ 1 +  a(28 - l ) ]  
I Q = Q  = AH BH 3 - 208 + 26e2 
i 
I - 6 + 118 + 4 3  -8(3 + 48)] 
3 - 208 + 26e2 QAK = QBK = 
~ 
- 6 + 100 + a[3 - 28(1+ 3 0 ) ]  
3-208+26e2 
2(20 - 1)[1+ a(20 - l)] 
3 - 200 + 2602 
QLK = Q 2  = 
HK 
As for airline 2, it has the solution as the following: 
(58 - 3 ) [ 1 +  a(28 - l ) ]  
3 - 208 + 268* QCK = Q D K  = 
- 6 + 118 + a [ 3  - 8(3 + 46)] 
Q C H  = Q D H  = 3 - 206 + 2682 
- 6 + 108 + a [ 3  - 28(1+ 3 8 ) ]  
2(26 - 1 ) [ 1 +  a(28 - l ) ]  
3 - 208 + 26e2 
3 - 208 + 26e2 Q C D  = 
= 
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The second order condition for the profit maximization problem reduces to 
8 < -(lo - f i )  z 0.204 . And the positive marginal revenue (cost) and the output 1 
26 
3-58 < a <  require a such that - 1 
1-28  - 16e2 + 9 8 '  
From the above results, the profit for airline 1 is as the following: 
n, = A + 4aB + a 2 C  
2(3 - 208 + 26e2)* 
where A=130 - 11068 + 269602 - 2O28Q3 
B=- 38 + 3238 - m e 2  + 5908' 
c=49-438 e + 1 1 96e2 - 12048~ + m e 4  
And for airline 2, it has the same profit expression. 
3.3 Partial alliance model 
Under such restrictive bilateral agreement, suppose now these two airlines make alliance. 
By the partial alliance, I mean that the two airlines jointly provide the flight between two 
hub cities H and K. After alliance the profit function for airline 1 and 2 can be expressed 
as: 
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c 
d 
- 4 a e 2  - 3 a 8 + 8 8 + a - 2  
1 - 9 8  + 16e2 Q:, = Q& = 
,&2 - 8ae2  - 4 a O + a - 1  
1 - 98 + 16e2 QHK - 
The second order condition for the partial alliance profit maximization problem reduces 
1 to 8 c - (9 - f i )  M 0.152 . Positive outputs and marginal revenue (costs) require 
32 
4 8 - 2  1 a such that < a <  
2e2 +e-1 5e-8e2 * 
Under the partial alliance, the total profits for these two airlines can be computed fkom 
the above solutions as IC ,&2 - 29 - 34a + 1 la2 - 808 + 96a8 - 3 8 a 2 8  + 16a202 - 
2 - 1 88 + 328 
3.4.Bilateral agreement (open -sky agreement) 
Under the open-sky agreement, each airline has the complete rights to fly in the other 
one’s network. If the network is within the country’s territory, such right is called as the 
cabotage. Or it can be extended to the third country by the fifth-freedom rights. 
3.4.1.No alliance situation 
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Under this kind of bilateral agreement, firstly consider the situation without alliance. The 
two airlines can serve any city-pair in the expanded network. Suppose they compete with 
each other on every city-pair market. Then the profit function for airline 1 is: 
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these two airlines play a Cournot game in each market of this expanded network. 
For airline 1, the first order condition for profit maximization before alliance can be 
written as follows: 
I a-QiH -2- Q j H  - 1 - 8 A  
I 
a-Qb, --=2-6B.-K Qt 
2 
a-Qfrc -2= 3 - 6 A - K - B D  
L 
a - Q b D - ,  Q'D = 3 - Q B - K - @ E  
Q f 
a-QcK I --=1-@D QfK 
a-QkD --=2-6D-6E 
2 
2 
B= QbH + Q:, + Qb, + QbD + Qb, 
c=Q:, + Q:, + ~ f ,  + Q:, + Q:, + Qbc + QbD + Q ~ c  + QHD I 
D=Q& + QLc + QkD + Qbc + QLC 
E= Q;, + + QZ, + + QiD 
As for airline 2, the first-order condition can be similarly written as: 
L 
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B=Q;, + QiB + QiK + QiD + Qk 
c = Q ~ ,  + Q:, + 
D=Q:K + Qic + Q f D  + Q ~ c  + Q:c 
I + Q:, + Q:, + QiC +QiD + Qic + QiD 
I 
I 
I 
I 
E=Q;, + ~i~ + Q : ~  +GD + 
I Given that the equilibrium arises when two airlines play Cournot game, the solutions are as 
following: 
2(-1 +a + 48 -8a6 + 8aQ2) 
3 - 346 + 48e2 Q:, = QLH = QLK = Q' DK = 
2(-6 + 3a + 46 - 6a6 + 8a6') Q' =Q' =QhH =Q' = 
AK BK DH 3(3 - 346 + 48e2)  
- 2( 6 - 3a - 246 + 14a6) 
Q' =Q1 - AB CD - 3(3 - 346 + 4 M 2 )  
2(-3 + 3a - 88 - 16a6 + 32ae2)  Q' = 
HK 3(3 - 346 + 4 w 2 )  
18 
- 2(9 - 3a -168 - 4a8 + 16~x8~) Q’ =Q’ =e:, =QLD = 
.4 c AD 3(3-348+48e2) 
1 
72 
And for the second order condition, the 8 is constrained such that 8 < - (1 7 - f i )  . 
9-168 -3-88 The positive output and marginal revenue requires < a <  
3 + 48 - 16e2 i6e2 -188 * 
From the above results, the profit for airline1 is: 
x, = 
where 
A + 12aB + 2a2C 
9(3 - 348 + 4882)2 
A = I 170 - 209708 + 619208~ - 518408~ 
B = -87 + 15638 - 468138~ + 40328~ 
c = 135 - 25178 + 9 3 5 ~ 8 ~  - 122888~ +46088~ 
And for airline 2, it has the same result for the symmetrical assumption. 
3.4.2 Complete alliance model 
Following the complete alliance, two partners link their networks by connecting their two 
hubs. The route between the partner’s hubs can be an intercontinental route. Furthermore, 
by code sharing or block-space agreements, the partner airline can fly beyond the hub city. 
Thus on each city-pair, they jointly provide the service. For example, airline 1 can code- 
share with airline 2 on the routes KC and KD in airline 2’s network. On the other way, 
airline 2 can code-share with airline 1 on the routes HA and HB in airline 1 ’s network. 
After the complete alliance, both airlines can fly not only between the two hub cities, but 
also between its own hub and the partner’s non-hub cities. Furthermore, they make joint 
operation on each city-pair market. 
Now on each city pair, suppose these two airlines are the only carriers. Then such 
alliances make the total profit maximize. This section is to examine the effects of such 
alliance on the output and total profits of the two airlines. 
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Consider the total profits of the two airlines, it has the form as follows: 
For the total profit maximization, the first order condition can be written as: 
a-Q:’, =1-6A 
a-QFH =I-BB 
..-e:’, =2-6A-6B 
a - Q i K  =1-K 
a-Q:c = 2 - K - B D  
a - Q i D  = 2 - K - 9 E  
a-Q:’, = 2 - 6 A - K  
a-QyK = 2 - 6 B - K  
~ 
a - Q E  = 3 - 6 A - K - e D  
a-Q:’, =3-8A-BC-BE 
a-Qyc = 3 - 6 B - K - B D  
a - Q z  = 3 - 6 B - K - 6 E  
a-QFD = 2 - e~ - e~ 
a-QFK =1-6D 
a-QFK =1-6E 
I 
where A=Q:’, + QE + QYK + QYc + QyD 
B=Q& + Qz + Qz + QyD + Q:c i 
1 c=Q;~ + + QfK + Q ; ~  +ea‘, + Q:c + QE + Q:c + Q:D 
D=QFK + Qfc + QFD + QFc + Qf,’, 
E=Q:~ +etD +Q: +e: +QYD 
Solving the above equations, the results are as follows: 
~ 
Q” = Q” = Q” = Q12 = - 1 + a + 66 - 12a9 + 18a02 
1 - 179 + 36e2 AH BH CK DK 
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- 2 +a + 126 - 7a6  Qii = QPD = 
1-178 + 36Q2 
- 1 +a - 48 - 8a6 + 24ae2 
1 - 176 + 3602 Q:K = 
Q" = Q" = Q" = Q" = - 2 +a + 26 - 3aO + 6aG2 
1 - 178 + 36e2 AK EK CH DH 
- 3 + a + 88 + 2a6 - 12ae2 
1 - 176 + 36e2 
QYc = QYD = Q$ = Q" - 
BD - 
1 
72 
The second order solution requires that 8 < - (1 7 - f i) . The positive output and 
3-88 l + 4 6  
-1219~ + 2 6 + l  96 -1202 * 
marginal revenue require < a <  
The total profit for these two airlines is: 
- 65-1808+a(-58+1686)+a2(-3+48)(-5+188) 
7 6 7 -  
2 - 348 -I- 72e2 
4. COMPARATIVE STATIC ANALYSIS 
4.1 The effects of the bilateral agreement 
Under the bilateral agreement, it can be shown that both airlines offer more outputs on 
markets AH, BH and AB for airline 1 and on markets CK, DK and CD for airline 2. The 
profits for both airlines increase after the agreement. 
Proposition 1 .a: 
Airline 1 increases its service in markets AH, BH and AB after the bilateral agreement, 
which connects the two airlines' network by the inter-hubbing route of H and K. 
Prooj 
Using the results in the section 3.1 and 3.2, I compute the changes in airline 1's output due 
to the bilateral agreement: 
8[6 - 118 + a(-3 + 38 + 48')] 
(1 - 38)(3 - 208 + 26e2 ) AQ,w (= A Q B H  ) = - 
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8[12 - 228 + a(-6 + 68 + SO’)] 
(1 - 38)(3 - 208 + 268*) AQ.a = -  
I 
The terms 1-3 8 ,  3 - 208 + 268’ and 8 are all positive values for the feasible range of 8 .  
The bracketed term of the above two expressions are negative for the feasible range of 
aand 8. 
The fact that the right side of the above two equations are positive implies that the airline 1 
increase its outputs in the markets AH and AB due to the new route right HK. That is to 
say, the bilateral agreement not only makes the airline 1 offer services on new route HK, in 
markets AK and BK, but also increase its traffic on the original market AH, BH and AB. 
The similar situation also holds for airline 2. 
I 
I 
Proposition 1.b: 
The profit for both airlines increases after the bilateral agreements. After the bilateral 
agreement, for airline 1, it adds the route between its hub city H and airline 2’s hub city K. 
For airline 1, the new route of HK not only expands its original service network- adding 
the service on city pair AK and BK, but also affects the marginal costs of providing service 
on the market AK, BK. For the economies of traffic density in airline network, the new 
route of HK reduces the costs of the network. Therefore, the profit for both airlines 
increases after the bilateral agreement. 
I Prooj 
A +  aB +a’C 
An,  (= A n 2  ) = 
2(1- 36)’(3 - 206 + 26e2)’ 
where A=l84- 27688 + 159988’ - 4440603 + 5920804 - 3042005 
~=-224+33808 -196198~ +5 4 8 ~ 8 ~  - ~ 9 2 8 ~  + 405849~ - 20288~ 
c=76-ii82e+7i87e2 -217228~ +34084e4 -2m8e5 + 70448~ 
It can be numerically shown that the change of the profit value is positive for the feasible 
range of a and 8 .  Thus both airlines benefit from the bilateral agreements and the profit 
increases after the agreement. 
22 
4.2 Effects of the “partial” alliance under the bilateral agreement 
Next consider another situation where airline 1 and airline 2 make a “partial” alliance, in a 
sense that they compete in the market HK before, but now they jointly offer the flight 
between the two hub cities. 
Proposition 2.a: 
Under the partial alliance, before alliance, two airlines compete on the market HK. After 
their alliance, the market HK becomes a monopoly one, the output on the inter-hub city 
pair market decreases. 
ProoJ 
The change of output in market HK due to alliance is: 
1 - 28(12 - 558 + 6602) + a[-1 + 28(10 - 478 + 6802 - 24Q3)] AQHK =Qg -Q’ -Q’ = 
( i -98+i6e2)(3-2o8+26e2)  HK H K  
The denominator is positive for the feasible range of 8, while the nominator is negative 
for the feasible a and 8 .  Thus, the change of the output in market HK is negative, which 
implies that airline 1 and 2 decreases their combined output between the two hub cities H 
and K. Before alliance, the two airlines compete in the market HK. After alliance, the 
market HK becomes a monopoly one, QHK decreases as a result. 
Proposition 2.b: 
AAer alliance, the service in each connecting market AK, BK for airline 1 and market CH, 
DH for airline 2 increases. Since the decrease of the output in HK market increases the 
marginal cost on HK segment, in order to compensate for the increase of marginal cost, 
airline 1 will increase the connecting traffic on markets AK and BK. And for airline 2, it 
will increase the output on markets CH and DH. 
ProoJ 
Using the results known from section 3.2 and 3.3, I get the change of the two airlines’ 
output due to the partial alliance as follows: 
e(i -38)[13 - 248 +a(-7 + i o 8  + 4e2)] 
(1 - 98 + 16e2)(3 - 208 + 26e2) AQ:, (= A Q ; ~  = A Q ; ~  = A Q ~ ,  ) = - 
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The terms 1 - 38,l- 98 + 168’ ,3 - 208 + 268’ , 8 are all positive for the feasible range of 
8. The bracket term ofthe right side of the equation is negative for the feasible range of 
a and 8. Therefore, the change of the traffic in market AK, BK, CH and DH is positive. 
Proposition 2.c: 
After the partial alliance, both airlines increase the output in their spoke routes. For airline 
1, it increases the service in the markets AH and BH. For airline 2, it increases the output 
in the markets CK and DK. 
Proof: 
Using the solution in segments 3.2 and 3.3, I compute the changes of output in market AH, 
BH, CK and DK: 
e2[i3-248+a(-7+i08+48’)] 
(1 - 98 + 16e2)(3 - 208 + 268’) A Q ; ~  (= A Q ; ~  = AQ;~  = AQ;, ) = - 
It has been shown that the bracket term in right side of the equation is negative for the 
feasible range of a and 8. Thus output change in market AH, BH for airline 1 and market 
CK, DK for airline 2 is positive. After alliance, both airlines increase the traffic on their 
spoke routes. Since the decrease in QHK increases the marginal cost on the segment HK, 
AK and BK, in order to compensate for that increase of the marginal cost, airline 1 
therefore increases the output on markets AH and BH. As for airline 2, it increases its 
I output between its hub K and the two spoke cities C, D respectively. 
From the equations a, by c, d, suppose the output on the market AK, BK for airline 1 and 
market CH, DH for airline 2 be constant, then the decrease of the traffic on market HK 
increases the marginal cost on the market AK, BK, CH, and DH. In order to set the 
marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, QAK , QBK,Qc,, QDH should increase. Thus both 
airlines increase their local services after such alliance. 
Proposition 2.d: 
In the connecting market AB and CD, both airlines increase the connecting service via 
their hub H and K after the alliance. In section 3.3, fiom the equations of first order 
, from a + + Q:,y + QLH + Q L )  -2  condition about market AB, I can get that Q:, = 
1-28 
set the equation hold in the new situation, Q:, should increase as a result. 
ProoJ 
It can be show that the change of output in market AB as: 
A Q L  (= AQ& ) = - 
2e2 [I 3 - 248 + a(-7 + io8 + 4e2 )I 
(1 - 98 + 1 6e2 )(3 - 208 + 26e2 ) 
in which the nominator is negative and denomination is positive for the feasible range of 
aand 8, thus the change on market AB for airline 1 and on market CD for airline 2 is 
positive. 
Proposition 2.e: 
As for the profits, it can be shown that the total profits for the two airlines increase after 
they make the partial alliance. 
Proofi 
where A=l+3528-3736Q2 +1333603 -1997204 +1081685 
B= 1 + 1888 - 1992Q2 + 696003 - 1013204 + 53 128’ 
c=i + 968 - 10248~ + 3464e3 - 4 ~ 6 8 ~  + 21768~ + 1 9 2 8 ~  
It can be numerically shown that the right side of the above equation is positive for the 
feasible range of a and 8. 
4.3. Effects of the “complete” alliance under the bilateral agreement (open sky 
agreement) 
Proposition 3: 
By “complete” alliance under the bilateral open sky agreement, the outputs in the 
following connecting markets AK, AC, AD, BK, BC, BD, CH and DH increase. For other 
markets AH, BH, CK, DK, AB, and CD, total output in each market decreases. As for the 
traffic between two hub cities H and K, the output decreases as well. The total profits for 
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airline 1 and 2 are lower in the situation where there is “complete” alliance between two 
airlines compared with that of no alliance. 
Proof 
Using the results in section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, the change of output in each market after the 
“complete” alliance is as follows: 
1-320+1646~ -2880~ +a(- l+306-21062 +508e3 -288e4) 
(1 -178 + 36e2)(3 - 346 +48e2)  A Q A H  (= A Q B H  = AQcK = A Q D K  ) = 
, 3 - 1068 + i m 2  + m e 3  + a(-3 + 948 - m e 2  + 8 8 0 8 ~  -1 152e4) 
3(i-i7e+36e2)(3-34e+48e2) 
I 
AQHK = QE - QkK - QL = 
AQA, (= AQcD ) = e:*,’ - QiB - Q,L 
- 6-1926+984e2 -1728e3 +a(-3+956-52602 +10086’) 
3(1-178 +36e2)(3 -346 + 48e2) 
It is numerically shown that the nominator in the above three equations is negative for the 
feasible range of a and6. The denominator is positive for the feasible 8. Therefore the 
change of output in markets AH, HK and AB is negative, i.e., the output in these markets 
decreases as result of the “complete” alliance. 
And it can be shown that: 
6 - 2026 + 64402 - 2880’ + a(-3 + 990 - 36W2 + 364@ - 28804) 
9-2988+113602 -1152e3 +a(-3+1046-264e2 -152Q3 +576e4 
3(1-176 + 360’)(3 - 346 + 4W2)  A Q A K  (= A Q B K  = AQcH = AQDH ) = 
3(1-176+3662)(3-346+4862) AQAc (= AQBC = AQA, = A Q B D  1 = 
The nominator of the above two equation is positive for the feasible range of a and6 
implying that the outputs in these connecting markets increase after the “complete” 
I 
I alliance. 
As for the profits, from section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, the change of the total profits for these two 
airlines is: 
I 
I An‘&2 = A - 2aB + a 2 C  
6(1- 176 + 36e2)(3 - 346 + 4862)2 
where 
, A=M + 98408 - 2223006~ + 10629608~ - 19353606~ + 12441606~ 
B=87+43209 -980920’ + 4721 12e3 - 87552004 + 5806088’ 
C=-l755+658146 - 799804e2 + 36786328’ - 7662624e4 + 71 147526’ - 2156544e6 
It can be shown numerically that the nominator is negative for the feasible range of a and 
6 ,  thus the total profits decrease as the result of “complete” alliance. 
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5. Effects on the price and economic welfare 
5.1. Effects of the bilateral agreements 
Proposition 5.1.a: 
From the proposition l.a, airline 1 produces more output in markets AH, BH and AB. For 
airline 2, it increases its traffic in markets CK, DK and CD due to the bilateral agreement. 
Therefore, the total outputs in these markets increase implying the reduction of the airfare 
in these markets. Furthermore, the new services are available on the inter-hub city pair HK 
and new flights from city A, B to K and from C, D to H. All above changes increase the 
consumer surplus in these markets, i.e., consumers are better off for the bilateral 
agreements. 
Proof: 
From the solution in section 4.1 and the assumption of the demand form, I get the changes 
of airfare in markets AH and AI3 as follows: 
e[i2 - 228 + a(-6 + 68 + 86')] 
2(1- 38)(3 - 208 + 26e2) APAB (= L\P,, = 
which are both negative for the feasible range of a and 8. 
Combining the positive change of output in the markets, the consumer surplus increases 
'and the increase of total consumer surplus in market AH can be computed by: 
where Q;, is the total output in market AH after the bilateral agreement. 
Therefore, 
6(6 - 3a - 118 + 3a6 + 4aB2)(6 - 6 a  - 348 + 43a8 + 4102 - 89ae2 + 5 6 ~ x 8 ~  
ACAH = 
4(1- 38)2 (3 - 208 + 2682)2 
(1 - 38)2(3 - 208 + 
8(6 - 3a - 118 + 3a8 + 4a02)(6 - 3a - 348 + l4a6  + 41e2 - 3a6' - 22ae3) 
ACAB = 
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As for the consumer surplus in HK, AK and BK markets, it has the form as follows: 
ACS = -Q(a - P) 1 
2 
Therefore, 
(6 - 3a  - 1 16 + 3a6 + 4a62)2 
4(3 - 206 + 2602 ) 2  ACS,, = 
4(1- 26')2 (1 -a + 2a6)' 
ACS, = 
(3 - 206' + ~ 8 ~ ) ~  
Since the same results are for that in markets BH, CK, DK, CD, CH and DH, the total 
change of consumer surplus is as follows: 
A+4aB+C ACS = 
(1 - 36)2 (3 - 206 + 2662)2 
where A= 40-2806 + 575e2 - 294e3 - 120e4 
B=-11+726-12302 +14@ +49Q4 +366' 
c=i3-926+249e2 -5908~  +i396e4 -17608~ +%$e6 
Proposition 5.1.b: 
The aggregate social welfare increases after the bilateral agreement. Therefore, the 
bilateral agreement is socially desirable. By social welfare, I refer to the summation of the 
change in consumer surplus and change in profits of these two firms. 
I 
I 
Using the proposition 5.1.a and l.b, the change in aggregate social welfare can be written 
A + a B + a 2 C  as: A W =  
(1 - 36)*(3 - 206' + 26e2)' 
where 
i 
, 
A=224-30486 + 16573Q2 - 44700e3 + 5908864 - 304206' 
B = -2060 + 696846 - 10691516'2 + 971645019~ - 57952999e4 + 2381297888' - 688136344e6 
+ 13997480568' -1967701352e8 + 182807630469 - 10218580326'0 + 2741207046" - 12338352612 
C = 697 - 239546 + 373732e2 - 3465256e3 + 21 19545W4 - 899629108' + 271314592e6 - 
~ ~ 7 7 4 8 7 6 8 ~  + 919056166'~ - 9357294168~ -t 6378399846'O - 2516398568'~ + 4 2 8 ~ 6 9 6 8 ' ~  
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Effects of bilateral agreement on the consumer surplus, profits and social welfare: 
0.02 
0.04 
0.05 
0.06 
0.08 
0.1 
0.12 
0.14 
0.16 
0.18 
0.20 
1.96078 16.7051 2.83149 2.81388 0.420936 420.759 -87.1337 12652.6 -86.7128 13073.: 
1.92308 8.37321 2.77422 2.74442 0.3976 110.541 -56.1104 1774.44 -55.7128 1884.9' 
1.90476 6.70732 2.721 19 2.68262 0.385848 72.5842 -42.4888 826.884 -42.103 899.46 
1.88676 5.59701 2.63965 2.59079 0.373923 5 1.7446 -30.0177 410.693 -29.6438 462.43 
1.85185 4.20984 2.28067 2.22191 0.349359 30.7275 -8.0901 1 116.587 -7.74075 147.31, 
1.81818 3.37838 - - 0.322747 20.8107 10.735 47.1645 1 1.0577 67.975. 
1.78571 2.82486 - - 0.292287 15.3287 27.9749 38.0851 28.2672 53.413 
1.75439 2.43026 - - 0.254525 11.969 46.1394 48.5738 46.391 60.6128 
1.72414 2.13509 - - 0.20238 9.75089 70.759 71.1953 70.9614 80.946 
1.69492 1.90632 - - 0.13056 8.19314 121.213 121.252 121.344 129.44. 
1.66667 1.72414 - - 3.47126 7.02374 274.931 274.93 1 278.402 28 1.951 
Table 1 shows the effects of bilateral agreement on the consumer surplus, profits and social 
welfare. Columns a - and indicate the lower and upper bounds of the demand intercept 
a ,  which satisfy the requirement that both the output and marginal revenue are positive 
before and after the bilateral agreement. 
- 
Columns &2J and ACS represent the lower and upper bounds of the change of the 
consumer surplus due to the bilateral agreement given the feasible range of a and 8. As 
argued in proposition 4.1 .a, these two columns show that the consumer surplus increases 
after the bilateral agreement. Furthermore, given a value of 8 ,  the increase of the 
consumer surplus gets larger as the market size increases. 
Columns & and show the different change given the lower and upper bound of a ,  at 
different feasible values of e .  It is shown that when 8 is less than 0.1, some range of 
agives the negative change of the total profits for the two airlines. For example, at 
8 = 0.05, the total profits decrease after the bilateral agreement for 1.90476<a < 2.721 19 
and the profits increase for 2.721 19 < a < 6.70732. The result shows that the extent to 
which the two airlines gain from the bilateral agreement gets greater as the market size 
increases. While for the higher value of 8, for instance, when it is larger than 0.1, the 
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change of profits is positive for any feasible value of a. In fact, if the economies of traffic 
density are high enough, the cost reduction from the increasing traffic density is high. 
Therefore, both airlines gain higher profits after the bilateral agreement. 
As for the change of the social welfare, it has the similar trend as that for the total profits. 
Columns and AW show the change of welfare for lower and upper bound of a, at 
different value of 8 .  When 8 is low and at some lower value of a, the gain to the 
consumers from the bilateral agreement is not high enough to compensate for the loss to 
the two airlines. Therefore, the social welfare decreases for the bilateral agreement. At 
higher value of 8 ,  the two airlines also gain from the agreement, thus the change of social 
welfare is positive for any feasible value of a .  
Effects of bilateral agreement on the profits of two airlines 
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igure 1 The effects of bilateral agreement on the profits of the two airlines 
In table 1 ,  column a, shows the critical value of a at which the change of profits is zero for 
any given value of 8 . For example, at 8 =0.06, the change is negative for 
1.88676 < a  < 2.63965 ; and it is positive for 2.63965 < a  < 5.59701. In figure 1 ,  the 
lower, upper and critical values of a are drawn at the different value of 8 .  The graph 
shows that the profits for the two airlines increase after the bilateral agreement if the 
I 
market size is large enough, or if the economies of density is high enough, but it decreases 
when the return to density is low and the market size is small. 
In table 1, column a2 shows the critical value of a at which the change of social welfare 
equals zero at the given value of 8. For instance, at 8 = 0.06, the change of welfare is 
positive for 2.59079 < a < 5.59701 : and it is negative for 1.88675 < a < 2.59079 The 
graph in figure 2 draws the lower, upper and critical value of a at different value of 8. It 
shows that the social welfare increases after the bilateral agreement when the market size is 
sufficiently large or when the return to traffic density is high enough. At the given value 
of 8, the change of the economic welfare is positive if the market size is sufficiently large, 
which implies that the benefits to the consumers outweigh the cost increase to the two 
airlines. As a result, the social welfare increases. Or, if the return to traffic density is 
sufficiently high, then the marginal costs decrease faster then those for weaker economies 
of density. The two airlines get higher profits after the bilateral agreement. Therefore, the 
social welfare increases. When the market size is relatively small and the degree of the 
economies of traffic density is lower, the gains to the consumers are not sufficiently large 
to compensate for the loss to the two airlines. As a consequence, the social welfare 
decreases after the bilateral agreement. 
Effects of bilateral agreement on the economic welfare 
18 
16 I, 
. .  
12 Welfare increases for the bilateral agreement 
2 10 
Q 
3 8  
6 
4 
2 
0 
2 4 5 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
theta'100 
Figure 2: The effect of the bilateral agreement on the economic welfare 
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ACS,, = 
e2(13 - 7 a  - 246 + loa6 + 4ae2)(6 - 3a - 646 + 29a6 + 199e2 - 67a6' - 184e3 - 12ae3 + 100ae4 
(1-96+1662)2(3-206+2662)2 
With the changes of consumer surplus in other markets, I get the change of overall 
, in which A - 2aB + a 2 C  consumer surplus as: ACS = 
4(1-96+1662)2(3-206+2662)2 
A=- 7 + 8566 - 10640e2 + 50212e3 - 1 10524e4 + 114184e5 - 44544e6 
B=- 7 + 5526 - 6572e2 + 30606Q3 - 67868e4 + 74852e5 -39600e6 + 9120e7 
C= 
- 7 + 3926 - 4584e2 + 22664e3 - 59804e4 + 988166' - 1 14304e6 + 86656e7 - 29696e8 
Combining the change of total profits in proposition 2.e, I get the change of the social 
welfare as: 
A + a B + a 2 C  AW = 
4(1-96+1662)2(3-206+2662)2 
where 
A =  -1 + 28746 - 65636e2 + 65912019~ -3771012e4 +132634886' - 2909166413~ + 38719056e7 
- 28600832e8 + 8998912e9 
B =  2-31726+7137662 -70802019~ +4004616e4 -13916728e5 +3011001666 -39449184e7 
+ 2863104068 -8839168e9 
C=-1+8746-1924462 +187364e3 -1039684e4 +3533112e5 -7423824e6 +9325712e7 
- 630016068 + 1597696e9 + 1597446'' 
- 
6 
0.03 
0.04 
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0.12 
Effects of partial alliance on consumer surplus, profits and social welfare 
- - - - 
a a a1 a 2  ACS - AX AX A W  A W  
1.94175 7.0028 6.06397 2.0553 -0.173659 0.45836 0.141876 24.2832 -0.03178 24.847-1 
1.92308 5.34188 3.31729 2.0112 -0.166554 2.23997 0.132531 15.3447 -0.03402 17.695( 
1.90476 4.34783 2.65466 1.97682 -0.159316 2.80984 0.122818 10.4773 -0.03650 13.4032 
1.88679 3.68732 2.34943 1.94712 -0.151935 2.9918 0.1 12837 7.46026 -0.03910 10.573' 
1.85185 2.86697 2.05372 1.89448 -0.136823 3.02287 0.092409 3.99334 -0.04443 7.14911 
1.83486 2.59605 1.9701 1.87012 -0.12933 2.99616 0.0821 18 2.93191 -0.04724 6.066 
1.81818 2.38095 1.9078 1.84681 -0.122385 2.96708 0.071873 2.12704 -0.05056 5.238 ', 
1.78571 2.06271 1.8227 1.8038 -0.1 16496 2.90719 0.051776 1.01525 -0.06490 4.075 : 
1.8018 2.20653 1.85999 1.82463 -0.1 17106 2.93908 0.061739 1.50421 -0.05546 4.592 i 
33 
5.2. Effects of partial alliance 
Now consider the effects of the partial alliance on the market price and social welfare 
under the bilateral agreement. 
Proposition 5.2.1 : 
For the partial alliance, the output in the joint market HK decreases, which results in the 
increasing airfare. The airfare change in the market HK is as follows: 
AQHK 1 - 2q12 - 550 + 660’) MHK =-- = - + 2q10 - 470 + 68e2 - 24e3)1 
2 2(1-90+1602)(3-200+2602) 
The consumer surplus in market HK decreases and the change is negative: 
ACS, = -[-I + 248 -1 loo2 + 132e3 + a(1- 200 + 94e2 -136e3 + 480‘)][-7 + 648 --me2 + 128e3 
+a(7-848+354Q2 -664Q3 +46484)J/[4(1-98+1682)2(3-208+ 2682)2] 
As for the consumer surplus in other markets, the outputs increase due to the “partial” 
alliance and thus airfare falls. The change of market price is as follows: 
MA, = 
0(l-30)[13-240+a(-7+100+402)] 
2(1- 90 + 160’)(3 - 200 + 260’) 
0’[13-240+a(-7 + i 0 8 + 4 8 ~ ) ]  
2(1- 98 + 16e2)(3 - 200 + 26e2) APAH = 
Consequently, the consumer surplus increases in all these markets. 
ACS,, =[0(1-30)(13-7a-248+10a8+4aB2)(12-6a-1176 53a& 
-2a@ +116a84)]/4(1-98+1602)2(3-208+2602)2 
ACSAH = 
8’ (13 - 7 a  - 240 + loa0 + 4a0*)(6 - 6 a  - 640 + 76a8 + 1990’ - 321a0’ - 1 84e3 + 542ae3 - 3 1 6a8‘ ) 
4(i-9e+i6e2)2(3-208+2682)2 
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Table 2. Effects of partial alliance on consumer surplus, profits and social welfare 
1.76991 1.9425 1.79339 1.78459 -0.130091 2.85042 0.042047 0.62759 -0.08836 3.631 12 
1.75439 1.84094 1.77016 1.76705 -0.20187 2.6876 0.032607 0.31871 -0.16985 3.15224 
1.73913 1.75439 1.74938 1.74888 -1.14271 1.19731 0.023497 0.07256 -1.12033 1.39304 
Table 2 shows the effects of partial alliance on the change of consumer surplus, overall 
profits and the social welfare. Columns gand a are the lower and upper bounds of the 
demand intercept, which guarantee the positive values of output and marginal revenue 
I before and after the partial alliance. 
Effect of partial alliance on the consumer surplus 
8 
7 
6 
5 m r - Q.4 
m 
3 
2 
1 
0 
3 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
theta*lOO 
Figure 3. The effects of partial alliance on the consumer surplus 
As for the change of consumer surplus after the partial alliance, it is shown from columns 
ACS and ACS that for any given value of 6 and the lower range of a the consumer 
surplus decreases under the partial alliance. According to the proposition 5.2.1, passengers 
in market HK (inter- hub city pair) are worse off since the output in this market decreases 
and the corresponding airfare increases. Although, in other markets, passengers are better 
off for the increased output and decreased airfare, for the lower value of a ,  such gains are 
- 
I 
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not high enough to compensate for the loss to passengers on the market between the two 
hub cities. Therefore, the overall consumer surplus decreases for the partial alliance. 
Column a, provides the critical value of a at which the change of the consumer surplus in 
all the markets equals zero for the given value of8 .  For example, at 0 =0.06, change in 
overall consumer surplus is negative for 1.88679 < a < 2.34943 ; and it is positive for 
2.34943 < a < 3.68732 . The lower, upper and critical values of Q are drawn in the figure 
above. 
Columns &and A n  in Table 2 indicate the change of the profits to the two airlines after 
the “partial” alliance given the lower and upper bound of a for the feasible range of 0 .  
As mentioned in proposition 2.e, the columns show the overall profits increase for the 
“partial” alliance. Furthermore, the two columns indicate that at a given value of 8 ,  the 
increase of the overall profits gets larger as the market size increases. 
Next consider the effect of partial alliance on the social welfare. In table 2, columns 
- AW and AW are the corresponding changes of social welfare given the lower and upper 
bounds of a for the feasible values of 8 .  As compared to the economic welfare before the 
partial alliance, the welfare decreases when the market size is overly small. Such 
decreases results from the decrease of the consumer surplus. Although the profits for the 
two airlines increase due to the partial alliance, the increase is not high enough to 
compensate for the losses to passengers. As market size gets larger, passengers gain from 
the partial alliance and the two airlines gain more profits due to the alliance. Therefore, the 
increase of the economic welfare gets larger as the market size increases. 
- 
The graph in figure 4 shows the change of economic welfare at the lower, upper and 
critical value for the given feasible range of 19. In general, the economic welfare increases 
as result of the partial alliance since most areas below the upper bound of a yield the 
positive change of the welfare. 
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Figure 4. The effect of partial alliance on the economic welfare 
5.3. Effect of complete alliance 
Proposition 5.3.a: 
The “complete” alliance results in the decrease of the total output and the increase of the 
airfare in markets AH, BH, CK, DK, HK, AB and CD. Therefore, the passengers in these 
markets are worse off due to the complete alliance. 
The price change due to the complete alliance: 
1 - 328 + 164e2 - 288e3 + a(-i + 308 - 2108’ + 5088’ - 288e4) 
(= A f B ,  = P c K  = P D K  ) = - 
2(1- 178 + 368’)(3 - 348 + 488’) 
3-1068+152e2 + m e 3  + a ( - 3 + 9 4 e - m e 2  +880e3 -11528~) APHK =- 
6(1- 178 + 368’)(3 - 348 + 488’) 
6 - 1928 + 9848’ - 17288’ + a(-3 + 958 - 5268’ + 10088~) 
6(i - 178 + 36e2)(3 - 348 + 48e2) APAB =- 
Using the results in section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, the consumer surplus in each market can be 
written as follows: 
AC,,~ = -[(-I + a + 328 - 30ae - 1648’ + 2 1 0 ~ ~ 8 ~  + 28803 - 508aQ3 + 288ae4)(-7 + 7a + 1368 
-i70ae-668e2 +1230aoZ +864e2 -2884ae3 + 2 0 i 6 ~ r 8 ~ ) ] / [ 4 ( i - i 7 8 + 3 6 8 * ) ~ ( 3 - 3 4 8 + 4 8 8 ~ ) ~ ]  
36 
AC, = -[(-3 + 3 a  + 1066 - 94a6 - 152e2 + 472ae2 - 576B3 - 880ae3 + 1 152ae4)(-21 + 21a + 2 
-442a6+37602 +2824aB2 -1728B3 -808OaO3 +8064aB4)]/[(36(1-17B+3662)2(3-346+48 
ACS,, = -[(6 - 3 a  - 1928 + 95aB + 98402 - 526aB2 - 1728e3 + 1008aB3)(42 - 21a - 8166 + 42% 
+ 40088~  - 2 2 4 2 ~ ~ 8 ~  - 5 1 4 w 3  + 3024ae3)]  /[36(1- 178 + 36e2 )’ ( 3  - 340 + 48e2 )’I 
In markets AH, BH, CK, DK, HK, AB and CD, since the price increases and the outputs in 
these markets decrease after the “complete” alliance, the change of consumer surplus in 
these markets is negative. 
Proposition 5.3.b: 
In markets AK, BK, CH, DH, AC, BC, AD and BD, the complete alliance results in the 
increase of the outputs and the decrease of the corresponding airfare in each market. 
Consequently, passengers are better off due to the complete alliance. 
Using the results in section 4.3, the change of airfare in these markets is negative and can 
be written as: 
6 - 2028 + 6448 - 28803 + 14-3 + 998 - 3688 + 36403 - 2888“ ) 
6(1-178 + 368’)(3 - 348 + 48Q2) 
APAK (= u*K = APCH = APDH ) = - 
9 - 2988 + 1 1368’ -1 m e 3  + a(-3 + 1048 - 2640~ - 1528’ + 576e4) 
6( 1 - 178 + 368 )(3 - 348 + 488 ) MAC(= MSC =MAD = AP,,) = - 
Next, the change of the consumer surplus in these markets can be calculated as follows: 
ACS,, = -[(-6 + 3a + 2028 - 99a8 - 64402 + 368a02 + 2888’ - 364a03 + 288a8“)(-42 + 21a + 6468 
-357a0-16288~ +1376a02 +864e3 - 2452a8’ +2016a84)]/[36(1-178+36e2)2(3-348+48e2)2] 
2(3 - a  -88 - 2aB + 12aB2 )(9 - 3 a  - 168 - 4aB + 16aB2) ACS,, = 
3(1-176+3662)(3-348+4882) 
In the markets above, the output increases and the airfare decreases due to the “complete” 
alliance. Obviously, consumer surplus in these markets increases and the change is 
positive. Therefore, the change of total consumer surplus in all the markets is as follows: 
A - 2aB + a 2 C  
ACS = 
3 6 ( i - i 7 6 + 3 6 8 2 ) 2 ( 3 - 3 4 ~ + 4 8 ~ 2 ) 2  
where 
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A = 5949 - 1636206 + 15559246’ - 67316806’ + 12692800e4 - 48384006’ - 7630848e6 
B = 1521 -204608 - 237916e2 + 4977920e3 - 29340992e4 + 78484480e5 -95182848e6 + 398131206 
c = 171 + 145208 - 5287028~ + ~ 8 7 9 3 2 0 6 ~  - 294050646~ + 733987206~ - 872280328~ 
+ 3806208067 - 663552e8 
As for the change of the social welfare, it is calculated by the summation of the change of 
consumer surplus in all the markets and the change of the profits for the two airlines. It has 
the form as follows: 
A + a B + a 2 C  AW = 
36(1- 176 + 366 2 ) 2  (3 - 346 + 48e2)’ 
where 
A = 71 19 - 1244706 - 739436e2 + 24446120e3 - 15535808004 + 429632640e5 
- 552572928e6 + 268738560e7 
C = -10359 + 5884146 -124196348* + 123746944e3 - 62335893604 + 16922593928’ - 24809987840 
+ 17948 160006 - 466477056e8 
Effect of complete alliance on consumer surplus, profits and social welfare 
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T 
- 
8 - - - a a a, a2 . c\cs ACS 87c AT - AW AW 
- 
2.95403 22.8188 9.99344 0.693643 -4,8110 251.992 -295.175 -17191.2 -299.986 -16939.2 
2.90943 11.71 17 7.4087 0.735241 -4.5634 61.7027 -291.753 -4602.97 296.316 -4541.27 
2.86612 8.01209 5.9184 0.780379 -4.3088 27.2768 -288.153 -2189.52 -292.461 -2162.24 
2.82405 6.16438 4.95163 0.829913 -4.0419 15.5285 -284.197 -1316.24 -288.239 -1300.71 
2.78317 5.05747 4.27618 0.884959 -3.7548 10.2454 -279.637 -898.067 -283.392 -887.821 
2.74343 4.32099 3.77985 0.947041 -3.4356 7.47035 -274.121 -662.269 -277.556 -654.779 
2.70478 3.7962 3.40193 1.01814 -3.0645 5.86 -267.136 -513.549 -270.2 -507.689 
2.66718 3.40376 3.10674 1.10128 -2.6071 4.85701 -257.926 -41 1.083 -260.533 -406.226 
2.63058 3.09955 2.87209 1.20079 -1.9956 4.19275 -245.339 -334.513 -247.334 -330.321 
2.59494 2.85714 2.68361 1.3234 -1.0785 3.72084 -227.569 -272.166 -228.648 -268.445 
2.56022 2.65969 - 1.48006 0.561953 3.34664 -201.68 -216.068 -201.118 -212.721 
2.53982 2.55797 - 1.59766 2.42621 3.13685 -180.287 -182.552 -177.861 -179.416 
de 3: Effects of complete alliance on consumer surplus, profits and social welfare 
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Table 3 shows the effects of complete alliance on the consumer surplus, profits and social 
welfare. Columns gand indicate the lower and upper bound of the demand intercept 
respectively, which guarantee the output and marginal revenue are positive before and after 
the complete alliance. 
- 
Columns &and ACSshow the change of consumer surplus at the lower and upper 
bound of a for the feasible range of 6 .  It is shown that for any given value of 6 ,  when 
market size is small, consumer surplus decreases due to the complete alliance. The gains 
to passengers from the alliance increase as the market size gets larger. 
Effect of “complete” alliance on the consumer surplus 
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Figure 5: The effects of complete alliance on consumer surplus 
As shown in Figure 5, where the lower, upper and critical values of a are drawn in the 
graph, consumer surplus decreases when market size is relatively small for given value of 
6 . For example, at B =0.05, the change of consumer surplus is negative for 
2.59494 < a < 2.68361 ; and it is positive for 2.68361 < a e 2.85714. As mentioned in 
proposition 5.3.b, passengers are better off in the connecting markets AK, BK etc. for the 
complete alliance, but worse off in other local markets AH, for example. Therefore the 
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change of total consumer surplus is negative when market size is small. As market size 
gets larger, the gains to passengers in the connecting markets are higher than the losses to 
the local passengers, so the total consumer surplus increases. Furthermore, the graph 
shows that when the value of 8 is large, the change of consumer surplus is positive for the 
full range of feasible a. It is reasonable since when the economies of traffic density is 
sufficiently high, marginal costs decrease faster from the increase of the traffic density as 
compared to that at lower value of 19 and for the alliance partner, they are willing to 
provide more connecting services. Therefore, the gains to connecting passengers are 
sufficiently high to compensate the losses to the local passengers. Therefore, the overall 
consumer surplus increases due to the complete alliance. 
Next consider the effects of complete alliance on the profits of the two airlines. In table 3, 
columnsc and shows that the changes of profits for the two airlines are both negative 
for the lower and upper bound of a at all the feasible value of6 .  Furthermore, the losses 
for the alliance partners increase as the market size gets larger. The detailed result is 
shown in Figure 6 .  
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The above graph shows that the overall profits for the two airlines decrease after the 
complete alliance. Furthermore, the two partners lose more, as the market size gets larger. 
While for the given value o f a  , the different values of B have little effects on the losses to 
the two partners. Such result seems a little unexpected, but it still deserves some 
consideration. The economies of traffic density have been empirically and theoretically 
shown to be evident in the airline industry, while for the economies of scope, the 
conclusion is not definite yet. In the case of complete alliance, the extent of the economies 
of scope is great enough since airline partners jointly provide services in the most 
extensive network. The decrease of the profits for the two partners implies that the 
negative effects with the expansive scope in airline network outweigh the positive effects 
with the increasing traffic density. 
Proposition 5.3.c: 
The overall profits for airlines decrease for the complete alliance and the losses to the 
alliance partners increase as market size gets larger. Therefore, the complete alliance 
makes the society worse off, even though passengers may benefit in certain condition. 
I 
I 
I 
6.CONCLUSION 
The paper examines the effects of two t.ypes of airline alliance on the airline’s output, 
profits and economic welfare on the basis of the two airlines’ hub and spoke networks. 
I 
Firstly, the comparison before and after the simple form of the bilateral agreement is made 
to investigate the effect of combining the two airlines’ separate hub and spoke networks. It 
is shown that by the agreement, the two airlines extend their service networks and increase 
the output in each market to exploit the economies of density. Passengers in both local and 
connecting markets are better off and the benefits are not only from the increased services, 
decreased airfare, but also from the more city pairs available, which are beyond the 
boundary of the individual airline network. 
Secondly, under the background of the simple bilateral agreement, the partial alliance in 
the market between the two hub cities makes passengers worse off in that market, it 
increases the welfare of passengers in all other city-pair markets served by the two airlines. 
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The reason for this result is straightforward. Before alliance, the two airlines compete in 
the market connecting tlie two hub cities. After they make the partial alliance, the market 
becomes a monopoly one. Therefore, the output in the market connecting the two hub 
cities falls. Given the economies of density and cost complementarities, this traffic 
reduction raises the marginal cost on the other affected markets of the two alliance 
partners. In order to compensate for the increase of the marginal cost, both airlines 
increase the output in other markets. Consequently, passengers in these markets benefit 
from the increase of service and the lower airfare. In this case, partial alliance generates 
positive externalities outside the market where it occurs. The result also shows that as the 
extent of the increasing return to traffic density increases, the critical value of the market 
size gets lower above which the consumer surplus in all the markets increases after the 
partial alliance. Since the high return to density stimulates the two airlines to increase the 
output in other markets, the gain to passengers in these markets is high enough to outweigh 
the loss to the passengers in the inter-hub city-pair market. As for the alliance partners, it 
is shown that the profits for the two airlines increase after the partial alliance. The increase 
can be explained by the exploitation of the economies of density. Furthermore, the gains 
to the two partner airlines get larger as the market size increases. 
Thirdly, for the complete airline alliance, which is under the background of the open sky 
bilateral agreement, only those passengers whose flights combine the two airline networks 
benefit from the increased services and decreased airfare. As for the two alliance partners, 
the total profits fall after the complete alliance and the losses to them increase as the 
market size gets larger. The economic welfare definitely decreases for the complete 
alliance. Such results come fiom a radical example, but it seems to support that some 
saturate extent of the alliance exists above which the negative effects with the alliance 
outweigh the positive ones. Therefore, for both airlines and passengers, they are worse off 
due to the alliance. 
These findings have several important implications for the air transport policy and the 
airline strategy. First of all, considering the fact that more and more airlines have taken the 
hub and spoke network, the bilateral agreement between governments can make airlines on 
the two sides better exploit the economies of traffic density. For passengers, they also 
benefit from the agreement. Second, as for the partial alliance, only those passengers 
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whose origin and destination points are the two hub cities are worse off. For passengers in 
other markets, the partial alliance benefits them. The two partner airlines also get more 
profits after the partial alliance. In general, the partial alliance increases the economic 
welfare, except under the situation when the market size is extremely small. 
Consequently, governments on both sides should be more supportive in allowing such 
partial alliance. Finally, the benefits with the strategic alliance to passengers and airline 
partners relate with the extent of the alliance. For the case of the complete alliance, most 
passengers and alliance partners are worse off due to the alliance. Therefore, for the 
alliance to be successful, the airlines must take into account the effects of economies of 
scope, economies of density and the market size. 
In this paper, several assumptions are made for the convenience of analysis, for example, 
the symmetrical assumption of network structure and the assumption of the same market 
demand. Further research needs more flexible assumptions. Taking the shift of the 
demand after alliance into account is necessary to analyze the effects of alliance more 
exactly. Finally, for the limitation of the data available, the study is restricted in the 
theoretical investigation. When sufficient data become available, some empirical work can 
be done to testify the specific results. 
I 
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